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FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1975
MERLIN G. BRINER*
INTRODUCTION
F EDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1975 is the third of an annual
series of articles to be published in the Winter Issue of the Akron LAW
REVIEW. The thrust of this article is not only to identify the new develop-
ments, but also to trace these concepts through their formative stages. The
area of concentration for this article includes cases decided through
September 30, 1975. Given the volatile nature of taxation, it is crucial for the
practitioner in this field to remain current with the changes which have
occurred during the tax year. The purpose of this article is to highlight
for the practitioner the key alterations which have transpired over the tax year.
A synopsis of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 precedes the TABLE OF
CONTENTS. The Act contains key amendments in the area of income tax,
which will affect individual and corporate taxpayers alike. Also of special
note are the significant and numerous developments which have occurred in
the area of deductions. A TABLE OF CASES, TABLE OF INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE SECTIONS and a TABLE OF RECENT REVENUE RULINGS can be- found
following the text of the article.
In an attempt to minimize the lead time between research and publi-
cation, this author has engaged the most able assistance of several members
of the AKRON LAW REVIEW. Without their substantial contributions and
complete dedication, this article would not have been possible. The author,
therefore, wishes to recognize and thank the following members of the AKRON
LAW REVIEW, for their efforts in researching, writing and compiling this
article: Kevin C. Krull, Frank B. Mazzone, Leonidas E. Plakas, Lawrence H.
Richards, and William C. Wilkinson. Special recognition is extended to
Timothy A. Shimko for his fine efforts.
[411]
*B.B.A., Wichita State University; J.D., University of Akron, School of Law; Associate
Professor of Law, University of Akron; formerly manager, Tax Department, The Timken Co.,
Canton, Ohio.
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SUMMARY OF THE TAX REDUCTION ACT OF 1975
On March 29, 1975, President Ford signed into law Pub. L. No. 94-12,
the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, which has been labeled as the largest
tax-cut measure in the history of the United States. It is anticipated that this
Act will result in net individual and corporate tax reductions approaching
$22.8 billion. Presented below is a brief synopsis intended to familarize the
reader with the key changes provided by the recent tax measure.
BASIC CORPORATION TAx
The Act changes the rate for corporate taxes to 20% on the first
$25,000 of taxable income, and to 22% on the next $25,000 of taxable
income. The rate for taxable income in excess of $50,000 remains at 48%.
This results in a savings of $7,000 for those corporations with taxable
income of $50,000 or more. For fiscal-year corporations the amount of the
savings must be computed on the basis of a proration of days in 1975.
The minimum accumulated earnings credit has been increased from
$50,000 to $150,000 for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1974.
INVESTMENT CREDIT
The Act changes the investment credit rate from 7% (4% rate for
utility property) to 10% for tangible personal property which is bought and
placed in service after January 21, 1975 and before January 1, 1977. If the
property is constructed by the taxpayer and completed and placed in service
after January 21, 1975, it qualifies for the investment credit even though not
completed and placed in service until January 1, 1977. However, if the prop-
erty is not placed in service until January 1, 1977, then only that portion of
the property constructed between January 21, 1975 and January 1, 1977
qualifies for the investment credit.
The Act increases the dollar limitation on used property qualifying for
the credit from $50,000 to $100,000 per year for taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1974 and before January 1, 1977.
An additional 1 % investment tax credit is allowed if the corporation
transfers employer securities into an Employee Stock Ownership Plan
(ESOP). In order to qualify, the securities must have a value of at least the
amount of the increase in the investment credit. This provision of the Act
applies to transfers between January 21, 1975 and January 1, 1977.
INDIVIDUAL TAx
The Act increases the low income allowance and the standard deduction
for the 1975 tax year. The minimum standard deduction (low income allow-
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ance) is $1,900 for married persons filing joint returns and surviving spouse,
$1,600 for single taxpayers, and $950 for married persons filing separate
returns. The standard deduction has been increased to 16% with a maximum
of $2,600 for married persons filing joint returns and surviving spouse, $2,300
for single taxpayers, and $1,300 for married taxpayers filing separate returns.
No tax return need be filed if gross income is less than $3,400 for a married
couple; $2,650 for a surviving spouse; $2,350 for a single taxpayer; and
$1,700 for a married taxpayer filing a separate return.
The taxpayer is permitted a credit of 5% or $2,000, whichever is the
lesser of the purchase price of a new home, condominium, or mobile home,
providing the home is the taxpayer's principal residence. The original use of
the home must commence with the taxpayer. Construction on the home must
have started before March 26, 1975, and the home must be purchased be-
tween March 13, 1975, and December 31, 1976. The seller of the home must
provide the buyer with a certification that the purchase price is the lowest at
which the residence was offered for sale after February 28, 1975. This certifi-
cate must then be attached to the buyer's income tax return. The credit is
limited to one residence per taxpayer.
The Act extends the replacement period on the sale of a taxpayer's prin-
cipal residence to 18 months for the purchase of a new home and 24 months
for the construction of a new home.
The child and dependent care deduction income limitation has been
increased from $18,000 to $35,000. Since the deduction is reduced by one
dollar for every two dollars of adjusted gross income over $35,000, a taxpayer
with an adjusted gross income of $44,600 is ineligible for this deduction.
Additionally, a credit of $30 is extended to each taxpayer for each
exemption-except old age and blindness--claimed for the taxpayer, his
spouse and his dependents. The personal exemption credit is available on 1975
calender year and 1975-76 fiscal year returns.
Winter, 1976]
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1.00 Income
1.01 Assignment of Income
It has long been recognized that a taxpayer may not reduce his income
tax burden by assigning income to others. Applying this principal, the Com-
missioner in S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,' assessed the Johnson Corporation with
a deficiency for not including in gross income the gain made from a disposi-
tion of a forward sales currency contract which the taxpayer had given to a
tax exempt organization as a charitable contribution.
In the summer of 1967, S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., a multinational cor-
poration, attempted to hedge against the possible devaluation of the British
pound. It made two £750,000 forward sales contracts with two New York
banks whereby the banks were obligated to pay Johnson $2,765 per pound,
to be delivered by Johnson within one year. The pound was in fact devalued
to $2.40 and Johnson was in a position to realize substantial profit. Instead
of taking this profit and increasing its tax liability, Johnson donated the
contracts to a charitable foundation. The foundation negotiated an agreement,
whereby it sold its contract rights to a third party; thus receiving the sizeable
profit that the taxpayer might have realized itself.
Finding that there was a "reasonable probability" that the profit could
be realized,' the Commissioner asserted that this was a classic assignment of
income situation. However, the Tax Court disagreed, pointing out that John-
son & Sons, Inc., had no right to the profit, until it was able to deliver the
British pounds. Even though the Johnson court recognized that this would
be relatively easy to accomplish, it declared that there was the possibility that
unexpected market fluctuations would wipe out the taxpayer's paper profit.
Additionally, the court gave weight to the fact that no negotiations were com-
menced and no agreement reached regarding closing out the corporation's
forward position until after the contracts had been given to the charitable
foundation. The result in Johnson seems appropriate when the donation of the
appreciated forward sales contracts is analogized to a charitable contribution of
appreciated stocks or bonds.' Although there is also a "reasonable probability"
that the profit will be realized with appreciated stock, it is basic that a chari-
table contribution of appreciated stock does not result in income to the
transferor. Indeed, the Johnson court recognized this analogy in striking down
the Commissioner's easy conversion argument.'
1 63 T. C. No. 74 (March 31, 1975).
21d.
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170 (b).
' 63 T. C. at 438.
Winter, 1976]
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1.02 Net Gift Tax Liability
Edna Bennett Hirst' is the most recent case which attempted to resolve
the issue of net gift tax liability. The petitioner owned a one-half interest
in three tracts of undeveloped land with an adjusted basis of $8,377.00
and an appraised value of $444,588.50 with the remaining one-half interest
in her husband's estate. Petitioner's liquid assets consisted of $25,000.00
in a savings account. The ownership of the land was a burden for
petitioner, since it did not produce any income and subjected her to liability
for the property taxes. Due to her limited liquid assets and for the benefit
of her son and his family, the petitioner in 1967 transferred three tracts of
land to her son and his family through inter-vivos gifts and a trust, upon the
condition that the recipients pay all resulting gift taxes. In 1968 her son and
his wife paid all gift taxes. In petitioner's 1968 tax return, she failed to include
the transfer of the property whereupon the Commissioner found a taxable
recognized gain of $38,546.28 derived from the benefit petitioner received
from her son's payment of the gift tax.
Whether a donor derives taxable income benefits when she makes a gift
of appreciated property to another, conditioned on the donee paying all
resulting gift taxes, is a question which has repeatedly caused considerable
confusion.
Section 2502(d) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code provides that the
burden of paying the gift tax is the donor's responsibility, but if the donee
agrees to pay the tax and absorbs the liability, the donor's obligation is
absolved.' Ordinarily the donor is viewed as having received a benefit which
may be taken into account when determining taxable income.'
The most common legal devices used to initiate and complete the trans-
fer of property for tax advantages are revocable trusts, irrevocable trusts,
testamentary trusts, and inter-vivos gifts. The structure of the vehicle imple-
mented and the true purpose for its creation and use in the transfer of the
property are essential in determining the validity of the donor's argument
that he received no taxable benefits.
The early development of case law in this area centered upon the use
of trusts. In the 1942 case of Estate of A. E. Staley, Sr.,8 the donor desired
to give to his five children $2,000,000.00 worth of stock, but lacked funds
to pay the resulting gift tax. In order to satisfy his objective of transferring
the stock, he required the trustee to pay him $150,000 from the trust income
63 T. C. No. 27 (Dec. 9, 1974).
Gd. at 315.
7 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
347 B.T.A. 260 (1942), afI'd, 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1943).
[Vol. 9: 3
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which equaled the amount of the gift tax. The court in rejecting the petition-
er's contention that the transfers were part-sale, part-gift, held that the
income from the trusts was taxable as income. The income was reserved for
the benefit of the donor; therefore, it was taxable to his income.
A later case, Estate of Craig R. Scheajfer,9 affirmed this view, adding
that where the gift tax was paid out of the income of the trust by the trustees,
the donor was found to have received a taxable income benefit. The Eighth
Circuit in affirming the decision stated: "What the trustee received as trust
income and applied to payment of the gift tax, the Scheaffers in reality
constructively received, and on that the petitioners must be taxed.""0
Estate of Annette S. Morgan" marked a shift in the Tax Court's position.
In this case, the petitioner in 1955 created irrevocable trusts in favor of
her issue consisting of 41,600 shares of Morgan Engineering Company stock
with an approximate value of $1,000,000.00 at time of transfer. Her son and
her attorney were co-trustees of the trusts. A clause in the trust agreement
stated in part, as follows:
... the stock is transferred subject to the trustee's obligation to pay all
such taxes. The trustees shall make all necessary arrangements for and
attend to the payment of all said taxes, and may raise funds for such
purposes by selling a portion of the transferred stock and/or by borrow-
ing, the decision to sell stock and/or borrow to be made in accordance
with the sole discretion of the trustees. 2
In 1956 the trustees arranged for a bank loan in the exact amount of the
gift tax, pledging the Morgan Stock as security. They subsequently paid the
loan with trust income in subsequent years. The respondent contended that
the trust incomes from the years 1957 and 1958 used to pay the loan
were taxable to the settlor. The Tax Court held that the petitioner received no
taxable benefits in 1957 and 1958 from the trust income stating: "There-
fore, since the decedent received no benefit from the fact that the trustees
borrowed to discharge her tax obligation and repaid the loan from trust
income, she cannot be held to have constructively received the income used to
repay the loan."'" From the record, no mention is made of charging the donor
with income in the earlier years, when on the alternative theory, the gift tax
liability was discharged."
937 T. C. 99 (1961), aff'd, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963).
10313 F.2d 738 at 743 (8th Cir. 1963).
x137 T. C. 981 (1962), aft'd, 316 F.2d 238 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963).
12 Id. at 982, alf'd, 316 F.2d 238 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963).
13 Id. at 985.
14 63 T. C. No. 27 (Dec. 9, 1974).
Winter, 19761
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In deciding Hirst, the court placed great significance on Turner v. Com-
missioner.5 The facts in Turner, as stipulated, were that the donor made nine
separate gifts of appreciated stock, three through inter-vivos gifts and six
through trusts. The gifts were subject to the condition that each individual
receiving a gift was to pay his share of any and all resulting gift taxes as
determined by donor's tax counsel. The Commissioner argued that the three
inter-vivos gifts were part-gift, part-sale transfers. The Court upheld the well-
established rule that "it is the substance rather than the form of the transfers
which must be the decisive factor.""' The substance test utilized in Turner was
directly applicable to the fact situation in Hirst. The intention of the Tax
Court in both Turner and Hirst was to impose the gift tax only upon the "net
gift" made by the donor, that is the gross amount of the property transferred,
less the value of the gift tax payable on the transfers.
With respect to the question of whether the trust transaction in Hirst
should be considered as part-gift, part-sale, Krause v. Commissioner" refused
to accept a transfer of securities through trusts as part-gift, part-sale. The
court, relying upon Turner as the controlling authority, found no capital gain
once the donor's gift tax obligation had been fulfilled.
The donor created three trusts for transfer of property conditioned upon
the trustees paying all resulting gift taxes. The court held that when the donor
has substantial dominion and control over the trust income, prior to the pay-
ment of the gift taxes, that income is taxable to the donor. However, once the
trustees had paid the gift taxes, the donor's liability as to taxable income
ceased to exist. For tax purposes the donor was viewed under Internal Reve-
nue Code Sections 671 and 677 as being the owner of the trust property until
his obligation to pay the gift tax was satisfied. 8 Therefore, only the income
from the trust property, which was earned before the gift tax was satisfied,
was chargeable to the donor's taxable income. The current holding conforms
with the Morgan court's determination as to when income tax liability has
ended.
The preceeding cases demonstrate substantial support for the decision
in Hirst favoring the taxpayer's position, but in Johnson v. Commisioner,19
the requirements by which the donor could escape tax consequences on net
gifts were tightened. In Johnson, the petitioner owned and used securities,
having a basis of $10,812.50 and a market value of $500,000.00, as collat-
15 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969), af'd per curiam, 49 T. C. 356 (1968).
Is 49 T. C. 356 at 363 (1968).
17 56 T. C. 1242 (1971).
18 Id. at 1245.
10495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974), af'd 59 T. C. 791 (1973).
,[Vol. 9:3
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eral to obtain a $200,000.00 thirty day note. Upon receiving the loan, the
petitioner established an irrevocable trust for his children, transferring his
ownership in the securities to the trust. The trustee assumed the loan obliga-
tion by substituting his note for the donor's note and placing the newly
transferred securities of the trust as collateral. The petitioner paid
$147,072.51 in gift tax, thereby netting $52,927.49 from the loan transaction.
The respondent, implementing the part-gift, part-sale rationale of Crane v.
Commissioner,"0 contended that petitioner had a long-term capital gain of the
amount of the loan ($200,000.00) less the basis of the transferred stock
($10,812.50). Petitioner argued that under Turner the $147,072.51 paid
gift tax should be deducted from the amount taxed as capital gain. But the
Tax Court in lohnson distinguished the Turner case, holding that:
The instant case is distinguishable from the Turner case both on the
facts and the issues presented. The transfers in the present case were
not conditioned on the payment of the gift tax liabilities by the recipi-
ents and no issue involving the payment of gift taxes is presented herein.
Nor was there any reservation or retention by the donor in the present
case, of any right or interest in the corpus or income of the trusts such
as was found by the Court in the Turner case. Nor, in our opinion,
are the loans in the present case to be equated with the gift tax liabilities
in the Turner case.2
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the Tax Court, applied
the substance test and concluded that whether the transaction is described as
"'part-sale and part-gift' or a 'net gift' has no importance."" Each taxpayer
received value upon transferring his encumbered stock into trust; therefore,
tax liability should have attached at the moment of transfer. In the court's
opinion there was "no basis whatsoever in the provisions of the Code for
taxpayers' assertion that a donee's discharge of a donor's gift tax liability does
not constitute the realization of income ...."I The court reasoned:
We find it immaterial whether the transaction is found to be "part-
sale and part-gift." This suggestive but artificial language should not
obscure the essence of the transaction in which the taxpayers engaged-
the transfer of highly appreciated stock to a trust for their children's
benefit, with the funds to pay their gift taxes raised out of the trans-
ferred property, plus additional cash. The effect of imposing a capital
gain tax at the time of the stock's transfer is to collect the tax at that time,
20331 U.S. 1 (1947).
2159 T. C. 791, at 812-13.
22 495 F.2d at 1083.
28 Id. at 1084.
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rather than to defer the tax until the trustees dispose of it through a
taxable event."
The Hirst court acknowledged that the Sixth Circuit in affirming John-
son Jr. had strongly criticized the Turner decision; nevertheless, the Sixth
Circuit had previously affirmed Turner and did not overrule that decision in
affirming Johnson Jr. The Hirst court also recognized the more "realistic"
approach suggested in Johnson Jr., but it refused to discard a position which
has been steadily developing through a number of cases over an extensive
period of time. In light of the previous pattern of decisions in this area, the
Hirst court refused to extend Johnson Jr. to Hirst without Turner first being
directly overruled by the Sixth Circuit.
In summary, the donor's tax liability as to appreciated transferred prop-
erty has not been clarified by the recent Tax Court and Sixth Circuit Court
decisions. The courts are, however, placing an increasing reliance upon the
substance test.
1.03 Determination - Gift or Income
Whether monies or "tokes" which were received by a craps dealer in
Las Vegas from patrons of the casinos where he worked are taxable as
income, under Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, or as gifts under
Section 102(a), was recently decided in 01k v. United States."5 In 01k,
petitioner was employed as a craps dealer in two gambling casinos. While on
duty, patrons occasionally gave "tokes" to the petitioner for good luck or for
other superstitious reasons. At the end of each shift all employees working
a table would equally divide the "tokes" among themselves under the policy
of the employer. The petitioner contended that the "tokes" were gifts under
Section 102(a) of the 1954 Code and were therefore excluded from his
income. The Commissioner characterized the "tokes" as tips and, as such, were
to be included taxable income.
The District Court decided the controversy in favor of the taxpayer hold-
ing the "tokes" to be gifts. The court based its decision upon the uniqueness
of the petitioner's position. The taxpayer does not furnish a personal service,
but merely carries out the duties of his employment. Contrast this to a taxicab
driver or waiter who performs personal services in order to obtain tips. 6
The taxicab driver or waiter can give special service to customers in order to
receive larger tips. However, if the petitioner demonstrated the slightest
inclination to give special service to a patron, he would be immediately
dismissed from his employment.
2 4 /d
.
25 388 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Nev. 1975).
26 Andrews v. United States, 295 F.2d 819 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 289 (1962).
[Vol. 9:3
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The court held that the determinative factor in determining a gift is the
intent with which the payment is made." Patrons gave "tokes" on sudden
inpulses of generosity in order to share their good luck with others, including
other patrons and spectators and not as compensation for services rendered.
There is no obligation or social compulsion for a patron to give anything to a
dealer (90% to 95% of gambling patrons give nothing to dealers).
The situation of the craps dealer is easily distinguishable from that of
taxicab drivers or waiters who receive tips as a result of the custom or moral
compulsion of their customers, even though the performed service may be less
than desirable. In the case of the taxicab driver or the waiter, tips are not
given out of a feeling of "affection, respect or admiration" but instead they
have become "expected" 2 8-a form of compensation for services rendered.
Since "tokes" received by a craps dealer are not tips, but gifts under the mean-
ing of Section 102(a), they are excluded from gross income.
1.04 Deferred Compensation
In Gale R. Richardson29 the petitioner, a doctor, entered into an agree-
ment in 1969 with the hospital in which he was employed. Each month the
hospital was to put $1,000 of earned income into a nonexempt trust for which
a local bank acted as trustee. The trust agreement contained several provi-
sions: First, the trust was to be held for the benefit of any person, corporation,
or trust designated by Dr. Richardson, and in absence of a designation, Dr.
Richardson would be the beneficiary of the trust upon his death, retirement,
or separation of service from the hospital; second, the trust required petitioner
to perform part-time services as may be required by the hospital during his life-
time and after termination of his employment. For such service, the doctor
would be paid at the same rate he was being paid when he left the employ-
ment of the hospital. He would also be reimbursed for expenses incurred in
performing the service. An amended trust agreement, dated April 2, 1970,
provided that if petitioner failed to render such service without good cause, he
would forfeit all rights under the trust agreement.
Dr. Richardson did not report any of the trust money for 1969 and 1970.
The Tax Court found that the petitioner received an economic benefit from the
hospital's payment of his compensation into the trust.3" The court therefore
concluded that the compensation was currently taxable unless Section 402(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code deferred tax consequences. Since Section
402(b) was amended by Section 321(b)(1) of the Tax Reform Act
27 Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
28 Andrews v. United States, 295 F.2d 819 (Ct. CI. 1961).
29 64 T. C. No. 63 (July 23, 1975).
30 See E. T. Sproull, 16 T. C. 244, 247-48 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (6th
Cir. 1952).
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of 1969,11 the tax consequences must be evaluated in light of two time periods,
i.e., prior to August 1, 1969 and after August 1, 1969.
For the time period prior to August 1, 1969, Section 402(b) provided
that contributions to an employee's trust were includable in an employee's gross
income "for the taxable year in which the contribution is made to the trust
in the case of an employee whose beneficial interest in such contribution is
nonforfeitable at the time'the contribution is made." The Regulations define
"nonforfeitable" as "no contingency under the plan which may cause the
employee to lose his rights in the contribution.""
After August 1, 1969, Section 402(b) provided that contributions to
an employee's nonexempt trust will be included in gross income of an
employee in compliance with Section 83(a), which states that such income
will be included in gross income when the income is "not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture."" Section 83(c) (1), by example, points out
that if a person's right to enjoyment of property is conditioned upon the future
performance of substantial services by any individual, such condition may
constitute a substantial risk of forfeiture. The Tax Court held that petitioner's
trust agreement failed to meet either version of Section 402(b); therefore, it
was not within the meaning of Section 83 (c) (1) of the Code. The court found
that the money paid into the trust was actually earned compensation otherwise
receivable by petitioner. Furthermore, he had not shown any reason for
subjecting the money to forfeiture. The trust deposits were paid out for past
and current services and not future services; they, therefore, represented
compensation. The provisions of the trust agreement also authorized 50
percent of the entrusted funds to be invested in an insurance contract
on the doctor's life and the other 50 percent to be invested in mutual
fund shares which were not subject to forfeiture. Therefore, their cost was
current income taxable to the petitioner.3"
The trust provision relating to optional transfers eliminated any risk
of forfeiture of the corpus, since a transfer to the petitioner could be
accomplished by two methods. First, the trustee could transfer by absolute
assignment to the doctor or, if petitioner were dead, to his beneficiary.
Second, the trustee could transfer, by absolute assignment of the corpus, to
another person or corporation who has employed the petitioner. Such
possibility of transfer would abolish the risk of forfeiture for failure to
perform post retirement services.
81Tax Reform Act of 1969, Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
3STreas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(a)(2)(i).
" Estate of James Max Harrison, 62 T. C. 524, 530-32 (1974).
3, Paul L. Frost, 52 T. C. 89, 95-96 (1969).
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In order to take advantage of Section 83(c)( 1 ), the court held that the
employee would have to be expected to perform substantial services in the
future. 5 The petitioner had not shown that the hospital had any need or
expected to have any need for such services. In fact, it was stipulated that the
hospital had not received advice and counsel services from retired physicians
during the years of 1969 and 1970 or at any previous time.
The use of a nonexempt trust to defer income will not be permitted unless
the taxpayer is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture of his interests in
the trust. The substance rather than the form of the transaction will be the
controlling factor in the determination of the tax liability.
1.05 Property Settlements
Under what circumstances a person realizes a taxable gain or loss on the
transfer of stock to his former wife, in compliance with an agreement
incorporated into a divorce decree, was decided in Worthy W. McKinney. 6
The petitioner in McKinney transferred personal property, cash, insurance
policies and appreciated stock to his wife pursuant to -a property settlement
accompanying a divorce decree. Petitioner failed to report on his tax return
a gain on the transfer of the appreciated stock. The Commissioner argued that
petitioner realized a long-term capital gain on the transfer of stock. Petitioner
contended that the transfer was voluntary and without consideration, and in
the alternative raised the issue that the Commissioner erroneously computed
the gain by failing to take into consideration the value of all the property
transferred by both parties, in accordance with the property settlement and
divorce decree.
The Tax Court held that the transfer of stock was a taxable event, but
that the Commissioner erred in taxing the gain on the shares of appreciated
stock, without taking into consideration all of the transfers and payments
made by the petitioner as indicated in the property settlement agreement and
divorce decree. The court, citing United States v. DavisY reasoned that peti-
tioner had taxable gain on the transfer of appreciated stock in exchange for
the release of his wife's marital rights. The court also ordered the petitioner
and the Service to agree on the net tax result of the marital transfers or move
for further action.
If losses are to be allowed to offset gains in a property settlement agreement,
35 64 T. C. at 350, where the court concluded:
Since there is no showing of any real likelihood that the doctor ever will be called upon
to perform services, we do not think petitioner has shown that his rights under the trust
are actually "conditioned upon the future performance of substantial services within the
meaning of Section 83(c)(1).
86 64 T. C. No. 25 (July 10, 1975).
37 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
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pursuant to a divorce decree, other problems become apparent. First, Section
267(b) of the Code disallows losses between members of a family.3 8 Since
the time of agreement is before the completion of the divorce the parties to
the agreement are still married. Secondly, Section 262 provides for the
disallowance of deductions for personal, living or family expenses. The
contract for the disposition of the stock would be the marital settlement
which is a personal transaction rather than a business or investment trans-
action. Therefore, one should not place strong reliance upon the results in
the instant case, since it is highly improbable that the Service will agree to
any loss offsets to the taxable gain on the transfer of appreciated property.
2.00 Exclusions from Income
2.01 Sick Pay
Section 105(d) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that employees
who are absent from work, due to sickness or personal injuries, may exclude,
from gross income, amounts received in lieu of wages, not to exceed $100
per week. To qualify for the exclusion the sick pay must be derived from an
accident or health insurance plan paid for by the employer or attributable to
contributions by him to plans not includable in the employee's gross income.
The Commissioner's traditional position that an employee's excludable sick
pay income ended when he reached the minimum retirement age 9 has been
changed by the final regulations of Treasury Decision 7325.0 This decision
permits an employee, forced to retire because of a disability, to exclude
amounts paid through a wage continuation plan until such time as he
reaches mandatory retirement age. The reversal by the Service is reflective
of the trend of court decisions in recent years which hold that the taxpayer
is entitled to the exclusion until he reached the mandatory age of retirement.4 1
Under Income Tax Regulation Section 1.105-6(a)(4) as set forth in
the Treasury decision, a disabled employee who retired voluntarily instead
of under disability provision (due to an apparent lack of a tax advantage in
the latter) can still qualify for the new exclusion retroactively by establishing
that he could have retired under a disability. This procedure also applies for
establishing an exclusion in the future. The employee may continue to claim
the allowable sick pay exclusion until he reaches his annuity starting date,
which is generally the mandatory retirement age. 2
3SINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 267(c)(4), defines family as follows: "The family of an
individual shall include only his brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half blood),
spouse, ancesters, and lineal descendants ......
3aSee Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1973, 7 AKRON L. REV. 188, 207 (1974).
40 T. D. 7352, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 19, at 7.
41 See Brooks v. United States, 473 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1973); Reardon v. United States, 32
Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 73-5199 (D.C. Colo. 1973); Jovick v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.
2d 73-5196 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Walsh v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 613 (E. D. N.Y. 1970).
42 T. I. R. 1363, 9 CCH 1976 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6527.
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To redesignate the pension, the disabled retiree must file IRS Form 5401
which will soon be issued. The form will require both the employer and
employee to detail information which will certify that the retiree is eligible
for the disability pension. Finally, to qualify for retroactive application, IRS
Form 5401 will have to be filed no later than April 15, 1977.
Revenue Procedure 73-1943 set forth the conditions whereby a taxpayer
was authorized to use his Form W-2 to substantiate his claim for a sick pay
exclusion from income, when the Form W-2 showed the excludable amount
of sick-pay separately. IRS audits found that this practice resulted in erron-
eous exclusions of income, as employers entered incorrect amounts in the
excludable sick pay section of Form W-2. Revenue Procedure 75-7"
eliminates a period of reliance on employer calculation of excludable sick
pay. The new procedure provides that the employer may list sick pay sepa-
rately on the W-2, but must still include that amount in total wages. In either
event, the taxpayer-employee must submit a statement with his return,
indicating his computation of the excludable amount, along with information
substantiating the exclusion.
2.02 Group Term Life Insurance
Section 79 of the Code permits an employee, in certain cases, to exclude
from gross income the cost of up to $50,000.00 for group-term life insurance
purchased by his employer. Revenue Ruling 75-9115 was issued to answer the
question of whether or not a group insurance policy, paid for by the employer,
which provides for employees in the form of level premium"6 five-year term
insurance, but does not provide any other benefits such as paid-up value,
cash surrender value, or an equivalent benefit, is excludable from income
under Section 79.
The Service took this opportunity to clarify Revenue Ruling 71-360,1
which states that a premium is not properly allocable to group life insurance
if it is a level premium. The Service now holds that if a level premium group
policy only provides life insurance protection, not exceeding a five-year
term, it is not viewed as a policy of permanent insurance, provided that the
individual employee's coverage under the policy ceases when the employee
no longer is included in the employer's group insurance plan.
43 1973-1 CuM. BULL. 470.
44 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 5, at 28.
45 Rev. Rul. 75-91, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 12, at 8.
46 Insurance which seeks to build up a reserve which will equal face value of policy at the endf
of insured's life. Helmer v. Equitable Reserve Ass'n., 214 Wis. 270, 272-73, 252 N.W. !28
729 (1934).
47 Rev. Rul. 71-360, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 87. -
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Since the employee receives no benefit other than general death bene-
fits, the premium is properly allocable to group-life insurance, as defined
under Section 1.79-1 (b) (1) (i) of the Income Tax Regulations, even though
it is a level premium group policy.
2.03 Foreign Income
Section 911 (a) of the Code disallows, as a deduction from gross income,
any deduction allocable to or chargeable against the amount excluded as
income earned abroad under that section. The Service has clarified the effect
of the section"8 as it pertains to sole proprietors and partners: (1) receiving
service fees in excess of the maximum exclusion, (2) receiving income from
services and capital in excess of the maximum exclusion, and (3) incurring
expenses in excess of income.
When service fees exceed the maximum exclusion, the amount of the
disallowed deduction will be the same proportion of all deductions as the
exclusion is to the total earned income.' 9 When the taxpayer is engaged
in a trade or business in which both personal services and capital are material
income producing factors, the taxpayer can claim as a reasonable allowance
for compensation of personal services no more than 30% of his share of
the net profits of the business. This figure sets the maximum limitation on the
amount of the gross income that can be considered as earned income. Once
the earned income exclusion has been determined, the disallowed deduc-
tion is in the same proportion of the total deduction as the exempt income
to the total income.5" If the expenses exceed the gross income (gross receipts
less cost of goods sold) then the 30% limitation on the amount to be treated
as personal service is not applicable since this limitation only applies in
situations where there are net profits. The reasonable allowance as compen-
sation for personal services rendered by the taxpayer will be the excess of
the expenses over the gross income. After the exclusion has been calculated,
the disallowed deduction is in the same proportion as the excluded income is
to the gross income.51
In Ivor Cornman,52 the petitioner was a self-employed biological re-
searcher living with his wife in Jamaica. During the taxable year 1970, the
petitioner from his research activities had no income but did have expenses
of $7,500, of which $7,000 was salary paid to his wife for secretarial and
lab technician services. The wife's salary was not taxable since it qualified
4 8 Rev. Rul. 75-86, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 11, at 13.
49 Id.
50 Id.
5 Id.
52 63 T. C. No. 63 (March 19, 1975).
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for the earned income abroad exclusion under Section 911. The taxpayer
took the $7,500 loss from his research business against his United States
source income on his 1970 return. The Service argued that since Section
911(a) disallows as a deduction from gross income any deduction allocable
to amounts excluded from gross income under that section, no matter how
small the income, it would not be logical to allow the deduction just because
the taxpayer earned no income. In other words, the expenses should not be
allocable to the income but to the "attempt" to earn income. The petitioner
argued that Section 911 (a) requires both the presence of excluded income
and deductions allocable to such excluded income; neither of which was
present here since the "earned income" excluded by the petitioner's wife in
1970 was in no way attributable to the petitioner. The court looked to the
legislative history of Section 911(a) and concluded that it was intended
only to cover the circumstances in which there was a double tax benefit of
both excluding income earned and then allowing expenses incurred in earning
that excluded income.53 Since there was no earned income to which the
expenses could be allocable, there was no possibility of a double tax benefit
and the court permitted the deductions.
However, as illustrated in Frieda Hempel,5" it is clear that if the
taxpayer had any earned income, none of his expenses would have been
deductible. There, the taxpayer, had "earned income" of $16.20 which
was excludable as foreign source income under Section 116(a) of the Revenue
Act of 1938. The court disallowed her expenses of $5,530 since they were
allocable to the excluded income. 5
3.00 Exemptions
4.00 Deductions
4.01 Moving Expenses
Section 217 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for a job
related moving expense subject to certain limits. However, when a person
employed by a domestic employer is transferred to a foreign country to
work for the same employer, a portion, if not all, of the deduction is lost."
This is due to the fact that the moving expense reimbursement is includable
in gross income and available for the earned income exclusion under Section
911. The moving expense, therefore, continues to remain deductible under
Section 217, except to the extent that such expense is allowable under the
earned income exclusion. The ratio between the earned income exclusion
53 Id. at 366.
54 6 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 47,183 (1947).
55 Id. at 47-669.
56 Rev. Rul. 75-84, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 11, at 8.
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and gross income is the same as that between the moving expense deduction
lost and the earned income exclusion."
If the employer later moves the taxpayer back to the United States,
still retaining his services, the taxpayer will be permitted the normal deduction
available under Section 217. However, if the employer moves the taxpayer
back to the United States without employing him, the taxpayer would not be
entitled to the moving expense deduction since he is not moving to a new
principal place of work. The reimbursement is attributable to the past
services performed in a foreign country and is eligible for the earned income
exclusion with the disallowed deduction calculated proportionately."
4.02 Sale or Exchange of Residence
In 1974 Section 1034(a) provided that when a taxpayer sold his princi-
pal residence and purchased another residence, within a period of one year
before to one year after the sale of the old principal residence" a gain was
realized only to the extent that the adjusted sales price of the old residence
exceeded the taxpayer's cost of the new residence. This section, however,
has taken on a more enlightened application with the recent decision of
Clapham v. Commissioner.60 The Tax Court in Clapham found that a tax
free home roll-over benefit was available three years after the petitioner
moved from his former principal residence.
In May 1966, the petitioner placed his principal residence for sale,
anticipating moving from San Francisco to Los Angeles due to a change in
his employment. In August 1966, the petitioner and his family moved to
Los Angeles where they rented a home, still attempting to sell their vacant
former residence. In Spring 1967, the taxpayer not having received an offer to
buy and being in financial difficulty accepted an offer to lease the home
with an option to buy. In Spring 1968, the lessee moved out without exercis-
ing his option to buy. The house remained vacant until the Fall of 1968 when
financial circumstances again dictated that another offer to rent be accepted.
The house was again vacant by December 1968 and remained so until June
1969 when it was sold for $32,000.00. Petitioner's basis was $26,453.00.
Meanwhile, in September 1968 the petitioner purchased a home in Los
Angeles for $31,500.00. Throughout the three-year period, the petitioner's
sole intention was to sell the former residence, but from August, 1966 until
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1974,.8 AKRON L. REV. 206, 226-27 (19,75);
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 extended the time- on Section 1034(a) from one year to
eighteen months. Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 207 (Feb. 18, 1975).
80 63 T. C. No. 46 (Jan. 30, 1975).
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the time of the actual sale, the petitioner had received no offers to purchase
the home.
Petitioner's claim for exclusion from gross income under Section 1034 (a)
was countered by the Commissioner's contention that the leaving of the old
residence with no intention to return amounted to abandoning it as a principal
residence. The Commissioner, therefore, concluded that when it was sold
in 1969 it no longer qualified as a principal residence. Both parties stipulated
that the sale of the old residence and the purchase of the substitute residence
was accomplished within a one-year period. The court held that each case
arising under Section 1034 must be decided on its particular facts and circum-
stances. The three-year period extending from ownership, vacancy, the rental
of the former residence for a temporary period, and time of sale, this court
went on to point out, was justified by the condition of the real estate market.
Furthermore, the leases were not permanent, but rather, were used as a
means to induce the purchase of the property.
The court discounted the abandonment argument of the Commissioner
by affirming the position previously adopted in John F. Bayley6 and Robert
W. Aagaard."2 In Aagaard, the taxpayer, while vacationing and with no
intention to return, rented his home briefly before he sold it. The court
held in favor of the taxpayer pointing out that it could not have been the
intent of Congress to disallow the exclusion if temporary renting of the
former residence occurred before its sale.63
The Tax Court determined that Congress clearly intended that a tax-
payer, under appropriate "facts and circumstances" could lease his property
for a temporary period and still retain the benefits provided under Section
1034.64 The court compared petitioner's plight to that of an involuntary con-
version where Congress found the need for relief to be "especially clear.""
In the instant case, under the facts and circumstances as presented, the lease
was temporary in the manner contemplated by the legislative history and the
subsequent regulations. For these reasons, the court held that petitioner was
entitled to the Section 1034 benefits.
Caution should be excerised in the application of the court's position
for there is strong indication that the Commissioner will appeal this decision.
61 35 T. C. 288 (1960).
62 56 T. C. 191 (1971).
63 63 T. C. at 282. The Tax Court referred to the following Congressional reports to support
its determination: H. R. REP. No. 586, 82d. Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1951); S. REP. No. 781
(Part 2), 82d. Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1951).
64 Id.
6
6
d.
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Under the Tax Reduction Act of 197566 Section 1034(a) now allows
nonrecognition of a gain realized on the sale of a taxpayers' principal resi-
dence if the taxpayer buys a new principal residence "within a period
beginning eighteen months before the date of sale and ending eighteen
months after such date ... ,"67 and the cost of purchasing the new residence
exceeds the adjusted sales price of the old residence.
Section 1034(g) makes a provision for the nonrecognition of a gain
on the sale of a principal residence owned by the taxpayer, his spouse or both
if they invest the proceeds from the sale of the old principal residence into
the new principal residence. However, no provision was made for the situation
in which a husband and wife, who owned two separate homes that each used
as his and her principal residence before they were married, sold both homes
and invested their individual proceeds in a new home in which they took title
jointly. Should they be required to recognize their respective gains on the
sale?
By way of Revenue Ruling 75-23811 the Internal Revenue Service has
ruled that if the gains on the sale of their respective homes are reinvested
into the new principal residence owned by both the husband and wife, there
will be no recognition of their respective gains in the current year. However,
if any portion of their respective gains are not reinvested in their new principal
residence, that portion of the gain not reinvested will be taxable in the
current year.
Finally, Treasury Information Release 136069 discusses the situation
where a taxpayer, in one transaction, attempts to take advantage of both the
Tax Reduction Act 1975 tax credit and the nonrecognition of gain under
Section 1033 or Section 1034 of the Code. If, for example, the taxpayer
sells his old principal residence for $30,000.00 having an adjusted basis of
$20,000.00 and immediately uses the proceeds to purchase a new principal
residence for $40,000.00, which satisfies the requirement of Section 1034,
and which also qualifies for the 5 % tax credit, the tax credit will be calculated
on an adjusted basis of $30,000.00. The adjusted basis of the new principal
residence is reduced by any gain from the sale of an old principal residence
when that gain is not recognized and a tax benefit is received under Section
1033 or Section 1034. Therefore, the $10,000 gain from the sale of the old
residence reduces the adjusted basis of the new principal residence by
$10,000.00 for purposes of determining the amount of the tax credit. It must
"6Act of March 29, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12 § 1, 89 Stat. 26.
61 Id. at § 207.
68 Rev. Rul. 75-238, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 25, at 14.
GOT. I. R. 1360, 6 P. H. 1975 FED. TAXEs 55,194.
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be remembered that the allowable tax credit does not in any way affect the
taxpayer's basis in the new principal residence.
4.03 Travel Expenses
Section 162(a) provides a deduction for all the ordinary and necessary
expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business, including travel expenses
such as meals and lodging. Interpreting this section, the Supreme Court has
applied the "sleep or rest" rule,"' also known as the "overnight" requirement.
Under the interpretation given this section by the Supreme Court, a taxpayer
must show that the nature of his employment is such that it is reasonable on
such trips for him to require and to obtain sleep or rest during his release
time in order to meet the demands of his job.
Two recent Revenue Rulings have also set forth guidelines concerning
meals and lodging for truck drivers"' and railroad employees 2 during layover
periods. The Service will now take into consideration all the circumstances
of the taxpayer's job, including any governmental regulations by which the
taxpayer is limited. If the employee can show that he meets the "overnight"
requirement by the nature of his duties and the duration of his trip, and that
his release period is of such a duration as to allow him to obtain substantial
sleep or rest, his expenses are deductible. Thus, if the layover is for a short
period of time, during which the taxpayer cannot obtain substantial sleep or
rest, his expenses for meals and related expenditures would not be deductible
under Section 162(a) of the Code."'
If a taxpayer is given allowances or reimbursements by his employer
and need not account to his employer for them, the taxpayer must include
these amounts in his gross income. If the employee must make an adequate
accounting to his employer of his expenses and if the total amount of the
allowance is equal to the expenses, the employee need not report the allowance
and reimbursements on his federal income tax return. If the allowances and
reimbursements exceed the expenditures, the employee must include the excess
on his return. When the expenses exceed the allowances and the employee
wishes to claim the excess as a deduction, they must meet the substantiation
requirements of Section 274 of the Code."
4.04 Mileage Allowance
Revenue Procedure 75-3"5 allows employees and self-employed individu-
70 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 445 (1967).
71 Rev. Rul. 75-168, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 19, at 12, superceding Rev. Rul. 63-239, 1963-2
CUM. BULL. 87.
72 Rev. Rul. 75-170, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 19, at 15.
7 Rev. Rul. 75-168, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 19, at 13.
7' Rev. Rul. 75-170, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 19, at 15.
75 Rev. Proc. 75-3, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 4, at 20, amplifying Rev. Proc. 74-23, 1974-2
CuM. BULL. 476.
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als who have fully depreciated their business vehicles, pickup trucks
and panel trucks, by the straight-line method to claim a. standard
mileage rate of 10 cents. If during the entire time that the taxpayer uses the
vehicle, he determines his operating costs under the optional method,"' then
that entire time period is considered the useful life of the vehicle. The vehicle
will not be deemed to have been fully depreciated until the end of that
useful life. However, if the taxpayer used the actual cost method for at least
one year during which time he used the vehicle for business purposes, then
the useful life of this vehicle would be that period which the taxpayer used
in calculating the straight-line depreciation for that year. It is immaterial
which method the taxpayer used in subsequent taxable years, since the
vehicle will be considered, fully depreciated when the period upon which
he has calculated the useful life ends. Thereafter he can take the standard
mileage rate of 10 cents per mile.
4.05 Commuting Expenses
The taxpayer in Alfred Patti" 
-was required by his employer to have
his automobile available at his place of employment at all times. On the
days that the taxpayer used his car at work, he was reimbursed by his em-
ployer at the rate of nine cents per mile for the total mileage driven that day,
including his mileage to and from work which totaled sixty miles round trip.
Since the taxpayer used his car only 63 days, he claimed a deduction for the
unreimbursed costs of commuting to and from work and parking fees, less
-the cost of takingthe train for the other 180 days. His claimed deduction
came to $1,053.14. The court conceded that the taxpayer met the "but for"
test of proving that he would not have used his car but for the fact that it
was required as a condition of his employment. However, the Tax Court
denied the deduction after considering that the taxpayer was reimbursed for
his commuting expenses on 63 days, stating: "Taking this into account, there
is no basis for determining that the allowable deduction at 10 cents per mile
for the use of the automobile exceeded the total reimbursement.""8
The Tax Court did not calculate the reimbursed commuting costs
which totaled $430.20 (9 cents per mile x 60 miles x 63 days). Therefore,
the taxpayer's claimed deduction exceeded his actual reimbursed commuting
expenses by $712.94. The actual significance of the case appears to be that
when appearing before the Tax Court, the taxpayer should have prepared all
76 See Rev. Proc. 74-23, 1974-2 CuM. BULL. 476.
77 44 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 75, 107 (April 21, 1975).
7
8 Id. at 515.
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the necessary calculations, rather than relying on the court itself to analyze
the figures.
The Internal Revenue Service has also allowed a deduction for commut-
ing expenses claimed by a policeman for driving to and from work.79 The
taxpayer, employed by New York City but living in another part of the state,
was required by New York City to be armed at all times when within the
City of New York. The only public transportation available to the taxpayer
from his home to work passed through the State of New Jersey which has a
law prohibiting anyone who is not a New Jersey Police Officer or other-
wise licensed by the State of New Jersey, from carrying a firearm while
traveling on public transportation. The taxpayer applied for a permit and
was rejected. The Service applied the "but for" test8" and concluded that
since the taxpayer would not have used his automobile but for the necessity
of carrying his firearm, the deduction was permissible.
4.06 Medical Expenses
Section 213(e) (1) (b) of the Code defines medical care as "amounts
paid ... for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care . .. ."
In Weary v. United States,"' the taxpayer claimed, as a medical expense
deduction for 1967, five cents per mile plus the pro rata portion of the
difference between the purchase price and sale price of a car bought and
sold in that year. The car was used to transport Mrs. Weary for purposes
of medical treatment, which was stipulated as a deductible purpose. Since
Revenue Procedure 64-15 at that time allowed a deduction of only five
cents per mile in. the absence of a substantiated actual amount, the Commis-
sioner disallowed the deduction. The taxpayer argued that the proportionate
amount of the difference between the purchase price and the sale price is a
proper deduction under Section 213 since it only required that there be an
"amount paid" for medical transportation. The government's position was
that depreciation is not an "amount paid" for purposes of Section 213.
This position appears inconsistent with the government's position in Commis-
sioner v. Idaho Power Co.12 in which the Supreme Court denied a claimed
deduction for depreciation on equipment during the time which the equip-
ment was used in constructing capital improvements. In that case the Supreme
Court agreed with the Commissioner that, since Section 263 requires that
"amounts paid out" for capital improvements be capitalized, the deprecia-
79 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 55, 148 (private determination letter dated 2-14-75 to Police
Officer William Addie).
80 Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 34.
91 510 F.2d 435 (10th Cir. 1975).
82 418 U.S. 1 (1974). See Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1974, 8 AKRON L. REV.
206, 241 (1975).
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tion on the equipment should be regarded as an "amount paid out" for
the improvement and therefore be capitalized.8" The Weary Court distin-
guished Idaho Power, as a question involving the timing of a depreciation
deduction, from the present case, which involves the question of the allowance
of a deduction."s On the basis of that distinction, the Tenth Circuit deter-
mined that depreciation is not an amount paid within the meaning of Section
213 and disallowed the deduction.85
In Revenue Ruling 75-230,86 the Service set forth guidelines for both
the recovery in a personal injury suit of medical expenses incurred and previ-
ously deducted, and the recovery in a personal injury suit for future medical
expenses. Under this ruling, if a taxpayer who suffers a personal injury
takes a medical deduction for his medical expenses, and then subsequently
enters into a settlement of the personal injury suit, the taxpayer must report
income to the extent of the previously allowed medical expense deductions or
the amount of the settlement, whichever is the lesser. However, if the personal
injury settlement contains an express allocation for previously paid medical
expenses, it will be presumed correct unless it is unreasonable.
If the taxpayer enters into a settlement which allocates a specific
amount for future medical expenses, the taxpayer will be denied future
medical expense deductions until his future medical expenses exceed the
amount specified. When this occurs, the deduction will be allowed only to
the extent his actual expenses exceed that amount specified in the settlement.
4.07 Casualty Losses
In the 1975 case of Robert M. Miller,7 the Tax Court re-affirmed its
position under Section 165(c) (3), which limits deductible losses to those
losses of property owned by the taxpayer claiming the loss. In Miller, peti-
tioner in exchange for his personal transportation agreed to deliver an auto
owned by Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., from Florida to New Orleans,
Louisiana. Under the arrangement, petitioner paid no rental fee and was not
covered by insurance. While en route, petitioner damaged the auto in the
amount of $2,434.64. Avis instituted suit against petitioner for the damages
to its automobile, which resulted in a settlement of $1,300.00. On petitioner's
tax return for that year, he claimed the $1,300.00 paid to Avis less the
$100.00 deductible, as a casualty loss. The Commissioner disallowed the
claim.
83418 U.S. at 16-17.
84 510 F.2d at 437.
85 Id.
86Rev. Rul. 75-230, 1975 INT. RE V. BULL. No. 25, at 6.
IT 44 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 75, 110 (April 21, 1975).
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Section 165(b) provides that the basis for determining the amount of
deduction for any loss shall be the adjusted basis provided in Section 1011.
A taxpayer has a basis only in property in which he has an ownership inter-
est. 8 In Draper v. Commissioner,9 the Tax Court held that the taxpayers
were not entitled to a deduction for a casuality loss caused by fire, even
though the destroyed property was owned by an adult daughter who was
still dependent on taxpayers for her support. The court in Draper reasoned:
Deductions are allowed to taxpayers only by virtue of legislative
grace and, to qualify, a taxpayer must prove he comes squarely within
the authorizing statute. Basic in the law is the requirement that to
support a deduction for loss of property, the claimant must have been
the owner of the property at the critical time."
The court in Miller re-affirmed the rule laid out in Draper and con-
cluded that since the petitioner did not own the auto, he had no basis from
which to calculate a loss. Therefore, the loss was not deductible.91
An alternative argument, offered by the petitioner was that to allow
a deduction for casualty loss only to the owner of the property, and not
to non-owners of property who made payments associated with owner's
property damages was unconstitutional. The Tax Court rejected that proposi-
tion, stating that a legislative classification will not be set aside if it is
rationally justified."
In determining the amount of loss deductible under Section 165 of the
Code, two methods of valuation are acceptable: (1) the decrease of the fair
market value as a result of the casualty; and, (2) the actual cost of repairs.9
In Anna Marie Hagerty,'" the court applied the decrease in fair market
value as a result of a casualty in order to determine the loss deduction. Peti-
tioners' residence had a fair market value of $78,000.00. A fire seriously
damaged the property resulting in an immediate after casualty fair market
value of $35,000.00 as determined by evidence accepted by the court.
Petitioners' fire insurance paid to repair the home at a cost of $33,504.57.
Although the repair work was saticfactory, it did not restore the residence
to its pre-fire condition or value. The petitioners' contended that since the
88 Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939).
89 15 T. C. 135 (1950).
90 Id.
9144 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 75, 110, at 522.
92 Id.
93Treas. Reg. § 1.65-7(a)(2).
94 44 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 74, 066 (March 4, 1975).
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fire insurance compensation did not fully restore the residence to its pre-fire
condition or value, that a casualty loss was sustained in the amount of the
difference between fair market value before and fair market value after the
casualty. The Tax Court agreed and held the loss was the difference between
the fair market value of the property before and after the fire ($78,000.00 -
$35,000.00), less the insurance compensation received ($33,504.57), and
the $100.00 deduction required by Section 165, thus netting the taxpayer
a deductible loss in the amount of $9,395.43.11
The implementation of the fair market value formula, as determined in
Hagerty, more accurately measures the actual loss suffered than the cost
of repairs formula. This is particularly true when repairs do not restore the
property to pre-loss condition.
4.08 Prepaid Feed Expenses
To determine the deductibility of a farmer's prepaid feed expense, the
Service published a three-part prepaid feed test.9" The validity of this ruling
was questioned in Cattle Feeders Tax Committee v. Schultz,"' where the
taxpayer sought to enjoin the Service from enforcement of the ruling. The
trial court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, but, on appeal was reversed by the
Tenth Circuit.
The court of appeals determined that the action to enjoin the enforce-
ment of the ruling was banned by the Anti-Injunction Act,98 and that
no special circumstances existed which would prevent the application of the
Act.99
The Service has now republished the 1973 Ruling without changeioo
To properly deduct prepaid feed bills, a cash-basis farmer must be able to
show that:
(1) the expenditure is for the purchase of feed rather than a deposit;
(2) the prepayment is made for a business purpose and not for tax
avoidance; and,
(3) the deduction will not result in a material distortion of income.
To meet the requirements in section (1) above, the taxpayer must
show that the expenditure was made pursuant to a binding commitment for
95 Id. at 354.
96 Rev. Rul. 73-550, 1973-2 CUM. BULL. 108.
97 34 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 74-5948 (10th Cir. 1974), rev'g 33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 74-428
(W. D. Okla. 1973). See Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1974, 8 AKRON L. REV.
206, 236 (1975), for a discussion of the district court's opinion in this case.
9 8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7421(a).
s9 34 Am. Fed. Tax. R. 2d 74-5948.
100 Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 17, at 15.
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a specific quantity at a specific price, and that the taxpayer cannot, under a
contract provision or by way of business custom, obtain a refund or a repur-
chase. The ruling lists factors that are indicative of a deposit rather than a
payment: the lack of specific quantity terms; the right by the taxpayer to a
refund of any unapplied credit at the end of the contract; the right by the
taxpayer to substitute other goods or products of the supplier for the feed;
and, the seller's treatment of the expenditure as a deposit.
To meet the second part of the test, the taxpayer must show that the
prepayment was made for a business purpose and not merely for tax avoid-
ance. The Service states that business purposes include establishing a guaran-
teed feed supply source, obtaining preferential treatment in anticipation of
A feed shortage,- and establishing a maximum price.
The third part of the test is that the expenditure cannot result in a
material distortion of the taxpayer's income. Section 446(b) of the Code
is analogous to this third requirement, and provides that when the taxpayer's
method of accounting does not clearly reflect income, the computation of
the taxpayer's income will be made under the method which the Commis-
sioner believes more accurately reflects the taxpayer's income. Since the
Service has had the option of applying Section 446(b) in the past, its inclu-
sion as a separate part of the prepaid feed expense test, is probably an indica-
tion by the Service that it intends to use this Section more in the future than
it has in the past. Some of the factors listed by the Service to be considered
in determining whether the taxpayer has met this part of the test are: the
customary business practice of the taxpayer in conducting his livestock
operations; the amount of this year's expenditure in relation to past years'
expenditures; the time of the year in which the expenditure was made; and,
the materiality of the expenditure in relation to the taxpayer's income for the
year.
4.09 Premature Deposit Withdrawal Penalties
Interest on a time savings account which is forfeited as a penalty for
early withdrawal is included in gross income, but may be deducted in arriving
at adjusted gross income.1"' Revenue Ruling 75-20o2 describes the procedure
to be used for making the above-the-line deduction. The taxpayer must file
entry on Form 1040, the amount of the interest forfeiture between lines 38
and 39, indicating "forfeited interest penalty" to the left of the entry, and
including the entered amount in the total for line 43 (total adjustments to
income). The financial institution with which the taxpayer has dealt is to
101 Act of October 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-483, § 6, 88 Stat. 1457, amending INr. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 62.
102 1975 INT. REV. BUtLL. No. 3, at 5.
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furnish information on the amount deductible, pursuant to guidelines found
in Revenue Ruling 75-21 103 established for such calculation.
4.10 Entertainment Expenses
In 1962, Congress enacted Section 274 to the Internal Revenue Code
in order to curb extensive entertainment expense deductions. Prior to this
time, the courts relied on the Cohan rule,' which allowed unsubstantiated
entertainment expenses by accepting approximations of the taxpayer's
expenses. Section 274(a) (1) (B) denies any deduction unless the taxpayer
shows: (1) that the facility was "used primarily for the futherance of the
taxpayer's trade or business"; and, (2) that the particular expenses were
"directly related to the active conduct of such trade or business." Under
Section 274(d) the taxpayer has the added burden of substantiating the
expenses claimed and the business relationship to those expenses.'
In Handelman v. Commissioner," the taxpayer claimed an entertain-
ment expense deduction for his 46-foot off-shore sailing sloop on which
he allegedly entertained clients and potential clients in connection with his
law practice. Since the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits attor-
neys from advertising, the taxpayer argued that he maintained his sailboat
to "sell himself" to wealthy individuals. It is interesting to note that from
his practice of law, the taxpayer reported a loss in 1963 of $18,930, a gain
in 1964 of $2,024, and a gain in 1965 of $6,183.
The court of appeals placed considerable emphasis on the fact that
most of the guests in the taxpayer's sloop were not clients but persons whom
the taxpayer hoped would become clients. It also noted that the taxpayer
avoided conducting actual business on the sloop for fear of encroaching
on the glamorous atmosphere he wished to create. The court concluded that
the boat was used primarily to establish good will and not for a specific
business purpose as required by the statute. Even if the taxpayer could show
a specific business purpose, he failed to maintain adequate records estab-
lishing "the time and place of each use of the boat, the business purpose
pertaining thereto or the business relationship to the taxpayer of the persons
using the boat."' 7 Thus, the deduction would have been disallowed under
Section 274(d) even if a specific business purpose could have been shown.
4.11 Unreasonable Compensation
The question of what is a "reasonable allowance for personal services"
103 1975 TNT. REV. BULL. No. 3, at 39.
104 Cohan v. Comm'r., 39 F.2d 540 (2nd Cir. 1930).
105 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5.
108 509 F.2d 1067 (2nd Cir. 1975).
10 ld. at 1075.
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under Section 162(a)( 1 ) has been frequently litigated especially in the area
of closely held corporations."°8 In Albert VanLuit Co., Inc.,'09 the corpora-
tion established a compensation plan providing for a base salary plus 30
percent of the profits as a salary for the 50% shareholder-president. The
plan was followed for twenty years and in 1969 the formula resulted in a
total annual salary of over $195,000. The Service contended that the salary
was unreasonable by producing evidence of compensation paid to presidents
of certain companies in the wallpaper industry. The Tax Court held that
the salary was reasonable since: (1) it was the product of an arm's-length
bargain between the president and an independent majority of the board;
(2) the plan was in effect before any services were rendered by president;
(3) the corporation's phenomenal success was due entirely to the president's
efforts; (4) the president was an acknowledged genius in the wallpaper indus-
try; and, (5) the compensation was reasonable under all the circumstances."'
In a related area the Fifth Circuit, in Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v. United
States,"' decided the question of whether a corporation may deduct fees
paid to its stockholder-directors for their personal guarantees on loans to
the corporation. The taxpayer was a closely-held corporation with almost
all of its outstanding stock owned by its thirteen directors. Eleven of the
directors held equal amounts of stock while the other two directors, a father
and his son, each owned one-half the number of shares owned by the other
eleven shareholders. As commonly is the case in a closely-held corporation,
the directors were asked to guarantee loans to the corporation by its bank.
Each guaranteed an amount equal to his proportionate ownership of the
stock. The guarantees were routinely made by the directors, without compen-
sation, until July of 1970 when the directors voted to pay each shareholder-
guarantor an annual fee, equal to three percent of the amount guaranteed
by the shareholder.
The court of appeals noted that until 1972, the taxpayer had never
paid a dividend, even though it had more than ample retained earnings.
Every year the directors had discussed the possibility of declaring a dividend,
since many directors desired a more substantial return on their investment.
The board, however, always voted against it. For these fees to qualify as
ordinary and necessary business expenses under Section 162(a), the court
concluded that "they must be appropriate, helpful, and of a common or
frequent occurrence in the type of business carried on by the taxpayer. "112
108 See Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1974, 8 AKRON L. P1v. 206, 237 (1975).
109 43 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 75, 056 (March 13, 1975).
O Id. at 320.
"' 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 75-5078 (5th Cir. 1975).
112 Id. at 75-5080.
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The test employed by the court of appeals to determine whether the fees
were "ordinary and necessary" was whether a hard-headed businessman
under the circumstances, would have incurred the expenses."'' The court
held that in the absence of evidence demonstrating that it was customary
for businesses, similar to petitioner's, the court could not properly find
"that the guaranty was an ordinary and necessary business expense because
it could not be sufficiently informed as to the economic realities of the
transaction."'14
In its opinion in the present case, the court sought to distinguish the
case of A. A. & E. B. Jones Co.'15 In the Jones case, the Tax Court allowed
a corporation's deduction of guarantor's fees paid to two shareholders as
an ordinary and necessary business expense. In Jones, however, the court
found that the guarantees could have been obtained elsewhere and that the
fees were reasonable in comparison to the amounts normally charged.
Tulia presented no evidence to show that the fees were customary or reason-
able in amount. Thus, the Fifth Circuit appears to have based its decision
upon the failure of the taxpayer to substantiate the "reasonableness" of the
fees rather than on the invalidity of such a deduction.
4.12 Interest Expense
In Israelson v. United States,16 the taxpayer invested a portion of the
substantial profit he made in 1965 from a real estate venture in tax-exempt
bonds. By January 1, 1967 the taxpayer owned tax-exempt bonds totaling
$360,000. During the years 1964-67, the taxpayer and another individual
entered into a joint venture, which purchased real estate and financed the
acquisitions with purchase money mortgages. The taxpayer also acquired
a loan previous to 1965, which was satisfied in July of 1965, but shortly
thereafter he borrowed again. The balance due on the loan totaled $230,000
during most of 1966 and between $136,000 and $384,000 in 1967 with
an average monthly balance of $254,000. None of the proceeds of the loan
were used to purchase the tax-exempt bonds; nor was the collateral securing
the loan ever tax-exempt bonds. The Service disallowed the interest on the
loan and purchase money mortgages in 1967 under Section 265, which
provides that no deduction shall be allowed for interest "incurred or
continued to purchase or carry obligations . . . the interest of which is
wholly exempt . . . ." The Service argued that the interest paid on the bank
loan and purchase money mortgages, although not interest on indebtedness
1
sId. at 75-5081.
114 Id. at 75-5082.
1s 29 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 60, 284 (1960).
116 33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 74-451 (D. Md. 1973).
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incurred to purchase the tax-exempt bonds, was interest on indebtedness
incurred or continued to carry the tax-exempt bonds. The district court
found a sufficiently direct relationship between the debt and the carrying
of the tax-exempt bonds by the taxpayer's overall investment plan to justify
the disallowance of the interest deduction on the taxpayer's loan. However,
the court allowed the interest deduction on the purchase money mortgages
since it found other considerations, such as business reasons and the desires
of the fellow venturers as to how the purchases should be financed, to justify
the conclusion that the purchase money mortgages were not used to enable the
taxpayer to continue carrying the tax-exempt bonds.
The taxpayers received even more of a setback before the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Levitt v. United States."17 The
taxpayers, husband and wife, borrowed substantial sums from their bank
to purchase United States Treasury Bonds at a discount. The bonds were
to be redeemed at par by their estates for the purposes of paying federal
estate taxes. Although the wife owned tax-exempt municipal bonds, her
loans from the bank were used only to finance her Treasury bond purchases.
The Treasury bonds were the only collateral held by the bank as security
for the loans. In addition to the husband's loans for Treasury bonds, he
secured loans to purchase the insurance policies on his life, carried by his
employer. Purchases of land, other real estate investments and business
ventures were also financed through loans. The husband deposited with
the bank tax-exempt bonds, Treasury bonds, and life insurance policies as
collateral for his loans.
The court of appeals relied on Israelson for the basic principles to be
applied in the immediate case:
The following principles are well established. Section 265 (2) does
not become operative merely because the taxpayer incurred or continued
indebtedness at the same time that he held tax-exempt securities.
Rather, the Commissioner must establish a sufficiently direct relation-
ship between the debt and the carrying of the tax-exempt bonds. The
touchstone for decision is the purpose of the taxpayer in incurring
or continuing the indebtedness.'18
In deciding whether the interest on the loans which were acquired
to finance the purchase of Treasury bonds was deductible, the court of
appeals stated that, although the borrowing may have been advantageous
for federal estate tax purposes, this did not necessarily show that the
LIT 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 75-5117 (8th Cir. 1975).
128 Id. at 75-5119, quoting 33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 74-451 (D. Md. 1973).
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taxpayers' purchases and holdings of the tax-exempt securities were
unrelated. In the opinion of the court, "the absence of any adequate business
justification for the loans compels the conclusion that the taxpayer borrowed
money in order to return his or her tax-exempts.""' 9 Hence the interest on
the loans which were secured to continue carrying the tax-exempt bonds,
was nondeductible.
The trial court was also of the opinion that the loans, used to finance
the husband's purchase of insurance policies, land, and business ventures,
had no direct relationship to the carrying of the tax-exempts and, therefore,
the interest was properly deductible. However, the court of appeals, relying
on the fact that the borrowings, underlying the husband's investments
were demand notes or notes with a maturity of less than a year, found
the crucial point to be that, with each renewal of the loans, the husband
was, in reality, maintaining the collateral to partially support his borrowings.
Therefore, the court denied the claimed deduction. 120
The Eighth Circuit did not address itself to the question of whether
business motives should be considered in determining the husband's method
of financing his investments. The court's mechanical test of deciding
whether tax-exempts are used as security oversimplifies the problem.
Although the court quoted with apparent approval from Israelson, the two
cases cannot be reconciled. It is this writer's opinion that the business
motive test as set forth in Israelson is the better approach.
4.13 Contingent Liability Trust Fund
Generally, no deduction is permitted for additions to contingency
reserves or accrued contingent liabilities. 2 ' However, in Crescent Wharf
& Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner,2 the Ninth Circuit allowed the
self-insuring taxpayer to deduct $266,000 of uncontested Workman's
Compensation liabilities which it had accrued for 1966. Relying on the
language in Section 461 (a) of the Code122 and its accompanying regula-
tions, " ' the court initially determined that since the taxpayer had acquiesced
"l9 ld. at 75-5120.
220 d at 75-5122.
121 American Auto Ass'n. v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); United States v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 366 U.S. 380 (1961).
12236 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 75-5246 (9th Cir. 1975).
122 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 461(a), reads: 'The amount of any deduction or credit allowed
by this subtitle should be taken for the taxable year under the method of accounting used
in computing taxable income."
124 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2), states:
Under an accrual method of accounting, an expense is deductible for the taxable year in
which all the events have occurred which determine the fact of the liability and the
amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy ... [The fact that the exact
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to liability for the claims in question, all events had occurred which were
necessary to fix the taxpayer's liability. The court also found that the
amount of the claims could be determined with reasonable accuracy and
remanded the case to the Tax Court to permit the taxpayer to establish
the reasonableness of his accruals.
Section 461(f) allows an accrual-basis company to take a current
deduction, if the company transfers money or property beyond its control
to pay future liabilities being currently litigated. However, there has been
a dispute as to the validity of Treasury Regulation Section 1.461-2(c) (1),
which states that a transfer in order to be considered valid under Section
461 (f) (2), must be made
• . . (i) to the person who is asserting the liability, (ii) to an escrowee
or trustee pursuant to a written agreement (among the escrowee or
trustee, the taxpayer, and the person who is asserting the liability)
that the money or other property be delivered in accordance with the
settlement of the contest .... "'
The controversy is whether the claimant-beneficiary must sign the
trust agreement, as a prerequisite for the taking of a current deduction for
the transfer of funds to a trust, established for the purpose of satisfying an
asserted liability which is still in litigation. The question was answered in
Poirier & McLane Corp.,12 where the Tax Court held that in order for the
deduction to be held valid the claimant-beneficiary did not have to sign
the trust agreement.
The case involved a construction company that contracted to do work
for the New York City Transit Authority and New York State. The construc-
tion company as part of the agreement held both the New York City Transit
Authority and New York State harmless for any damages arising from their
construction work. While performing the contract, damage occurred to
property located near the construction sites, occasioning suits for trespass
and negligence totaling $14,781,150, against the petitioner. The petitioner
set up a trust fund, in the amount of $1,100,000, to pay the obligations
expected to occur from the current litigation. The trust fund was in the
control of a trustee and the petitioner had no control over the funds. The
construction company took a tax deduction pursuant to Section 461 (f),
for the year in which the funds were transferred.
amount of the liability which has been incurred cannot be determined will not prevent
the accrual within the taxable year of such part thereof as can be computed with
reasonable accuracy.
125 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1).
126 63 T. C. No. 55 (March 10, 1975).
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The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the petitioner's deduction
claiming that: (1) the company was not in compliance with Section
461(a), 111 and (2) since the funds were not placed "beyond the control"
of petitioner and the beneficiary did not sign the trust agreement, the
petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 461(f), as amplified
by Treasury Regulation 1.461-2(c) (1).12
The Tax Court ruled that the deduction was taken in the proper year
since the purpose of Section 461 (f) was to allow the deduction in the year
the money was transferred to the trust account rather than in some later
year when the case was settled. 2 ' The purpose of permitting the deduction
in the year the money is transferred into trust was to match the receipts
and disbursements in the year in which they occurred.'
The second contention of the IRS was also overruled by the court.
The court found that the petitioner had no right to revoke the trust but he
was to receive the remainder after the disposition of the claim. The
petitioner could not have received or controlled the trust until all the claims
were paid. Therefore, the petitioner made "a genuine transfer of funds
beyond its control . . . " within the meaning of Section 461(f) (2), as
interpreted by Treasury Regulation Section 1.461-2 (c)( 1 ).131
The court also ruled that the claimant-beneficiary did not have to sign
the trust agreement in order for the deduction to be held valid. However,
this did not require the Regulation to be declared invalid. "Properly
interpreted, the Regulation simply does not require the signatures of the
claimant-beneficiaries in this case.' ' 2
The court, in reaching its conclusion relied primarily on the legislative
history'33 of Section 461 (f), which does not suggest that the person asserting
the claim must have signed the trust agreement. The court also referred to
the case of In re Prudence Co.,34 which held that: "The failure to notify
the cestui que trust of the creation of the special interest in his favor
127 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 461(a): 'The amount of any deduction or credit allowed by
this subtitle shall be taken for the taxable year which is the proper taxable year under the
method of accounting used in computing taxable income."
128 63 T. C. at 318.
129 Id. at 318-19, relying on S. REP. No. 830 (Part 2), 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted
in 1964-1 (Part 2) CUM. BULL. 604-05, 745-48.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 320.
132 Id.
133S. REP. No. 830 (Part 2), 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964-1 (Part 2)
CuM. BULL. 604-05, 745-48.
134 24 F. Supp. 666 (E. D. N.Y. 1938).
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does not prevent the creation of a trust. '13 5 Furthermore, the rights of the
clamiant-beneficiaries in the trust agreement would be exactly the same
whether or not they signed the instrument. The deduction was, therefore,
held to be valid.
However, in dissenting, Justice Hall stated that a literal interpretation
of the statute requires the claimant-beneficiaries to sign the trust agreement.
If the claimant-beneficiaries do not sign the trust, the petitioner would be
able to set up a "secret trust" which would give the petitioner a tax deduction
without giving the claimant-beneficiaries knowledge of the trust arrangement.
Justice Hall further stated that this arrangement served no business purpose
and that it was not the intent of the statute to allow such an arrangement.136
However, this arrangement still does not affect the claimant-beneficiaries'
rights under the trust. If they received a judgment in their favor, the petitioner
would probably disclose the trust rather than have a lien put on its property.
If the petitioner did not disclose the trust it would be revealed upon examina-
tion of its assets,' and the claimant-beneficiaries would be able to make
their claims.
Clearly, there is no significant purpose to require the signature
of the claimant-beneficiaries. The decision in this case will allow taxpayers
to continue to take a deduction for the trust arrangement without having
the claimant-beneficiaries sign the trust agreement. This is significant, since
knowledge of the trust would clearly be a signal to the claimant-beneficiary
that the settlor was admitting liability.
4.14 Ministerial Fees
Can a sole proprietor deduct fees paid to a minister for conducting
prayer meetings, rendering personal and business advice to the proprietor
and his employees, and performing various business-related tasks? In Lionel
F. Trebilcock,"5 the petitioner was sole proprietor of a company engaged in
the brokerage of wood products. He employed five people: his father,
his brother, a secretary, a traveling salesman, and a minister. The minister
conducted prayer meetings at which he tried to raise the level of spiritual
awareness of the participants, advised the taxpayer and his employees
concerning both their business and personal problems, and performed various
business-related tasks. To assist the taxpayer with his business problems, the
minister would turn to God in prayer and then propose an answer resulting
135 Id. at 668.
186 63 T. C. at 322-23.
131 N. Y. Civ. PRc. LAw § 5223 (McKinney 1963).
138 64 T. C. No. 80 (August 7, 1975).
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from that prayer. The solutions the minister offered came through prayer,
from God, and were not based on his knowledge of the petitioner's business.
The Tax Court denied the deduction for the prayer meetings, since the
benefits were personal in nature and, therefore, nondeductible under Section
262. The advice rendered by the minister concerning the personal problems
of the petitioner and his employees was found to be nondeductible for the
same reason. Nor did the court permit a deduction for the business advice
rendered the petitioner and his employees, since it did not meet the require-
ments of Section 162(a) that it be in the "ordinary" course of business. In
reaching its position on this point, the court concluded: "Petitioner has
offered no proof that his payments to Wardrop for solutions to business
problems, considering the method Wardrop used, 'were ordinary' in his
type of business.
However, the court did allow the deduction for the various business-
related tasks and errands the minister performed for the taxpayer's company.
4.15 Office Furnishings
In Leroy W. Gillis, ° petitioner's employer moved to a new office
building, and each office was supplied with new furniture except for the
petitioner's. This was due, in part, to a personality conflict between the
petitioner and the person selected by his employer to decorate the new
offices. The petitioner, a district sales manager for an insurance company,
thinking it important to protect his image and maintain his status with
respect to prospective clients, others he frequently saw in his office, and
desiring not to cause any conflict between his supervisor and the decorator,
purchased new furniture for his office at his own expense. The petitioner
never sought or received reimbursement from his employer.
The court concluded that the petitioner's desire "not to upset the apple
cart" and to protect his image as a successful district sales manager was
sufficient reason to justify his expenditures. The court considered them
"appropriate and helpful" and allowed the petitioner's depreciation expense."'
The petitioner also maintained an office in his home located fifteen
minutes from his employer's office. His home office was used on weekday
evenings to reid new rules and regulations affecting insurance companies,
to prepare weekly bulletins for his agents, and to maintain a small supply of
forms for agents to pick up when they exhausted their own supply. The
Commissioner maintained that since his employer's office was completely
139 Id. at 473.
14042 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 423 (1973).
141 Id. at 427
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adequate and located nearby, the petitioner's deduction for home office
expenses should be disallowed. In its opinion, however, the Tax Court stated:
Neither the absence of an employer requirement that a home office
be maintained nor the mere existance of duplicate facilities in and of
itself demands the disallowance of a deduction of home office expenses.
Rather, the test is whether, like any other business expense, the mainten-
ance of an office in the home is appropriate and helpful under the
circumstances or simply serves the personal convenience of the
taxpayer.' 2
After consideration of the distance from the petitioner's home to his
office, the hazards of working downtown at night, the nature of the work
performed at home, and the fact that the office was maintained as a
separate room for business use, the court concluded that the petitioner's
home office was appropriate and helpful in performing his employment.
4.16 Rental Property Expenses
The Service has clarified its position on the deductibility of expenses
associated with rental property when property is leased by the taxpayer
to the taxpayer's relative at less than fair market value.' The expenses
are not deductible under Section 162 or 212 since these sections require
a profit motive. Under Revenue Ruling 75-14, property is held for the produc-
tion of rents only when the primary purpose in holding the property is to
produce rental income in excess of the expenses attributable to the property.
Therefore, these expenses are governed by Section 183 which is concerned
with activities "not engaged in for profit." Under this section, the expenses
are deductible from adjusted gross income when computing taxable income.
Therefore, these are deductible only if the taxpayer itemizes his deductions.
The interest and taxes resulting from the rental property are deductible
in full since these are allowable under Sections 163 and 164. The operating
expenses are deductible only to the extent that the gross income from the
rental house exceeds interest and taxes. Finally, depreciation is deductible,
only to the extent that the gross income from the rental exceeds the interest,
taxes, and operating expenses.
4.17 Improvement and Preservation of Existing Income
In Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States,"' the Tenth Circuit
decided that certain expenditures in the areas of computer costs, credit
checks, and promotional activities incurred by the taxpayer in starting up
142 Id. at 425.
143 Rev. Rul. 75-14, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 2, at 7.
14434 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 74-6166 (10th Cir. 1974), aff'g 32 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 73-6175.
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its Master Charge credit system were deductible as business expenses under
Section 162. The government contended that the expenses were pre-operation
costs for entry into a new business, therefore failing to meet the requirement
of Section 162, that they be incurred in carrying on a trade or a business.
The Court rejected this argument stating that credit cards merely enabled
the bank to carry on an old business (financing consumer transactions) in
a new way. Since the expenses were for the preservation and improvement of
existing income, they were ordinary under Section 162.
In James 0. Gould,' 5 the taxpayer was the sole shareholder of a
corporation, which he organized to perform residential plumbing services.
He was also a 25 ,percent shareholder, director, and full-time employee of a
second corporation formed to handle industrial plumbing services. His
position with the industrial concern was that of a purchasing agent, thus
permitting him to come into direct contact with manufacturers who supplied
plumbing materials. His wholly owned residential corporation experienced
financial difficulties and eventually one of its creditors garnisheed its bank
account and accounts receivable. Since some of the creditors with whom the
taxpayer dealt, while working for the industrial concern, were also creditors
of his residential corporation, the other directors of the industrial corporation
became apprehensive about the possible impact of the residential corporation's
situation. The taxpayer believed that he would have to settle the affairs of
his wholly owned residential corporation or his employment with the
industrial corporation would be terminated. The taxpayer and four of the
residential corporation's creditors reached a compromise in which the
taxpayer agreed to pay them approximately 75 percent of the face value
of his corporation's obligations even though he was not personally liable.
The taxpayer claimed a business deduction under Section 162, which permits
as a deduction "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." The Commis-
sioner disallowed the deduction claiming that it constituted a contribution to
capital. The Tax Court, however, allowed the deduction under Section 162,
since the taxpayer's employment with the industrial corporation constituted
a business. The court found that the evidence clearly showed that the
taxpayer's motive was to preserve his employment with the industrial
corporation. The payments were not made to revitalize or enhance his
investment in his own corporation or to retain his personal reputation.
Furthermore, he believed his job with the industrial corporation to be in
jeopardy. The court said the taxpayer was required only to prove that his
1,5 64 T. C. No. 11 (May 1, 1975).
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motive for making the payment was to protect his job with the industrial
corporation and the taxpayer met that burden.' 6
4.18 Home Office Expense
Utilizing the "ordinary and necessary expenses" provision of Section
162(a) of the Code, executives and employees have been successful in recent
years in obtaining deductions for those expenses incurred in maintaining
offices in their homes.' The Tax Court and Second Circuit have allowed
the deduction under Section 162(a) if the home office expenditure was
"appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's business. 14 s In Stephen A.
Bodzin, " I the taxpayer, an attorney in the Washington office of the Internal
Revenue Service, used his den in the evenings and on weekends for reading
and writing proposed ruling letters, published rulings, requests, for technical
advice and opinions. The den was also used by the taxpayer for various
non-business purposes.
The taxpayer claimed a deduction for $100 of the $2,100 annual rent paid
for his apartment. The taxpayer was not required, requested, expected, or
encouraged to work in the evenings or on weekends. Even though the taxpayer
could have used his office in the Internal Revenue Building which was
always open and not a long distance from his home, he preferred his den
since it was more convenient and pleasant than remaining at or returning
to his office. The Tax Court allowed the deduction finding that it made no
difference that the taxpayer was not required to maintain a home office but
did so only because he wanted to do a good job and liked his work. The
court found the expenses were "appropriate and helpful" in the conduct
of his business and were therefore "necessary" under Section 162(a).
Four judges dissented viewing the claimed deduction as a personal
expense and not a business expense.
The Fourth Circuit reversed... relying on Section 262 of the Code,
which provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter,
no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
Quoting from the Supreme Court in Idaho Power,"' the court of appeals
found that Section 161 provides that deductions specified in Part VI of the
Code are subject to the exceptions in Part IX. Since Section 162 is in
146 Id. at 64-75.
147 See generally Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1973, 7 AKRON L. REV. 188,
209 (1974).
14
8 Newi v. Comm'r., 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970), affg 38 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 735 (1969).
149 60 T. C. 820 (1973).
150 Bodzin v. Comrn'r., 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975).
51 Cornm'r. v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
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Part VI and Section 262 is in Part IX, Section 262 takes precedence over
Section 162.152 The Fourth Circuit noted that the Treasury Regulations
under Section 262 specify that "a taxpayer who rents a property for residential
purposes but incidentally conducts business there (his place of business
being elsewhere) shall not deduct any part of the rent."' 3 Therefore, the
court concluded that the taxpayer did not use his apartment as his place of
business and therefore disallowed the deduction.
4.19 Legal Fee Splitting
In Jimmie T. Jermigan,"' the petitioner expended $75,000 in legal
fees in connection with her divorce proceedings. Of that amount, $2,000
was incurred in the securing of the divorce, $23,000 was incurred in connec-
tion with the property settlement, and the remaining $50,000 was allocated to
the production and collection of alimony payments taxable to her under
Section 71. By a mutual agreement, that was incorporated in the final
divorce decree, the husband agreed to pay $25,000 of the legal fees which
he would not deduct on his tax return, and the petitioner agreed to pay the
remaining $50,000 "for that part of their professional services which pertains
to her alimony arrangements."' 55 The petitioner then deducted $50,000 from
her tax returns under the provisions of Section 212(1). The Commissioner
maintained that the fee splitting agreement between the parties should be
disregarded to the extent that it designated which payments were to be
applied to the various portions of the fee. He argued that since two-thirds
of the petitioner's total legal fees were incurred in the production and
collection of income, only two-thirds of the actual amount expended by the
petitioner should be permitted as a deduction under Section 212.
The Tax Court relied on Marion R. Hesse"5 6 in which the wife entered
into two agreements with her attorney. One agreement was to pay him 10
percent of the value of any assets she received in the divorce settlement, and
the other was for his fee in the divorce proceedings. In the divorce settlement,
the husband agreed to pay the wife's legal fees for the divorce proceedings.
The court in Hesse held that the fee paid by the wife for the divorce
settlement was deductible by her under Section 212.
The Commissioner sought to distinguish the Hesse case from the
present case on the ground that in the present case there was only one
152 509 F.2d at 601.
153 Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3).
15 44 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 75, 132 (May 7, 1975).
155  d. at 75-602.
15 660 T. C. 685 (1973).
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contract. The court termed this a "distinction without substance" and
allowed the petitioner's claimed deduction.
The court concluded that the agreement between the petitioner and
her husband, who were adverse parties, was "the best evidence of what
portion of the total legal fees paid by the petitioner was incurred in
connection with the production of alimony."' 57
4.20 Employment Agency Fees
The Internal Revenue Service has reconsidered its position on whether
employment agency fees are deductible." 8 For years the Service's position,
one with which the Tax Court has not agreed, 9 has been that the deducti-
bility of the fee was contingent upon the success of the agency in securing
new employment. The Service has now acquiesced and will allow the
deduction of agency fees regardless of whether the agency secures new
employment. 6 ° There are some limitations. If the taxpayer is entering a
new trade or business, the fees are not deductible even if employment is
secured. However, if the individual is unemployed for a short period of time
and obtains employment in the same trade or business he previously
performed, the fee becomes deductible. In other words, the fee is not
deductible where there has been a "substantial lack of continuity" between
the past employment and the seeking of new employment or where the
individual is obtaining employment for the first time.' 6 '
4.21 Acquisition of New Business
In Johan Domenie,"'6 the taxpayer resigned from his job in order to
devote full time to the search of a new business. He placed advertisements
in two journals and received a reply from a broker in Florida. The broker
introduced the taxpayer to a businessman who was interested in divesting
himself of his interests in one of his corporations. The taxpayer made
several trips to the corporation's office, had an accounting firm make an
audit of the corporation's books, contracted with a law firm to represent
him in the acquisition, filed the articles of incorporation and bylaws,
signed signature cards at the bank with which he expected to open the
corporation's account and took an active part in managing the business, and
familiarized himself with all aspects of the business. Shortly before the
157 44 P-H TAx CT. MEM. at 75-604, 75 605.
158 Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 15, at 7. David J. Primuth, 54 T. C. 374
(1970).
159 See generally Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1973, 7 AKRON L. REv. 188,
220 (1974).
160 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 15, at 6.
161 Id. at 8.
262 44 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 75, 094 (Apr. 7, 1975).
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closing date, the taxpayer discovered that the seller of the corporation was
encountering financial difficulties in another of his corporations. Since the
other corporation was a customer of the corporation that the taxpayer was
about to acquire and owed the corporation money, the taxpayer became
worried. Further investigation discovered that certain misrepresentations
had been made to the taxpayer and some irregularities appeared in the
corporation's books. The taxpayer went to Florida, discussed these problems
with the broker, and decided to terminate the transaction. He claimed a
deduction for all the expenses incurred in the proposed acquisition under
Section 162(a)(2), 212(1), and 165(c)(2). Section 162(a)(2) allows
as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in a trade
or business including travel expenses while away from home.
The Tax Court reasoned that the expenses were incurred in searching
for and investigating a new business and that the taxpayer at that time was
not engaged in any business thereby failing to qualify for a deduction under
that section. 6 ' The court also disallowed the deductions under Section 212(1),
which permits as a deduction all the necessary and ordinary expenses incurred
for the production and collection of income. Since the purchase was never
consumated, the taxpayer had no existing interest in any income producing
asset and could not, therefore, rely on that section.
The taxpayer alternatively argued that the expenses were deductible
under Section 165(c) (2), providing for "losses incurred in any transaction
entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade or business."
Conceding that the taxpayer had the requisite profit motive, the government
argued that the proceedings had not reached the "transaction" stage. The
court disagreed with the Service's position, finding the losses were not
expenses incurred in the search for a suitable business, but occurred after
the taxpayer thought he had found a business and was preparing to consumate
the purchase.' The court allowed the deduction under Section 165(c) (2),
for all except those incurred in placing the advertisements in the journals
and the trip to Florida when the proposed acquisition was terminated.
4.22 Charitable Deductions
In Haverly v. Commissioner,6' the Seventh Circuit reversed a district
court decision which permitted the taxpayer to take a deduction for a
donation of unsolicited sample books to a school library. Haverly gave the
books, which had a fair market value of $400.00, to the school library
and claimed a $400.00 charitable deduction on his income tax return. The
2631d. at 75-465.
1641d.
165 35 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 75-1082 (7th Cir. March 20, 1975).
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school was free to utilize the books in any manner it chose. The taxpayer
did not include the books' value as income to which the Commissioner took
exception, citing, Section 61(a) of the Code which states that gross income
"means all income from whatever source derived." The court of appeals
held that although the books were unsolicited, once the taxpayer exercises
"complete dominion" over the textbooks he has an "accession to wealth".
The possession of the textbooks and their donation to the library and use
as a charitable deduction are evidence that an income was "clearly realized"
by the taxpayer. Therefore, "when a tax deduction is taken for the donation
of unsolicited samples the value of the samples received must be included
in the taxpayer's gross income. '
The court's decision is consistent with a recent Revenue Ruling' which
determined that when a newspaper's book reviewer donated to charitable
organizations unsolicited books he received from publishers, the value of
the deduction must be included in his gross income.
5.00 Tax Credit
5.01 New Housing Credit
Under the Tax Reduction Act of 1975,15 a taxpayer who purchases
a newly constructed home in 1975 will be eligible for a tax credit of five
percent 6 of the purchase price of the home up to a maximum of $2,000'o
and $1,000 in the case of married taxpayers filing separate returns.'
To be eligible for the tax credit, the taxpayer must meet the following
requirements:
(1) The residence purchased must be new' 2 and be used as the
taxpayer's principal residence."'
(2) The construction of the residence must have begun before
March 26, 1975."'"
166 id. at 75-1084.
167 Rev. Rul., 70-498, 1970-2 CUM. BuLL. 6.
166 Act of June 30, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-45, § 401, 89 Stat. 236, amending Act of March
29, 1975, 94-12 § 208, 89 Stat. 26.
169 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 44(a).
1701d. § 44(b)(1).
171 Id. § 44(b)(3).
7
2 Id. § 44(e)(1). See T. I. R. 1360, 6 P. H. 1975 FED. TAXES 55, 194: "The residence must
be new. A renovated building does not qualify as new for this purpose, regardless of the
extent of the renovation."
1
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 44(e)(1)(A). See Section 44(c)(1) of the Code, which
provides that the meaning of the term "new principal residence" for the purposes of Section
44 will be interpreted within the meaning of Section 1034.
1741d. § 44(e)(1)(A). See T. I. R. 1360, 6 P. H. 1975 FED. TA Xs 55, 194. Construction
is considered to commence when the actual physical work has occurred at the building site, i.e.,
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(3) The residence must be... acquired and occupied by the taxpayers
after March 12, 1975 and before January 1, 1977.11
(4) The taxpayer must have entered into a binding contract for the
purchase of the home before January 1, 1976. This does not apply
to a taxpayer who is building his own residence."'
(5) If the taxpayer is building his own residence only that portion
of the home constructed after March 12, 1975 will be eligible
for the tax credit."'
(6) The taxpayer must attach to his return "... written certification
(which may be in any form) signed by the seller of such
residence . . .""' stating that the construction of the home began
before March 26, 19751 and that ". . . the purchase price . . .
is the lowest price at which the residence was offered for sale
after February 28, 1975. '""° The certification requirement does
not apply to a taxpayer who is building his own home.
The Internal Revenue Service has warned that any seller who falsely
certifies that a home was sold at its lowest price will be liable for both civil
and criminal penalties."' However, the tax credit will not be denied to the
buyer because of the seller's false certification, providing that the taxpayer
otherwise qualifies for the tax credit.'82
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 limits the tax credit to only one
residence of the taxpayer,8 ' and will not allow the credit for residences
purchased from certain persons who are related to the taxpayer.'84
In addition to these qualifying prerequisites, the taxpayer will have his
excavation. "Construction of a mobile home or a factory-built house is considered to com-
mence when construction of important parts . . . is commenced." Id. at 54,973.
175 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 44(e)(1)(B).
176Id. § 44(e)(1)(C).
'7' id. § 44(e) (2). For example if a taxpayer builds a home that has a total cost of $30,000
and a portion of the home costing $10,000 was constructed before March 13, 1975 only
$20,000 will be considered eligible for the tax credit.
178 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 44(e)(4).
179 1d. § 44(e)(4)(A).
280 Act of June 30, 1975, Pub. L. No. 95-45 § 401, 89 Stat. 243, amending INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 44(c) (4) (B).
181 Act of March 29, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 208, 89 Stat. 26, as amended, Act of June
30, 1975, Pub. L. No. 95-45, § 401, 89 Stat. 243.
182 T. I. R. 1360, 6 P. H. 1975 FED. TAXEs $ 55, 194.
183 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 44(b)(2).
l' Id. § 44(c)(3) (A). Such related persons "include only [the taxpayers] spouse, ancestors
and lineal descendants .... " However, certain related corporations, partnerships and trusts
under Section 267 and 707(b) are also considered related for the purposes of this section.
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tax credit recaptured if he sells his new residence within three years of the
date of purchase.185 However, there will be no recapture if the taxpayer:
(1) buys a new principal residence;18
(2) dies within the three year period and his residence is sold;1.
(3) disposes his residence due to its destruction; 188
(4) disposes his residence "pursuant to a settlement in a divorce or
legal separation proceeding where the other spouse retains the
residence as principal resident";" 9 or,
(5) disposes his residence pursuant to any other type of involuntary
conversion within the three year period. 9
6.00 Depreciation
6.01 Contracts of Professional Athletes
Section 167(a) of the Code provides the taxpayer a reasonable
allowance in the form of a depreciation deduction for the exhaustion, wear
and tear of property used in his trade or business. An intangible asset is a
proper subject for depreciation, provided such asset has a finite useful life
which may be estimated with reasonable accuracy.'
Depreciating the contracts of professional athletes has been a source
of controversy since the mid-1930's 9 2 Although the position of the Internal
Revenue Service on the subject has fluctuated since that time,9 3 it is now
firmly established that even a one-year player contract is depreciable in view
of the option clause included in the standard player contract.' This clause
restrains a player from playing for any team other than the one with which
he has dealt one year after expiration of the original contract.
The taxpayer in Laird v. United States95 was a minority stockholder in
185 Id. § 44(d)(1).
186 Id. § 44(d) (2). If a taxpayer sells his residence which qualified for a tax credit within
three years of the date of purchase, but buys a new home within eighteen months or in the
case of self construction within two years, and the proceeds from the sale are reinvested in
the new residence, there will be no recapture of the tax credit.
187Id. § 44(d)(3)(A).
1881d. § 44(d)(3)(B).
189 Id. § 44(d)(3)(C).
190 1d. § 44(d)(3)(B).
191 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3.
192 E.g., Helvering v. Kansas City Am. Ass'n. Baseball Co., 75 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1935);
Comm'r. v. Chicago Nat'l. League Ball Club, 74 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1935); Comm'r. v.
Pittsburgh Athletic Co., 72 F.2d 883 (3rd Cir. 1934).
s Compare I. T. 2932, XIV-2 CUM. BULL. 61 (1935), with I. T. 2993, XV-2 CuM. BULL. 146
(1936); I. T. 4078, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 39; [and] Rev. Rul. 54-441, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 101.
194 Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 CuM. BULL. 104; Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 127.
195 35 AM. FED. TAX R. 2d 75-899 (N. D. Ga. 1975).
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The Five Smiths, Inc., which had elected to be taxed as a Sub-chapter S
Corporation. Five Smiths purchased, from the National Football League and
its member teams, certain assets,196 in order to operate the NFL franchise in
Atlanta, Georgia. For tax purposes, the entire purchase price of the
franchise (less franchise fee and deferred interest) was allocated by Five
Smiths to the forty-two veteran player contracts acquired in the transaction,
in spite of the fact that other substantial assets were also obtained. 9 ' The
rationale proposed by the taxpayer for such allocation was the purchase
agreement with the NFL, which specifically designated that amount as
consideration for the veterans' contracts.
Although not disputing the useful life of five and one-quarter years
assigned to these player contracts, an Internal Revenue Service audit resulted
in disallowance of depreciation deductions taken against the contracts due to
the inflated basis used in calculating the deductions. Whether the basis used
by the taxpayer was accurate, or was assigned to achieve favorable tax
consequences was a difficult matter for the court to resolve, as the taxpayer
was able to produce expert testimony which supported his valuation.'98
In spite of this evidence, however, the district court concluded that
the true substance of this transaction had been disguised by the formal
agreement, and that the economic realities of the taxable event could be
discovered only by disregarding the forms employed by the parties. 99
While agreeing with the taxpayer's valuation of the membership fee
and deferred interest, the court found that the value of Atlanta's right to a
pro rata share of television revenues, generated by a contract previously
negotiated by the NFL, was substantial, even though it had been ignored
by the taxpayer in computing the depreciable basis of the player contracts.
Subtraction of these items from the total purchase price ($8,500,000.02)
yielded a value ($3,445,871.02) which was allocated by the court between
the player contracts and the franchise."' 0
Even though the court refused to accept the taxpayer's valuation of the
veteran player contracts, it rejected the government's contention that it was
impossible to establish a reasonably accurate basis for the depreciation of
196 Among the assets acquired by The Five Smiths, Inc. were: Forty-two veteran player con-
tracts, the right to participate in the college selection draft, the right to share equally with
other member teams in television revenue, the exclusive right to exhibit NFL football within
75 miles of Atlanta, and the benefit of league rules and administration. Id. at 75-900.
197 Of the $8,500,000.02 purchase price, Five Smiths allocated $50,000 to the franchise fee,
$727,086 to deferred interest payments, and $7,722,914.02 to the veteran player contracts.
198 35 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 75-905.
19 9 Id. at 75-907, 75-908.
200 Id. at 75-905.
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the contracts. Rather, the court assigned a value to the player contracts
purchased from the NFL, concluding that $3,035,000.00 was "the most
reasonable result possible under the circumstances fully realizing that such
a result may necessarily be imprecise." '' Treasury Regulation 1.167(a)-5
authorizes this type of procedure in determining the basis for depreciation
where depreciable and non-depreciable assets are acquired for a lump sum.
Laird asserted alternatively, that Five Smiths' right to share in the
television revenues was a depreciable intangible asset. The contract with the
NFL provided that the Atlanta franchise would participate equally with
other league members in proceeds from network television contracts
negotiated by the NFL "during the time the Atlanta Club continues as a
member of the league." The court was on solid ground in denying this
claim. Although the television contract in force at the time Atlanta entered
the league spanned a definite four-year term, the franchise was entitled to
share in more than this contract alone. Atlanta's right to participate in
television revenue as long as the team remained in the NFL entitled it to
share in network contracts which would be negotiated in the future. The
useful life of this right to future television revenue was, therefore, indefinite,
i.e., not subject to measurement with reasonable accuracy.'
Similar treatment was afforded state liquor licenses in Nachman v.
Commissioner.' Although the holder of a one-year license had no legal
right to renewal, the Fifth Circuit held that the useful life of the license was
not subject to accurate measurement in view of established local practice
which made renewal nearly automatic. Likewise, depreciable status for
intangible assets has been denied in cases dealing with land leases,' 0"
Federal Communications Commission television station operating licenses,
'2 0 5
and local television network affiliation contracts.0 In each case the useful
life of the intangible asset was deemed indefinite in spite of the finite
duration of the formal agreement, due to a past history of frequent renewals.
6.02 Race Horses
In accordance with Jockey Club rules, a race horse ages one year every
2 11 d. at 75-910. The value attributed to the player contracts by the district court was provided
by Norbert Hecker, the first coach of the Atlanta Falcons, as an expert witness. The court
determined that the figure representd the fair market value of the contracts and that its
determination was substantiated by "persuasive evidence."
202 d. at 75-908.
203 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951).
20 Shutler v. United States, 470 F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1972).
205 KWTX Broadcasting Co. v. Comm'r., 272 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1959).
20SComm'r. v. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 350 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
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January 1. In Hardin v. Commissioner'" petitioner attempted to apply the
Jockey Club rule for depreciation purposes. Taxpayer acquired a race horse
twenty-seven days prior to the end of the calendar year. In filing his return,
petitioner depreciated the horse for one full year, claiming that the horse
aged one year under the Jockey Club rule. The court disallowed the deduction
for one year holding that the petitioner was permitted to depreciate the horse
only for the actual period of ownership, in this case 1/12 of a year. The
court based its rationale on general depreciation principles, which only
entitle the taxpayer to depreciate the actual wear and tear on the asset
during his period of ownership.
6.03 Economic Useful Life
Regulation 1.167(a)-3 provides that if an intangible asset has been
shown, by experience, to have a limited useful life, the length of which can
be estimated with reasonable accuracy, that asset may be depreciated.
However, if an asset has an unlimited useful life or its useful life cannot be
reasonably ascertained, no depreciation is allowed. In Computing & Software,
Inc.,2"' the court was asked to decide if purchased credit information files
had an ascertainable useful life, thereby qualifying them for depreciation.
The petitioner purchased the credit information files from three
companies. The purchase price was prorated among goodwill, furniture,
fixtures, credit files, and other assets. The petitioner's claim for depreciation
on the files was disallowed by the Service on the thoery that the files were
self-regenerative. The Service argued that when a person's name had been
entered in the files, that name remained in the files, so long as customers'
inquiries, which added new information about that individual, were received.
The petitioner argued that customers place great reliance on the age of
the information, since an applicant who may have been a poor risk in the past
may be a good risk today and, conversely, a good risk in the past may be
a poor risk today. A person's ability to obtain credit is affected by employment
and salary changes, credit performance, judgments, liens, bankruptcies, and
other factors all of which must be updated regularly. Since its customers
desire only current information, the information contained in the files will
become worthless within the ascertainable future.
In rejecting the position taken by the IRS, the Tax Court noted that
the petitioner regularly purged stale information from its files. Furthermore,
the court found that 98 percent of the information contained in the files
would be purged within six years. For these reasons, the court permitted
207 35 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 75-460 (4th Cir. 1974).
208 64 T. C. No. 20 (May 15, 1975).
[Vol. 9:3
50
Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss3/2
FEDERAL INCOME TAx DEVELOPMENTS: 1975
the petitioner to depreciate their files on a straight-line basis, over the
six-year period.
7.00 Capital Gains and Losses
7.01 Net Operating Losses
Section 269 (a) (2) of the 1954 Code disallows net operating losses
as an offset against later acquired income, where the corporate taxpayer's
basis in the income producing property is that of its transferor, and the
taxpayer made the acquisition for the principal purpose of avoiding income
tax.
In O'Mealia Reserach and Development, Inc., °9 the petitioner success-
fully avoided the constraints of Section 269. In this case O'Mealia Research
and Development, Inc., a subsidiary of O'Mealia Outdoor Advertising
Corporation, was experiencing extreme financial difficulties and had incurred
large net operating losses. The parent and subsidiary corporations agreed
upon a plan by which the parent purchased for $150,000 income-producing
property which was directly transferred to the subsidiary. The subsidiary
immediately assumed all liabilities of the parent in the transaction. In a
second transaction, the parent bought 40 percent of the stock of two unrelated
corporations and transferred it to the subsidiary, who again assumed all
liabilities related to the transaction. The stock was later redeemed for assets
which the subsidiary retained. The petitioner recorded all the liabilities and
used its net operating losses to offset the acquired income on its tax return.
The Commissioner disallowed the deduction under Section 269 (a) (2).
Since both parties stipulated that the acquisitions of assets were part
of a single plan designed to shift income-producing assets into petitioner
corporation, the only disputed issue was whether the basis was determined
"by reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor corporation" within
the meaning of Section 269(a) (2).21 ° The Commissioner argued that the
purchase of assets and later transfer to petitioner by the parent corporation
should be treated as separate and distinct transactions. Therefore, such
stock and asset transactions would be controlled by Section 351 of the
Code, requiring petitioner's basis in the acquired property to be determined
by reference to that of the parent corporation.
However, by invoking the "integrated transaction" doctrine of
Yoc Heating Corp.,"1 the Tax Court held that the purchase of the assets
constituted a single transaction. The court reasoned that the parent
209 64 T. C. No. 47 (June 26, 1975).
2.0 Id. at 275.
21161 T. C. 101 (1973).
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corporation had acted as a conduit through which the assets passed;
therefore, the petitioner's basis was determined by reference to the
cost of the assets to the petitioner, and not by reference to the basis of the
assets in the hands of the parent corporation. Since the basis of the acquired
assets was a cost basis, as opposed to carryover basis, Section 269(a) (2)
was inapplicable, and the court therefore permitted the net operating
loss deduction to offset the later income.
7.02 "Like-Kind" Property
Section 1031 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to
exchange property for other property of a like kind without recognizing
gain or loss, if the property transferred was held for productive use in the
transferor's trade or business and the property received is also to be so
used. Although most of Section 1031 cases deal with what constitutes
"like-kind" property, two recent Revenue Rulings highlighted the Section's
requirement that both the property traded away and the property received
must be productively used by the taxpayer.
In Revenue Ruling 75-921,212 Corporation A desired a tract of land
and factory owned by Corporation B. To this end, the former purchased
another tract and constructed a factory upon it. Corporation A then
exchanged this newly-acquired land and factory for the land and factory
owned by Corporation B. The IRS ruled that only Corporation B was
entitled to Section 1031 (a) non-recognition of gain or loss, since the
property Corporation A had transferred had not been held for productive
use in A's trade or business.
In Revenue Ruling 75-292,1a Section 1031(a) treatment was denied
Corporation C when it exchanged land and office buildings productively
used in its business for similar land and office buildings owned by Corporation
D. Difficulties arose when Corporation C transferred its newly acquired
property to a third corporation, formed by it, in exchange for all of the
stock of the new corporation. Since the final result of the transaction was
that C ended up with a fluid corporation's stock rather than like-kind
property, which it could put to productive use, only D Corporation was
able to qualify for Section 1031 treatment.
7.03 Corporate Stock Held by Corporate Officer
Revenue Ruling 75-131" provides a response to the question of
whether an officer-stockholder of a stock brokerage and investment firm,
who purchased stock in the corporation which later becomes worthless, can
212 Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1975 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 29, at 17,
218 Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 18.
21, Rev. Rul. 75-13, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 2, at 6.
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receive ordinary loss rather than capital loss tax treatment. Here, an
individual began his employment with an incorporated stock brokerage and
investment banking firm in 1960. From 1962, when the employee became
an officer, to 1968, the firm experienced remarkable growth and high
prosperity. Beginning in 1968 the firm suffered severe financial setbacks
resulting in cessation of all normal business operations and the initiation
of liquidation in 1970. Before 1962 and up to December 1967, the taxpayer
at various times purchased shares of stock in the employer corporation.
Some of the stock purchases were made after taxpayer had received promo-
tions. Purchase of the stock was not mandatory; however, the corporation
did encourage such purchases and employees considered such purchases
of stock helpful in obtaining promotions within the firm.
In 1968, the taxpayer, when he was in a position to know the full
extent of the firm's difficulties, ceased purchasing stock. Despite his lack
of stock purchases in 1968 to 1970, taxpayer received two significant
promotions during the same period. In 1970, taxpayer's stock became
worthless. The taxpayer argued that the purchase of stock was a condition
of employment and promotion, and that being an integral part of his business,
the resulting loss should be treated as ordinary loss under Section 165 of
the Code.
The Commissioner in this ruling adopted the test applied by the
Supreme Court in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,215 which
held that profits and losses arising from the everyday operation of a business
should be considered as ordinary income or loss rather than capital gain or
loss. Later court decisions have indicated that the question of whether the
sale or exchange of stock results in ordinary, as opposed to capital gain or
loss is dependent upon whether the taxpayer acquired the stock with a
"predominant business" motive as distinguished from a predominant
investment motive.21
In the instant set of circumstances, the purchase of stock was held not to
be a condition of employment or promotion. The taxpayer's stock purchases
were all within the period of the firm's rapid growth and high prosperity,
making the purchase of such stock an attractive investment. When the firm -
faltered, the taxpayer ceased his purchase of stock. Even though he ceased
purchasing stock, he received two promotions. It was quite apparent that
the taxpayer purchased the stock for investment purposes and that such
215350 U.S. 46 (1955).
216 Rev. Rul. 75-13, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 2, at 7. Motive is determined by analyzing all
the surrounding circumstances. See United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972).
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purchases were not necessary to maintain employment or receive promotions.
Therefore, the taxpayer sustained a capital loss in the year the corporate
stock became worthless.
Irwin v. United States217 recently held that an attorney, who purchased
stock in a corporation to enhance and increase the amount of legal business
he would derive from the corporation, will be entitled to an ordinary business
deduction when that stock becomes worthless. In order to determine whether
the stock fell within the "integrated business activities exception" to the
definition of a capital asset, as established by the Corn Products case, the
district court adopted 218 the test originally articulated in Booth Newspapers,
Inc. v. United States.219
[I]f securities are purchased by a taxpayer as an integral and
necessary act in the conduct of his business, and continue to be so
held until the time of their sale, any loss incurred as a result thereof may
be fully deducted from gross income as a business expense or ordinary
loss. 220
It is clear that if the property is held for investment purposes, final
disposition will result in capital asset treatment. In the instant case petitioner's
purpose for purchasing stock was to acquire the legal and notarial business
of the corporation. The district court examined petitioner's past and
present stockholdings, his position within the corporate structure (director
and later president), and his initial and subsequent involvements in the
corporation, and determined that he had truly purchased the shares in
expectation of increasing his legal business. He was, therefore, entitled to a
deduction from gross income as a business expense or ordinary loss.
7.04 Forfeited Deposits
Revenue Ruling 58-77,"' which held that any gain or loss realized or
sustained, due to the failure of customers to return containers, for which
deposits are required, within a specified period is to be treated as ordinary
gain or loss, has been revoked by Revenue Ruling 75-34.2 This ruling
provides that, if Corporation A manufactures cable which is sold on steel
reels, having a useful life of eight years, and requires a refundable deposit
217 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 75-5073 (E. D. La. May 22, 1975).
2 1 8 1d. at 75-703. The district court in Irwin erroneously attributed the test it applied to the
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115(5th Cir. 1971). However, the Schlumberger court merely adopted the test as it was originally
set forth in the Booth Newspapers case, 443 F.2d at 1120.
219 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
220 d. at 921.
221 Rev. Rul. 58-77, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 118.
222 Rev. Rul. 75-34, 1975 1NT. REV. BULL. No. 5, at 14.
[Vol. 9:3
54
Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss3/2
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1975
from its customers, or if title in the cable reels passes to the customer by
contract, with the corporation retaining the deposit, the reels will qualify
under Section 1231(b) of the Code as depreciable property used in the
taxpayer's trade or business. The gain or loss from the sale of the cable
reels then be treated under Section 1231 (a) of the 1954 Code.
In order to benefit from the favorable business tax treatment of
Section 1231 which allows gain to be treated as capital gain and loss to be
treated as ordinary loss, Corporation A must capitalize its cost of the reels
and maintain adequate records reflecting depreciation and other factors
necessary in the computation of gain or loss on the sale of the reels.
Revenue Ruling 75-34 is consistent with the decision by the Court
of Claims in Philadelphia Quartz Co. v. United States.22 The court held
that where a taxpayer transported chemical products in returnable steel
drums, bearing legends indicating that the taxpayer owned the drums and
separately billed buyers for the drums, at prices significantly higher than
their cost, the income, resulting from such forfeiture of deposits, was to be
treated as a capital gain from the sale or exchange of business assets, under
Section 1231 of the Code.
8.00 Procedure
8.01 Tax Exempt Status-Private Schools
In Technical Information Release 1347,22 ' the Internal Revenue Service
announced a Proposed Revenue Procedure concerning tax exempt status
for private schools under Section 501 (c) (3). The proposed procedure would
require all private schools desiring Section 501(c) (3) tax exempt status
(whether presently tax exempt or applying for such status) to keep specified
records and to meet specific anti-discrimination guidelines. The record
keeping requirements and guidelines have been drawn to determine whether
private schools, having or seeking tax exempt status, racially discriminate
against students.22
The Proposed Revenue Procedure was prompted by a need for a new
system to "ensure a uniform approach"2 6 in determining whether such private
223 374 F.2d 512 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
224 T. I. R. 1347, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXEs 55,050.
225 A racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is defined to mean that:
... the school admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, programs, and
activities generally accorded or made available to students at that school and that the
school does not discriminate on the basis of race in administration of its educational
policies, admissions policies, scholarship and loan programs, and athletic and other
school-administered programs. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 230.
226 T. I. R. 1347 § 2.03, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXEs 55,050.
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schools have been following a nondiscriminatory policy as to students. Failure
to comply with the proposed record keeping requirements will result in a
presumption that the school has failed to comply with the guidelines.""
Failure to comply with the guidelines, themselves, will ordinarily result in
the revocation of the tax exempt status of the noncomplying school.2 '
Revenue Procedure 72-54.29 sets forth the presently effective guidelines
for determining whether a school has sufficiently publicized its nondiscrim-
inatory policies. Under the present procedure, a school is required to show
only that a nondiscriminatory policy has been adopted, is being used in
good faith, and has been made known to the community from which the
school draws its students.
The proposed procedure under Technical Information Release 1347
reflects the disatisfaction of the Internal Revenue Service with the present
guidelines under Revenue Procedure 72-54.110 The proposed procedure
provides guidelines as to organization requirements,' publication require-
ments,"2 annual notification and certification, 33 facilities and programs,
34
and scholarships and loan programs. 33
If adopted, the guidelines will impose as an organizational requirement
that a school provide in its "charter, bylaws, resolution of its governing
body, or other governing instrument that it will not discriminate against
applicants and students on the basis of race." '
With regard to the proposed publication guidelines, any method may
be used to publicize the school's nondiscriminatory policy, as long as it is
effective in reaching all racial segments of the community which may use
the school.237 Under this procedure the school also will be required to
publicize its nondiscriminatory policy at least once a year, either during
student registration or during the school's solicitation of students. The
proposed guidelines also require the school to certify that it has not qualified
any of its previous published statements. 38
227 Id. § 6.02, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAxEs 55,050. The presumption may be rebutted only through
use of clear and convincing evidence.
228 Id. § 3.06, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 55,050.
229 Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 834.
230 T. I. R. 1347 § 2.03, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 55,050.
231 Id. § 3.01, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 55,050.
232 Id. § 3.02, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 55,050.
233 Id. § 3.03, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 55,050.
234 Id. § 3.04, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 55,050.
235 Id. § 3.05, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 55,050.
236 Id. § 3.01, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 55,050.
237 Id. § 3.02, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 55,050.
238 Id. § 3.03, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 55,050.
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The proposed recordkeeping requirements state that each school must
keep the following records for a period of three years:
(1) All applications for general admissions. Any rejected applications
must be annotated to show the reasons for rejection.
(2) All requests for scholarships or other forms of financial aid, and
a list of the amounts awarded or the reasons for rejection, together
with copies of all correspondence concerning comparable requests
to other parties insofar as the school has at any time been a party
to such correspondence.
(3) All applications for employment. Any rejected applications must
be annotated to show the reasons for rejection.
(4) Copies of all catalogues brochures, announcements, and other
printed advertising.
(5) Copies of all materials used to solicit contributions, and all contri-
butions received.239
The proposed procedure is much stricter than the present requirements
of Revenue Procedure 72-54.
8.02 Tax Exempt Status--Private Clubs
Under Section 501 (c) (7) a social club will qualify for a tax exempt
status if the club is "organized and operated exclusively for pleasure,
recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." In
Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States,"'° the Federal District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania considered the issues of when a club's
purpose fails to be nonprofitable and when a private individual benefits
from the club's earnings.
The Internal Revenue Service revoked the tax exempt status of the
Pittsburgh Press Club, contending that the club failed to meet the require-
ments of Section 501(c) (7). The Service argued that the revocation was
justified on two grounds: first, that club earnings inured to the benefit of
private individuals through the club's differential dues structure favoring
a particular class of members; and, secondly, that the club was not operated
exclusively for nonprofitable purposes---due to the substantial number of
nonmembers patronizing the facility.4 1
The press club employed a dues structure under which members
involved in editorial work (called active members) paid lower dues than
239 Id. § 6.01, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAxEs 1 55,050.
240 388 F. Supp. 1269 (W. D. Pa. 1975).
241 Id. at 1272.
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those not directly involved in such work. Active members enjoyed other
singular privileges including the sole right to vote and the sole right to
serve as club officers or directors with the exception of the position of
Treasurer.
The district court held that the dues structure did not result in net
earnings to active members. Instead, the court found that the club policy
was designed simply to reflect ability to pay and that the policy was not a
burden on other members." 2 The court relied on the reasoning employed
by the Supreme Court in the decision of Walz v. Commissioner"' to support
its result. In Walz, the Supreme Court held that a church which is
exempted from paying property tax does not receive revenue from the
government, and therefore, the exemption provided does not amount to
a prohibited establishment of religion. The church is simply exempted from
making payments to support the state. Here, the active members of the
club do not receive earnings but are exempted to a limited extent from the
obligation to pay club dues."
The Court next considered the contention that the club failed to meet
the statutory requirement of operating exclusively for nonprofitable purposes.
Although the club was not open to the general public, it served a substantial
number of meals to nonmembers. Under club rules, nonmembers could
be served when they were a guest of a member or a part of a group sponsored
by a member.
The Service contended that the nonmember use of club facilities
required revocation of the 501 (c) (7) exemption, first, because the charges
for services provided nonmembers were ultimately paid by the nonmembers
themselves and, secondly, because the club failed to meet the 75 percent
rule of Revenue Procedure 64-36.1" The Service argued that nonmember
guests traditionally reimburse their hosts for charges incurred for services
provided them. The club failed to meet the Revenue Procedure 64-36
requirement that at least 75 percent or more of the club members be
members of the nonmember groups using club facilities.2 '
The district court reinstated the club's exemption. Although the court
agreed that guests traditionally reimburse host members for club services
received by them, it found such a practice to be customary in the member-
242 Id at 1273.
242 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
24,4 388 F. Supp. at 1274.
245 Rev. Proc. 64-36, 1964-2 CuM. BuLL. 962.
246 388 F. Supp. at 1275.
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guest relationship and within the 501(c) (7) exemption. The court also
found Revenue Ruling 64-36 "not controlling", and refused to apply its
requirements to the instant case.""7
The decision by the court will be useful for clubs who charge different
dues rates to their members. They will no longer have to worry about losing
their tax exempt status under this decision, since differential dues structures
such as that employed by the Pittsburgh Press Club do not result in net
earnings to regular members. Finally, as long as the club is not open to
the general public, nonmember use of club facilities by guests of members
will not cause a club to lose its tax exempt status.
8.03 Tax Exempt Status--Unrelated Business Activities
A trade association composed of travel agencies failed in its attack on
the tax exempt status of otherwise exempt organizations which offer extensive
low-cost travel plans for their members."4 8 The American Society of Travel
Agents alleged that since travel is not an exempted organizational purpose
within Section 501(c) (3), the tax exempt status of groups engaging in
massive travel programs for members should be revoked. The Federal
District Court for the Northern District of California declined to order
revocation of exempt status, holding that such relief would be appropriate
only after a finding that the travel plans were per se unrelated to the organiza-
tion's tax exempt purposes.
The court likewise declined to order the IRS to levy the "unrelated
business tax" on the income received by the organizations, from travel
programs. In reaching its decision, the court said:
The court's jurisdiction may be invoked to check a specific abuse of
discretion by IRS . . . . But it may not be invoked to undertake
continuing supervision of IRS's administration of the Internal Revenue
Code. Plaintiffs second count fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted." '4
8.04 Tax Exempt Status--Public Interest Law Firm
In Revenue Ruling 75-74,2" ° the Internal Revenue Service defined the
"ideal" type of public interest law firm which qualifies for an exemption
under Section 501 (c) (3) of the Code. The "ideal" organization should have
a board of governors whose membership would consist of a majority of
247 d. at 1277.
248 American Society of Travel Agents v. Simon, 36 AM. FED. TAx R. 2d 75-5142 (D. D. C.
1975).
2149Id. at 75-5144.
250 Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 10, at 7.
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attorneys and include law professors and leaders of public interest organiza-
tions. The criteria established for an acceptable case is as follows: (1) the
subject matter must involve a matter of important public interest; (2) the
prospective clients must not be able to afford competent private legal
counsel; and (3) the case should provide for active participation by law
students.
The tax exempt public law firm is to be operated exclusively for chari-
table purposes. Charitability is to be based, not upon the particular positions
advocated by the firm, but upon providing a vehicle for the resolution of
issues of broad public importance and the inability of the prospective clients
to afford adequate private counsel. The fact that the services provided by
the public interest law firm are not feasibly handled by private firms may,
also, be a prerequisite of charitable recognition.
In order to maintain its exemption, the public law firm may not charge
for its services, even on a cost basis.25' However, under Revenue Ruling
75-76,252 the firm can accept court-awarded fees, which the opposing party
must pay under statute, and certain special fees which the judge orders to
be paid. The exempt public firm must use such awards only to defray normal
operating expenses up to a limit of 50 percent of the total cost of its legal
functions. The percentage is to be computed over a five-year period, which
includes the taxable year the fee is awarded and the four preceeding tax
years. The thrust of these recent Revenue Rulings is to prohibit a tax
exempt public law firm from using, as a factor in selecting its cases, either
the expectation or the possibility of an award of attorney fees. 5 '
Revenue Ruling 75-74 also requires all public interest law firms to
file form 1023"' with the District Director of the IRS in the district in
which the principle place of business or principle office of the firm is located.
Compliance with this requirement is necessary to be eligible for tax exempt
status under Section 501 (c) (3) of the Code.
8.05 Self-Incrimination
An individual may not refuse to file a federal income tax return on the
basis that some information contained therein is self-incriminating; he may,
however, refuse to answer certain questions on the return where the response
may tend to incriminate him. 5 The question which arises is whether
251 Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 10, at 9.
252 Rev. Rul. 75-76, 1975 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 10, at 9.
253 Id. at 10.
254 Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 10, at 8.
255 United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
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or not a response to such a question on the tax return, may be used as
evidence against the taxpayer in a criminal trial unrelated to the tax laws.
Certiorari has been granted by the Supreme Court to a Ninth Circuit case
for the determination of this question." 6
In Garner v. United States,25 ' the taxpayer filed a federal income tax
return, and revealed that gambling was the principle source of his income.
The tax return was used as evidence against Garner in a subsequent
prosecution for conspiring to violate federal gambling statutes. Garner
contended that the government's use of the tax return violated his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrinmination, and the Ninth Circuit
agreed. The majority held that in spite of Garner's right to object to revealing
his source of income, his disclosure was not voluntary in light of the reporting
requirements contained in Section 7203 and Section 7206.
In reaching its conclusion the court overruled its prior decision in
Stillman v. United States55 (holding that tax returns are admissible as
evidence in an unrelated criminal prosecution despite fifth amendment
claims on the basis of implied waiver), relying on the Supreme Court's
refusal to apply the implied waiver concept in Marchetti v. United States.
59
Marchetti, however, involved a statute requiring special registration, which
was potentially incriminating and, as the dissenting judge in Garner
indicates, 6 ° the majority's extension of Marchetti to a case involving routine
filing may be a fundamental weakness in the court's reasoning.
Another issue which the courts addressed this year was whether a
taxpayer could, through the assertion of his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, thwart an IRS investigation by obtaining his accountant's
working papers and subsequently transferring them to his attorney. In
Fisher v. United States 6' and Kasmir v. United States,262 the courts of
appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits, disagreed as to the answer to this
question. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari26 in an attempt
to resolve this "hotly contested issue. ''264
256 Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228, (9th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1115
(1975).
257 501 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1972).
258 177 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1949).
259 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
260 501 F.2d at 235 (Wallace J., dissenting).
261 500 F.2d 683 (3rd Cir. 1974).
262 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974).
263 500 F.2d 683 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 824 (1975) (Upon granting certiorari
the Supreme Court consolidated the Fisher and Kasmir cases.).
264 499 F.2d at 448.
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Attempting to delineate the point at which the important IRS power of
summons 65 and enforcement266 in tax investigations must yield to the guaran-
tees of the fifth amendment 6 is a sensitive and difficult task. Generally
viewed as preventing the compulsion of testimonial self-incrimination, the
protection of the fifth amendment has been applied to incriminating business
records and memorandum since the landmark decision in Boyd v. United
States."8 Even though barring sources of evidence is unfavorable to the
efforts of any government agency, applying the fifth amendment protection
to private business and tax records is an especially serious hindrance to
the IRS, since it must rely on voluntary assessment and compliance by
taxpayers. Furthermore, it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain a taxpayer's
tax liability from the external evidentiary sources which are normally relied
upon in non-tax prosecutions. Indeed, it is arguable that if taxpayers were
cognizant of the protection from discovery of tax evasion offered by the
fifth amendment as applied to business records, the voluntary compliance
basis of our tax system would be shattered.
As stated, the basis for the taxpayer's assertion of a fifth amendment
protection is the Boyd decision. In Boyd, it must be emphasized that the
taxpayer had both title and possession of his receipts; therefore, when the
court spoke of private and personal business records, it was not clear whether
the court considered title or possession most important. The Boyd rationale
was explicitly extended to tax records in United States v. Cohen." '
Fisher and Kasmir differed from Boyd in that the title of the business
memorandum was held by the accountant. Additionally, both taxpayers had
obtained possession only a relatively short time before the summons was
served. In Fisher, the taxpayer's accountant had possession of his working
papers for twelve years before the taxpayer re-acquired possession of them.
After holding the papers for two weeks, the taxpayer transferred them to his
attorney who was subsequently served with the summons two and one-half
months later. In Kasmir the facts are similar; when he became aware of the
IRS investigation, the taxpayer asked his attorney and accountant to meet
him at his office. Taking the papers from his accountant, the taxpayer
immediately transferred them to his attorney. The taxpayer had actual
possession of these papers for only a few seconds.
In Couch v. United States,"' the Supreme Court dealt with a situation
265 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602.
266 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7604.
2 6
7 U.S. CONT. amend. V.
268 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
269 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
270 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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where business records owned by the taxpayer, but in the accountant's
possession, were summoned by the IRS. The Couch Court held that in
applying fifth amendment protections, the emphasis is upon avoidance of
personal compulsion. The Court then stated: "We do indeed believe that
actual possession of documents bears the most siginificant relationship to
fifth amendment protections against governmental compulsions upon the
individual accused of crime." '' By establishing that possession rather than
title was the major factor in determining the validity of the self-incrimination
assertion, the stage was set for taxpayers to assert the privilege as to their
accountant's working papers which they possessed but did not own. However,
even in situations such as Kasmir and Fisher, where the taxpayer did not
have actual possession at the time of summons, Couch again opened a door
for taxpayers through the following dictum:
[S]ituations may well arise where constructive possession is so clear
or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant
as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially
intact. 2
In Couch, the taxpayer did not have actual possession of the records
until after the summons was served on his accountant. The Court held that
the rights of the taxpayer were frozen at the time the summons had been
served. ' In United States v. White, "' the taxpayer's accountant transferred
his working papers to the taxpayer's attorney a year before the summons
was served. However, in that case, the taxpayer never had actual possession
of the working papers, nor is it clear that he even had knowledge of the
transfer. Since there was no actual possession, the court once again held
there was no privilege.
The question in Fisher and Kasmir was the narrow one of whether
by taking possession of his "hot" papers for two weeks or two seconds before
transferring them to his attorney, the taxpayer can avail himself of the fifth
amendment privilege. The threshold question that both circuit courts
addressed themselves to was whether the taxpayer could have claimed fifth
amendment protection if the summons had been served the instant in which
he physically held the papers. 5 The Fisher court inappropriately borrowed
271 Id. at 333.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 329.
274 487 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1973).
275 Fisher v. United States, 500 F.2d at 689 (3rd Cir. 1974); Kasmir v. United States, 499
F.2d at 447 (5th Cir. 1974).
Winter, 1976]
63
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1975
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1976
AKRON LAW REVIEW
a phrase from the Couch decision 6 and stated that the shift to the taxpayer
presents a "temporary and insignificant history of actual possession in the
taxpayer . *.". ." ' Thus, the Fisher court seemed to determine the question
on the basis of the duration and purpose of actual possession by the taxpayer.
Without the taxpayer having a right to assert the privilege, the court did not
find it necessary to come to grips with the issue of whether or not the papers
in the attorney's possession were constructively possessed, stating: "Papers
otherwise not endowed with fifth amendment protection cannot be trans-
muted into a privileged status merely because of the act of delivery to a
lawyer. '"278 The Kasmir court 79 and Judge Hunter's partial dissent in Fisher211
declared that the duration of actual possession was irrelevant. Judge Hunter
argued: "I fail to understand how the personal compulsion, which is the
essence of the fifth amendment prohibition, can vary depending on the length
of time the documents had previously been in Goldsmith's (taxpayer) actual
possession. '
The logic of the Kasmir court seemed particularly appropriate. The Fifth
Circuit rationalized that if, as Couch had declared, 8' the rights of the
parties were frozen at the time of the summons, the taxpayer could assert
the privilege if he actually possessed the records, regardless of when he had
acquired them. If this "freezing" theory was valid, the Kasmir court concluded
that to diminish the taxpayer's rights, for transferring the papers to his
attorney, was a fortiori inappropriate. Due to the traditional expectations
of confidentiality accompanying the attorney-client relationship, the court
believed that the taxpayer should be deemed to have maintained constructive
possession permitting him to assert the fifth amendment privilege."' The
Kasmir court distinguished the attorney-client relationship from the
accountant-client relationship in Couch. Kasmir stated that in Couch, the
records were given to the accountant for the purpose of tax return prepara-
tion; the taxpayer must have realized that the accountant was under a duty
276 409 U.S. at 333.
277 500 F.2d at 691.
278 Id.
279 499 F.2d 444.
280 500 F.2d at 691.
281 Id. at 695.
282 409 U.S. at 329 n. 9.
283 499 F.2d at 453-54, where the court stated:
Nor has the government offered any reason why we should compel the taxpayer to hold
onto the documents for a particular period of time. In our judgment, the taxpayer's short-
lived possession was sufficient to permit a claim based on the Self-Incrimination Privilege,
and the subsequent transfer to his attorney evidenced a sufficient legitimate expectation
of privacy to permit the taxpayer to retain the Amendment's protection through construc-
tive possession.
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to disclose the basis of his computations." ' However, in Kasmir, the working
papers were given to the attorney for legal advice and preparation for a
possible suit. Additionally, Kasmir stated that the taxpayer legitimately
expected greater privacy and confidentiality in transactions with his
attorney.28
Unfortunately, neither Couch, Fisher, nor Kasmir dealt with the validity
of the "required records" doctrine which was enunciated in Shapiro v. United
States.28 This concept contends that if the government requires the prepara-
tion and maintainance of records in regards to any activity validly controlled
by the government, then the records cannot be privileged.
Perhaps the judges dismissed the "required records" doctrine because
of its potential for misuse. However, it seems that if the Fisher viewpoint
should prevail, it should do so on this basis rather than any technical argument
based on duration of actual possession.
8.06 Criminal Procedure in Tax Proceedings
Evidence seized from a defendant, during a search pursuant to a warrant
issued without probable cause, is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution of
the defendant." 7 The issue arises as to whether the IRS may use such
unlawfully seized evidence as the basis for a civil tax assessment. The
question was answered in the negative in Janis v. United States.2 8 The
Supreme Court, however, will review that decision.8 '
In Janis, the Los Angeles Police Department seized bookmaking
paraphernalia and cash from the defendants' premises under a defective
warrant. The cash was seized by the IRS, after it assessed an excise tax
deficiency against Janis for his bookmaking operations. The court ordered
that the cash be returned to Janis, and held the excise tax assessment invalid
since substantially all the evidence underlying the assessment was obtained
by the IRS through the illegal actions of the police officers who conducted
the search. The Supreme Court decision, hopefully, will clarify this extension
of the exclusionary rule to the civil tax area.
In United States v. Beckwith,8 ° the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that a Miranda warning is not required where IRS agents
284 Id. at 452.
285 Id. at 453.
286 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
28? Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
288 31 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 73-1049 (C. D. Cal. 1973).
289 31 AM. FED. TAX R. 2d 73-1049 (C. D. Cal. 1973), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 1010 (1975).
280 510 F.2d 741 (D. C. Cir. 1975).
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question a taxpayer in a friend's home, since such interrogation is non-
custodial. The agents questioned defendant while at the home of a friend,
without fully apprising him of his rights. The information obtained from the
questioning was used to convict Beckwith of tax evasion. The defendant
contended that the full Miranda warning was required prior to interrogation,
and argued that Mathis v. United States, 9' and United States v. Dickerson"..
were controlling under the circumstances. The court rejected defendant's
contentions, however, on the basis that both cases were distinguishable.
In Mathis, interrogation of the taxpayer by IRS agents while he was
incarcerated in a state prison was clearly custodial, whereas the suspect in
the instant case was free to leave the home at any time. In Dickerson, no
warning of any kind had been given to the suspect, whereas Beckwith was
given a "modified" Miranda warning. 9' The fact that Beckwith was substan-
tially apprised of his rights, however, may limit the application of this case
in the future to situations where such a modified warning is given.
8.07 Freedom of Information Act
On July 4, 1966 President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the
Freedom of Information Act."' The purpose of this Act was: (1) to make
available to "any person" vast amounts of government records; (2) to
specify nine classes of records exempt from the provisions of the Act; and
(3) to establish a system of judicial review for persons denied records under
the Act with the burden of proof placed on the agency to justify its
withholding."'
Section 552(a)(2) of the Act makes available for public inspection
and copying, statements of policy and interpretations adopted by an agency,
but not published in the Federal Register, administrative staff manuals, and
instructions that affect a member of the public.' 9 Section 552(b) exempts
from the provisions of the Act nine specific classes of information, the most
important of which for purposes of tax litigation are paragraphs (b)(2),
(3), (4), and (5).297
Judicial interpretation of these provisions has been made somewhat
292 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
292 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
293 510 F.2d at 742 n. 6.
294 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967) (hereinafter referred to as the Act
or the FOIA).
295 Kass, The New Freedom of Information Act, 53 A.B.A.J. 667 (1967).
296 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1967).
297 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1967).
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difficult due to differences between the House Report. 8 and the Senate
Report.29 The courts have generally preferred the Senate Report's version
over the House version for two reasons. First, the Senate Report generally
follows the express language of the statute;"0 second, the Senate Report was
before both Houses when the Act was adopted.3 0 1 A discussion of the
applicable cases aptly reveals this preference.
In Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Internal Revenue Service,'"2
plaintiff sought to compel the IRS to disclose three items: first, unpublished
private letter rulings and technical advice memoranda issued to producers
of minerals, other than oil and gas; second, communications to and from the
IRS with regard to said rulings and memoranda, from outside the Executive
Branch of the United States Government; third, all the necessary material
from the IRS letter ruling index system in order to permit plaintiff to
ascertain whether additional unpublished rulings existed. In the district court
the IRS contended that Section 552(a)(2)(b) of the Act did not apply
to letter rulings or technical advice memoranda, and that even if the Act
did apply, specific exemptions precluded disclosure of the materials sought.
The district court, in deciding whether Section 552 (a) (2) (b) relating to
"statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the
agency" applied to private letter rulings and technical advice memoranda,
compared the Senate Report to the House Report. 3 However, the court
concluded that the Senate Report was to be preferred for the reasons
mentioned above. 0 ' Furthermore, the court came to the conclusion that
letter rulings and technical advice memoranda were in fact "relied upon" by
the agency as at least a "research tool."30
The IRS argued in the alternative that even if the Act did apply,
paragraphs (b) (3) and (4) regarding trade secrets, confidential information,
and matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute acted to prevent
such disclosures. The court cited National Cable Television Association, Inc.
v. F.C.C. °6 which held that paragraph (b) (4) protects "only that information
which cannot be rendered sufficiently anonymous by deletion of the filing
298H. R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong. 2nd. Sess. 2418 (1966) (hereinafter cited as H. REP.).
299 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 2418 (1965) (hereinafter cited as S. REP.).
300 Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
301 Comment, Response of the IRS to the Freedom of Information Act: An Uphill Battle for
Disclosure, 1974 Aouz. ST. L. J. 431.
302 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D. D. C. 1973).
303 Id. at 1304.
304 See text accompanying notes 283 and 284 supra..
305 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (D. D. C. 1973).
306 479 F.2d 183 (D. C. Cir. 1973).
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party's name and other identifying information." The IRS argued that since
Section 6103(a)(1) provides that returns will be open to inspection only
by order of the President, then paragraph (b) (3) is applicable. The court
concluded that a voluntary request from a taxpayer submitting information
and seeking tax guidance for his own purpose is not a return within the
meaning of the statute.07
Finally, the IRS contended that the court should use its inherent
powers of equity to refuse disclosure, since such disclosure would result in
the disruption of the agency's established procedures and possibly cause
the present program of private letter rulings to cease. The court replied that
it had no discretion since the disputted materials came within the terms of
the statute." 8 The district court concluded its opinion by observing that while
the private letter rulings were widely disseminated among the tax bar and
taxpayers with similar problems and interests, resulting in a body of "private
law", publication would allow total public access and scrutiny. 809
On appeal, 1° the IRS limited its arguments to whether the (b) (3)
exemption for matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute was
applicable, and whether the district court had erred in holding that under the
Act it did not have the equitable power to refuse ordering disclosure. The
court of appeals held that private letter rulings were not encompassed by
either Section 6103(a)(1), restricting disclosure to orders of a President,
or Section 7213 (a) (1 ), making it unlawful for any person to divulge to any
other person, portions of income tax returns. 1' However, the appellate court
decided that technical advice memoranda dealt directly with information
contained in returns, were a part of the process by which tax determinations
were made, and were specifically exempted from disclosure by statute under
the meaning of paragraph (b) (3). Without discussing the issue, the court
affirmed the decision of the district court holding that it had no jurisdiction
under the Act to deny disclosure on equitable grounds.3 1'
In Hawkes v. Internal Revenue Service,13 plaintiff sought items,
including portions of the Internal Revenue Manual relating to the examina-
tion of returns and interrogation of taxpayers by agents of the Service, and
other matters which plaintiff felt would be useful in preparing his defense to an
indictment for criminal tax fraud in a separate proceeding. After having
307 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (D.D.C. 1973).
sos Id. at 1309.
309 ld.
310 505 F.2d 350 (D. C. Cir. 1974).
31" 505 F.2d 350, 355 (D. C. Cir. 1974).
3121d.
313 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
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commenced the civil suit under the FOIA, plaintiff pled nolo contendere
to the criminal charges and was sentenced to prison. The IRS moved to
dismiss the civil suit on the grounds: (1) the plaintiff had failed to seek
the Manual through criminal discovery processes and was, therefore, barred
from resorting to the equity powers of the court under the Act, since
equitable relief cannot be granted where an appropriate remedy at law
exists; (2) the IRS Manual is not administrative in nature and therefore does
not come under the Act; and (3) if the Manual does come under the Act,
then paragraph (b) (2) exempts matters relating solely to the internal person-
nel rules and practices of an agency. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reasoned that since the plaintiff was still subject to a civil suit by the IRS
to recover his underpayment of taxes, and since he had pled guilty to the
criminal charges, he would be without a remedy if the court followed the IRS's
argument.31 ' Another factor the court considered was that the Act makes
information available "to any person" not relying on the identity of the
seeker.315
In determining whether the IRS Manual is administrative in nature and
therefore included in the Act, the court looked to the House Report and
Senate Report. Noting the discrepancy in the interpretation of the Act
between the two, the Hawkes court accepted the Senate Report's version. 16
Although much activity, which at its inception is administrative in
character, ultimately concludes in law enforcement proceedings, this court
was of the opinion that it was not the purpose of the Act to deny disclosure
to all materials which might eventually affect the law enforcement process. 1
The court said the law enforcement exception in Section 552(a) (2) (c) is
to be applied "only where the sole effect of disclosure would be to enable
law violaters to escape detection." '18
In determining whether the paragraph (b) (2) exemption, for matters
relating solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
covered the Manual, the court observed the House-Senate discrepancy again.
Since the two views could not be reconciled, the court again adopted the
Senate version over that of the House. 9 The court remanded the case to the
district court to decide what materials qualified for disclosure in accordance
with the court's opinion.
314 Id. at 793.
315 Id. at 790 n. 3.
316 Id. at 794.
317 Id. at 795.
318 Id.
319 Id.
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On remand, the district court ordered all materials requested by the
plaintiff to be made available to him. In its appeal,32 the IRS contended that
seventy paragraphs of the Manual "are considered critical" and should not be
disclosed since this would "significantly impede" its enforcement program.
The IRS argued that the "sole effect" criterion applied by the district court,
which was taken directly from the court of appeal's opinion, was too narrow.
The appellate court concluded that the district court's conclusion was not
clearly erroneous under either the "sole effect" or the "significantly impede"
criterion. The court's holding was clearly influenced by the fact that many
of the paragraphs in dispute were already available to the public."'
In Fruehauf Corp. v. Internal Revenue Service,32 plaintiff sought
private rulings under the FOIA to use in preparation of its defense in a
separate criminal proceeding for evasion of manufacturers' taxes. The IRS
objected to the disclosure on the grounds that paragraph (b) (3) relating
to matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute was applicable. The
IRS cited Section 6103(a) (1), which permits disclosure of returns only by
order of the President. In its opinion, the district court relied on the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Hawkes" and ordered disclosure. The
court observed that to the extent that any of the material sought by plaintiff
might constitute an invasion of the privacy of taxpayers, "there are means
that may be employed to avoid such disclosures."32'
In Tax Reform Research Group v. Internal Revenue Service,"' plaintiff,
a "public-interest" group, brought suit under the FOIA to compel the IRS
to disclose all confidential comments submitted by taxpayers dealing
with various Code sections, and to declare void the unamended Section
601.601(b)2 6 which allowed taxpayers to specify which portions of their
comments contain confidential information or data. The IRS defended using
as a basis paragraph (b) (4), which exempts trade secrets and financial
information obtained from a person which is either privileged or confidential.
The IRS argued that since Section 601.601(b), prior to April 29, 1973,
acted as a promise of confidentiality by the IRS to taxpayers, the court should
exercise its equity powers by refusing to order disclosure. The district court
replied that it had no equity powers under the Act and that the promise of
320 507 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1974).
21 Id. at 494.
22 369 F. Supp. 108 (E. D. Mich. 1974).
823 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
824369 F. Supp. 108, 110 (E. D. Mich. 1974).
82533 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 74-1252 (D. D. C. 1974).
82026 C.F.R. § 601.601(b) (1974).
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confidentiality by the IRS was "ultra vires"."' The court, therefore, declared
Section 601.601 (b) prior to April 29, 1973 void. 28
In its decision the court cited National Cable Television Association, Inc.
v. F.C.C.,"' which held that paragraph (b) (4) only applied to materials
"independently confidential" based on their contents and not capable of
being rendered anonymous by deletion of identifying information.33 The
court ordered the IRS to disclose the information unless it could demonstrate
that it was independently confidential and not susceptible of being rendered
anonymous.3 '
In Robins & Weill, Inc. v. United States,"' plaintiff sought under the
FOIA to force the IRS to disclose all internal memoranda containing instruc-
tions, statements, or interpretations of policy concerning depreciation of the
cost of insurance accounts and expirations. The material sought included
private letter rulings and technical advice memoranda. The purpose of this
was to aid the plaintiff in the preparation of its petition for a refund of
corporate income taxes. Plaintiff wanted such information to obtain
corroborative testimony from other taxpayers that the insurance accounts and
expirations had a limited useful life. The court denied plaintiff's request
to obtain the private letter rulings and technical advice memoranda. The
court found that not only had plaintiff failed to show relevancy, materiality,
and reasonable specificity, but also, that the private letter rulings and
technical advice memoranda could not reasonably be expected to lead to
admissable evidence."' The court, however, granted plaintiff's request for
copies of the abstract and statement for each offer in compromise accepted by
IRS, since these were a matter of public record. The court was of the opinion
that the Act does not enlarge the scope of discovery to entitle plaintiff "to
engage in a hunting expedition" for anything that might be of aid in its
case. Instead, all parties must still adhere to the applicable rules of relevancy,
materiality, and reasonable particularity. 33
In Wine Hobby U.S.A. v. Internal Revenue Service,"' plaintiff
brought suit under the FOIA to obtain the names and addresses of
all persons who have registered with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
827 33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 74-1255.
328 Id. at 74-1257.
$29 479 F.2d 183 (D. C. Cir. 1973).
30 Id. at 195.
3"1 33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 74-1255.
'32 63 F.R.D. 73 (N. C. 1974).
338 Id. at 77.
334 Id.
33 502 F.2d 133 (3rd Cir. 1974).
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Firearms to produce wine for family use in the Mid-Atlantic region. Plaintiff
was engaged in the business of selling and distributing amateur wine-making
equipment and supplies. The IRS relied on paragraph (b) (6), which
exempts personnel, medical and similar files which would constitute an
invasion of personal privacy. The court of appeals accepted this argument
relying on the decision in Getman v. NLRB." 6 The court found that
exemption (b) (6) requires a balancing of the public interest purpose for
disclosure against the potential invasion of privacy. Noting that the reason
for disclosure in this case was "commercial exploitation", the court held
that the lists were exempt from disclosure."' 7
It appears difficult to reconcile the Fruehauf and Robins & Weill
cases. The "hunting expedition" that the court believed Robins & Weill
was engaging in was really not much different than plaintiff's request in
Fruehauf. In reality all plaintiffs are partaking in a "hunting expedition"
when seeking information or rulings from the IRS. If the plaintiffs knew
what information was in the IRS's possession, it would not be necessary to
resort to judicial proceedings. Conversly, if it is necessary to resort to
judicial proceedings, plaintiffs do not know if the information sought will be
beneficial to them.
It is certainly arguable that the court reached the right decision in
Robins & Weill, but for the wrong reasons. The plaintiff in that case wanted
the names and addresses of other taxpayers to obtain corroborative testimony
from them. The real issue in the case should have been the (b) (6) exemption
relating to personal privacy. The Fruehauf decision permitted disclosure, but
observed that appropriate safeguards could be taken to avoid invasion of
privacy. In Tax Reform Research Group the court allowed disclosure except
for those materials that were "independently confidential". If measures can
be taken to render the information anonymous, there appears to be no valid
reason to withhold it. In Wine Hobby, the information being sought was a list
of names, which obviously could not be rendered anonymous.
8.08 Innocent Spouse
An "innocent spouse" is absolved by Section 6013(e) of the Code
from joint and several liability for tax, interest, and penalties assessed on
income wrongfully omitted from a joint return, when the omission is greater
than 25 percent of the gross income stated in the return. Limiting the
application of this section to spouses who have filed joint returns, results in
a perplexing result where innocent spouses file separate returns in community
386 450 F.2d 670 (D. C. Cir. 1971).
337 502 F.2d 133, 137 (3rd Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 9:3
72
Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss3/2
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1975
property states. According to United States v. Malcolm,338 in a community
property state, half of each spouse's income is attributable to the other spouse.
When filing separate returns, each taxpayer must report half of his income
and half of his spouse's income. Under these guidelines, a spouse in a
community property state, who is deceived by a husband or wife, and who is
not disclosing a portion of gross income, is liable for the tax on half of the
unreported income. Although not as broad as the joint and several liability
imposed on spouses filing joint returns, this liability is certainly analogous.
In Mary Lou Galliher,3 9 the spouses filed separately and the taxpayer
sought to invoke Section 6013 (e) to negate tax liability for the portion of
her husband's undisclosed income which was attributable to her. Although
this "innocent" spouse position is clearly parallel to that of the deceived
spouse who files a joint return, as contemplated by the statute, the Tax Court
held that, despite the similarity, relief is available only to spouses filing
jointly. This limitation was likewise applied in Bettie Jane Coffman,"' even
though the deceived spouse neither benefited from, nor had reason to know
of, the omitted income.
The "innocent spouse" in Ann B. Resnick"' met the joint-filing require-
ment, but failed to satisfy the condition that the augmented tax liability
arise from omitted gross income."' Here, gross income from sales in the
husband's business was fully reported on Schedule C, but the cost of goods
sold was overstated by nearly four million dollars. Relying on the specific
language in Section 6013 (e) (1) (A) and Treasury Regulation 1.6013-5 (d),
the Tax Court again denied relief to the otherwise qualifying spouse, since
the increase in the tax liability stemmed from the overstatement of cost,
rather than omission from gross income." '
On June 11, 1975 the Fifth Circuit in Allen v. Commissioner
3
"
determined the manner in which the 25 percent test is to be computed under
Section 6013(e). Three factors must be considered to qualify the innocent
spouse for the exoneration from liability within the meaning of Section
6013(e). First, a joint return must be filed in a taxable year in which there
was "omitted from gross income an amount properly includable therein
which is attributable to one spouse and which is in excess of 25 percent of
338 282 U.S. 792 (1931).
339 62 T. C. No. 81 (Sept. 3, 1974).
840 43 P. H. TAX CT. MEM. 74,308 (Dec. 12, 1974).
341 63 T. C. No. 48 (Feb. 3, 1975).
342 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(e)(1).
843 63 T. C. at 291.
a44 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 75-5135 (5th Cir. 1975).
Winter, 1976]
73
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1975
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1976
AKRON LAW REVIEW
the amount of gross income stated on the return." Second, when the other
spouse signed the return, he or she must have had no knowledge or reason
to know of the omission. Third, all the facts and circumstances of the
situation must be taken into account, such as whether the other spouse had
benefited directly from the omission and whether it would be inequitable
to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency caused by the omission in
the taxable year in question." '
In the instant case, petitioner's joint return stated a gross income of
$235,735. In calculating the amount of omitted income, the Commissioner
applied a storage-receipts item, which was overstated by $66,814.69, due
to Lewis Allen's error in implementing the accrual method rather than the
cash method. The Tax Court accepted the Commissioner's reasoning as to
the 25 percent test, but found that petitioner had no knowledge or reason
to know of the omission and that it would be inequitable to hold her liable
for any tax deficiency attributable to the omission." '4
It is important to recognize that Mrs. Allen was not granted total
immunity from taxable liabilities of the year in question. The immunity
extended only to income omissions which fulfilled the three requirements of
Section 6013 (e). Such immunity does not extend to tax liabilities determined
by the Internal Revenue to be from properly disallowed deductions.
The purpose of Section 6013 (e) is remedial," '4 and is intended to protect
one spouse from inequalities which are the product of the imposition of joint
liability." 8 Such statute should be liberally construed in favor of those whom
the statute was designed to benefit." '4 Application of the Tax Court's reasoning
is directly opposed to the stated purpose of the innocent spouse provision.
Furthermore, an acceptance of the Commissioner's position would have
allowed a single mistake of her former spouse to deny Mrs. Allen of the
benefits of the statute, enacted to relieve her from tax liability for such
mistakes. The mistakes should not cancel the benefits due Mrs. Allen,
especially where the statute does not clearly authorize such action, as argued
by the Commissioner.
8.09 Investigation of Books and Records
The question of whether the IRS may issue a "John Doe" summons to
a bank to discover the identity of a person whose bank transactions suggest
potential liability for unpaid taxes, was answered in the affirmative by the
$45 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(e).
346 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 75-5139.
347 Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975).
38 See S. REP. No. 91-1537, 91st Cong. 2nd Sess., 6089 (1970).
349 Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934).
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Supreme Court in United States v. Bisceglia."' The defendant in Bisceglia
was vice-president of a bank which had accepted for deposit in each of
two transactions $20,000 in $100 bills which had become unusually thin and
severly disintegrated, probably as a result of long-term storage under unusual
conditions. Pursuant to the Service's investigatory powers, 5' an agent issued
a "John Doe" summons calling for the production of bank records which
would provide information as to the identity of the depositor. The Sixth
Circuit held that the summons was invalid since the agent had not ascertained
the identity of the depositor prior to issuance. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the Service's summons power is not exclusively an accusatory
device, but may validly be exercised in an investigatory framework.352 Justice
Burger stated, further, that the public is protected from abuse of the summons
power since only the courts may enforce the summons, and enforcement will
be ordered only where the information sought is relevant to a legitimate
investigatory purpose. 53
In a later action, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded United States
v. Humble Oil & Refining Company" ' to the Fifth Circuit for review in
light of Bisceglia. In Humble, the IRS issued a "John Doe" summons to
Humble Oil for documents pertaining to certain unknown lessors of Humble,
whose tax liability was being questioned. Again, the deciding factor will be
whether the IRS activity has evolved into an investigation, or is simply
research.
8.10 Determining the Existence of a Lease
An agreement which purports to be a lease, but provides for outright
ownership of an equity interest in the lessee, may be considered a conditional
sale for tax purposes. 55 Revenue Ruling 54-540 states that the intent of the
parties is controlling in the determination of whether a particular transaction
is a sale or a lease, and describes several factual situations where intent to
purchase and sell may be implied. Revenue Procedure 75-2l,"' on the other
hand, establishes criteria for determining the existence of a lease.
In order to qualify the transaction as a lease for advance ruling purposes,
the lessor must maintain a minimum unconditional "at risk" investment in
the property throughout the term of the lease equal to at least 20 percent
of the cost of the property, and show that the property will retain that
350420 U.S. 141 (1975).
35 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602(2).
352 420 U.S. at 150.
858 ld. at 151.
354421 U.S. 943 (1975).
355 Rev. Rul. 54-540, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 39.
356 Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 18, at 15.
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percentage of its original cost and its useful life at the end of the lease term.
No lessee may obtain a purchase option at a price less than fair market value
at the date exercisable, nor may any lessee furnish any part of the cost
of the property. In addition, the lessor must demonstrate that he expects to
earn a profit from the transaction, apart from the value of deductions, credits,
or other tax benefits.
The procedure for obtaining an advance ruling as to whether the IRS
will treat a given transaction as a lease is described in Advance Revenue
Procedure 75-28.1" The procedure sets forth the documents and representa-
tions which must be filed with the ruling request, and provides that the
lessor, lessee, and all other parties with an interest in the transaction must
join in the request.
8.11 Interest Rate--Underpayments and Overpayments
The annual rate of interest payable on underpayments and overpayments
of tax has been increased to nine percent on amounts outstanding as of
July 1, 1975, and on amounts which subsequently arise. The increase is
made effective in the form of amendments to appropriate Regulations. " 's
Interest will run on any underpayment of tax from the original due date to
the date on which payment is received, irrespective of any extension. Interest
is permitted on a refund from the date of the overpayment to a date which
precedes the date of the refund check by not more than 30 days.
8.12 Installment Sales
Section 453 of the Code allows a taxpayer to elect the installment
method of reporting profits on the sale of real 59 or personal6 0 property.
However, the IRS will deny a taxpayer his election under Section 453 if
the taxpayer directly or indirectly maintains control over the proceeds or
derives a benefit therefrom. 361
The case of Nye v. United States..' raised the question of whether the
sale of securities by a wife to her husband, who later sold the securities, gave
the wife direct or indirect control over the proceeds, which would invalidate
her election under Section 453. Mary Jane Nye was a doctor and her husband
Charles Nye was a lawyer. They maintained separate checking accounts, as
357 Rev. Proc. 75-28, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 21 at 19.
358Treas. Regs. 1.115-1; 1.514(b)-i; 301.6332-1; 301.6601-1; 301.6602-1; 301.6602-1;
301.6611-1; 1.6654-1; 1.6655-1; 1.6655-5; 301.6863-1.
359 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 453 (b) (1) (A).
360INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §453(b)(1)(B).
361 See Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 355 (1939); Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523
(5th Cir. 1955); Everett Pozzi, 49 T. C. 119 (Nov. 28, 1967); Rev. Rul. 73-157, 1973-1
CUM. BULL. 213.
362 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 75-5150 (M. D. N. C. 1975).
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well as holding separate investments. The husband was investing in a construc-
tion project and his wife sold him some securities for cash and a promissory
note, payable in eleven annual installments at an interest rate of four percent.
Charles Nye then sold the securities and invested in the construction project.
The husband and wife filed a joint return for the year in which she
sold her husband the securities. The sale was reported as having been made
on the installment method. The Internal Revenue Service denied the election
under Section 453, claiming that Charles Nye acted as an agent for his wife.
The sale of the securities by Mary Jane Nye to her husband had a two-
fold purpose: (1) to give her the tax benefit of reporting the sale on the
installment method; and, (2) to give her husband a loan at four percent
instead of eight percent."
However, the district court relying on the decision in Rushing v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service... held that a taxpayer can use
the installment method to minimize his or her tax, as long as there is a
bona fide installment sale.3"' A sale of securities between a husband and
wife in which the husband later sells the securities by himself may raise the
presumption that the husband acted as her agent. But in the instant case,
due to the unique circumstances showing that the husband and wife were
"two separate, and evidently, very healthy economic entities,""36 there was
no way of proving that the wife had any control over the proceeds from the
sale. Therefore there was no violation of Section 453. Furthermore, there
was no violation of Revenue Ruling 73-157,67 since there was neither any
prearranged plan with the construction company, nor any established
relationship between the wife and the construction company.
8.13 Employment Tax Deposits
Effective October 1, 1975 Treasury Regulation 31.6302(c)-i eased
the administrative burden on small employers associated with the deposit
of certain employment taxes. The revised procedure relieves employers from
the quarter-monthly deposit requirements whose aggregate social security and
withheld income taxes during the preceding calendar quarter was less than
$25,000. Qualifying employers are required to deposit the employment taxes
within 7 days of any day on which the aggregate amount is $2,000 or more.
368 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 75-5150-52.
364441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971).
365 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 75-5153.
386 Id.
367 Rev. Rul. 73-157, 1973-1 CuM. BULL. 213.
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Where the employer's aggregate in the preceding calendar quarter is $25,000
or more, the quarter-monthly deposit procedure remains in effect.
8.14 False Dependent Claims
It is unlawful for any individual, required by Section 3402 of the Internal
Revenue Code to supply information to his employer, to willfully supply
false or fraudulent information." 8
In order to avoid paying taxes which would support the military
establishment, the Quaker defendant in United States v. Snider"9 filed an
Employee's Withholding Allowance Certificate (Form W-4) with his
employer claiming three billion dependents on the basis that he and his
wife were "conscientiously opposed to any and all wars" and "becoming
more and more aware of our responsibilities to our 3 billion fellow human
beings. '"3 '° The Sniders enclosed a letter addressed to the IRS with the W-4
expressing this rationale. The Fourth Circuit overturned the defendant's
district court conviction on the grounds that the information supplied was
not false or fraudulent, within the meaning of Section 7205.
Rejecting the government's contention that the word false, as used,
means simply untrue, the majority held that a taxpayer cannot be convicted
of a Section 7205 violation, unless the information provided is either supplied
with an intent to deceive, or is false in the sense of being deceptive; that is,
such that it could reasonably affect withholding to the government's
detriment."' Applying this test to the facts, the court found that a claim of
three billion dependents could deceive no one.
Shortly after the Snider decision, James Shea petitioned to have his
prior conviction under Section 7205 vacated."' Shea filed a W-4 claiming
twenty dependents, being entitled only to six. He had earlier expressed his
intent to resist paying taxes in a letter to the government. The Fourth Circuit,
however, refused Shea's petition to vacate, distinguishing Snider on the
grounds that a claim of twenty dependents was not completely implausible.
Prior to these decisions, the Third and Ninth Circuits upheld convictions
under Section 7205 where taxpayers planned to avoid withholding of taxes
by claiming fifteen"7 and seventeen " dependents, respectively.
368 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7205.
269 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974).
370 Id. at 647.
37 502 F.2d at 645.
372 Shea v. United States, 506 F.2d 1226 (1974).
373 United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir. 1973).
371 United States v. Smith, 487 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1973).
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8.15 Joint Filing Status-Mexican Divorce
Whether a taxpayer is entitled to file joint returns with his second
wife after divorcing his first wife through ex parte Mexican proceedings,
not recognized in taxpayers domiciliary state, was the issue in Harold K.
Lee."' Lee obtained a Mexican divorce from his wife in 1966, and in 1967
married his second wife in Nevada. Although Lee had filed joint returns
with the second wife from 1967 through 1970, he instituted divorce proceed-
ings against the first wife in his domiciliary state of California, shortly after
his second marriage. In his California complaint, Lee alleged that he was
married to the first wife. Lee and the first wife were divorced in 1971 by
the state of California, and the IRS assessed deficiencies against Lee and the
second wife for 1967 through 1970, contending that Lee and the second
wife were not husband and wife during these years within the meaning of
Section 6013 (a).
Lee relied on Borax v. Commissioner"' for the proposition that the
marital status of taxpayers should be determined by a uniform federal
standard, rather than the rule in the domiciliary state. Borax held that a
taxpayer may be considered divorced for tax purposes where he has obtained
a divorce in a Mexican proceeding, although not recognized in the
domiciliary.
The Tax Court, however, chose not to follow the Borax rule, holding
that marital status is a fact to be determined by state law. Since the Mexican
divorce was inferentially considered a nullity by the subsequent California
divorce, Lee and his second spouse were not "husband and wife" during the
period in question, and were, therefore not entitled to file jointly."'
8.16 Income Averaging--Support Requirement
An individual is not eligible to use the income averaging method if,
for any base period year, he furnished less than one-half of his support." 8
Section 1302(c) (3) defines a base period year as any of the four taxable
years immediately preceding the computation year.
Upon the request of a taxpayer who had received a scholarship during
a base period year which exceeded the amount otherwise used for his support,
the IRS ruled that the taxpayer had not met the eligibility requirement with
respect to support."" The ruling states that in determining whether the
375 64 T. C. No. 52 (July 8, 1975).
378 349 F.2d 666 (2nd Cir. 1965).
877 64 T. C. at 309.
378 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1303(c)(1).
379 Rev. Rul. 75-40, 1975 INT. REV. BuLL.. No. 6, at 21.
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taxpayer has, together with his spouse,' "8 furnished 50 percent of his support,
that a comparison should be made between the amount furnished by the
individual and his spouse, and the total amount of support received from all
sources, including "food, shelter, clothing, medical and dental care, education,
and the like." ''
8.17 Informal Settlement Agreement-Estoppel
In Stair v. United States,382 the Second Circuit held that equitable
estoppel precludes a taxpayer from claiming a refund, where the income tax
was paid pursuant to an informal agreement with the IRS (Form 870-AD).
The dispute centered on a deficiency assessed on the condemnation proceeds
from a sale of land owned by Stair. The IRS maintained that the land was
held for sale to customers in Stair's ordinary course of business, as a
land developer. Stair, however, claimed capital gains treatment for the
proceeds.
In settlement of the matter, which arose in the 1964 tax year, the
parties executed an informal agreement on Form 870-AD in 1966. The
agreement provided for payment of approximately half of the disputed
amount, and for the taxpayer to file "no claim for refund or credit". Stair
paid the agreed deficiency in December, 1966, but filed for a refund in 1968,
contrary to the prohibition in the agreement.
Although execution of the Form 870-AD is not in itself binding on the
parties, 18 the court held that the taxpayer was estopped from filing for the
refund. The court found that the taxpayer's representation, that he would not
file for a refund, coupled with his subsequent filing for refund, amounted to
a misrepresentation which justified the application of estoppel principles. 85
An additional factor which influenced the court was the fact that the
statute of limitations for assessment of a deficiency on the portion of the
original disputed amount which remained unpaid had expired. 8 ' Allowing
Stair to prevail would have encouraged other taxpayers to execute informal
settlements with the IRS, and then seek refunds for the settled amounts in a
later year.
38oTreas. Reg. 1.1303-1(c)(1).
ss' Rev. Rul. 75-40, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 6, at 22.
382 516 F.2d 560 (2nd Cir. 1975).
383 The form is titled: "Offer of Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of
Deficiency in Tax and Acceptance of Overassessment."
884 Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282 (1929).
885 516 F.2d at 565.
3 8
e TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501(a).
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8.18 Unclaimed Depreciation
The taxpayer in Gardiner v. United States.87 purchased depreciable
rental property, but failed to claim depreciation deductions in her federal
income tax returns for the first three years of ownership. She claimed the
appropriate deductions in the fourth through the seventh years, and sold the
property in the eighth year. Gardiner calculated her gain on the transaction,
using cost less the claimed depreciation for four years as the basis, which
yielded a loss on the transaction. The IRS, however, recomputed the basis
as cost less claimed and unclaimed depreciation, which yielded a gain on
the transaction. Gardiner then filed for a refund of taxes paid during the first
three years in which the depreciation was not claimed, but the refund was
barred by the statute of limitations."'
Finally, the taxpayer sought to "reopen" the barred tax years through
the mitigation provisions of Sections 1311-14. The District Court of Utah
concluded that the only section under which plaintiffs claim might be
reopened was Section 1312(7), and examined the facts of the case only
with reference to that section. Section 1312(7)(c) requires that there must
have been prior erroneous treatment with respect to the taxpayer in the form
of an erroneous inclusion or omission from gross income, an erroneous
recognition or nonrecognition of gain or loss, an erroneous deduction of a
capital item, or erroneous capitalization of a deductible item.
The plaintiff cited M. Fine & Sons Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States...
as support for the proposition that unclaimed depreciation amounts to an
erroneous overstatement (inclusion) of gross income. The district court,
however, distinguished Fine on the grounds that Fine involved a manufactur-
ing operation where unclaimed depreciation could understate cost of goods
sold and thereby result in overstated income. The court held that no such
overstatement results where property is held to produce rents and where
the depreciation is a deduction from gross income. Thus, plaintiff's situation
did not satisfy the requirements of Section 1312(7) and she was denied the
benefit of its mitigation provisions.
8.19 Bankruptcy Court-Jurisdiction
In Phelps v. United States,"'0 the Supreme Court resolved a conflict
between two circuits on the question of whether service of a notice of levy
38735 AM. FED. TAX R. 2d 75-1112 (D. Utah 1975).
388 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6511(a). This section requires that a claim for credit or
refund for overpayment be filed within three years of the time of filing, or two years of the
time of payment of the tax, whichever is later.
389 168 F. Supp. 769 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
390 421 U.S. 330 (1975).
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by the IRS on the assignee of a bankrupt taxpayer deprives the bankruptcy
court of jurisdiction to turn over the levied assets to the receiver.
The Ninth Circuit had held that the levied assets were subject to the
bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction to enter a turnover order, provided
the assignee makes no claim to the assets. 91 The Seventh Circuit, in Phelps,
ruled that once the IRS lien was filed and the assignee was notified, the
turnover order may not issue without the consent of the United States. 39 2
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the levy
created a custodial relationship between the assignee and the United States,
and that the Government thereby obtained constructive possession of the
assets through the assignee.39 3 The levy, then, gave the United States, as
opposed to the assignee or the receiver, the right to the assets, thus depriving
the bankruptcy court of the authority to issue the turnover order.
8.20 Declaratory Judgment
Prior to the execution of a planned merger between Hartford Fire
Insurance Company and ITT Hartford Fire Insurance Corporation (a wholly-
owned subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph), ITT requested
and received two rulings from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue which
qualified the proposed merger as a tax-free reorganization. After an exchange
offer to the Hartford Fire Insurance Company shareholders had been made
assuring the offeree-shareholders that the transaction would be tax-free, the
Commissioner revoked the two rulings on the grounds of alleged misrepresen-
tation by ITT. The Service then assessed deficiencies against exchanging
shareholders, and ITT brought an action in district court,3 ' seeking a
judgment declaring the Commissioners revocation invalid.
Although ITT had standing to maintain the action, the district court
of Delaware held that it did not have jurisdiction to grant the desired
remedy.93 Section 7421 of the Internal Revenue Code, commonly known as
the "Anti-Injunction Act", prohibits suits which seek to restrain the assessment
or collection of taxes. In addition, the Declaratory Judgment Act contains
an express denial of jurisdiction in federal courts where the remedy sought
is a declaration "with respect to Federal taxes"."9 6 These statutes denied the
391 In re United General Wood Products Corp., 483 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1973).
392 495 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1974).
393 421 U.S. at 334.
394 ITT v. Alexander, 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 75-5695 (D. Del. 1975).
$95 Id.
396 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
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court subject matter jurisdiction in the controversy, and the Commissioner's
motion to dismiss was, therefore, granted.""
8.21 Informal Pre-ruling Conferences
Revenue Procedure 75-23... reported an expansion of the Service's
informal conference program. Revenue Procedure 74-19... had announced
a program under which the Reorganization and Excise Branches within
seven days of a ruling request would contact taxpayers seeking rulings for
an informal discussion of the Service's probable position in the matter. Under
the new procedure the program is expanded to include an informal discussion
within fifteen days after receipt of requests for certain rulings from the
Individual Income Tax Branch," '° the Corporation Tax Branch,"0 1 the
Employment Tax and Administrative Provisions Branch,"0 2 and all other
requests received by the office of the Assistant Commissioner (Technical).
Although the IRS will not be bound by the informal opinion, the
Branch representative will inform the taxpayer as to how he will recommend
that the Service rule on the issue and, if something less than a favorable
ruling is indicated, how the taxpayer's transaction might be modified to permit
issuance of a favorable ruling. The program is expanded on a test basis,
and will expire July 1, 1976.
9.00 Inventory
9.01 Full Absorption Regulations
A manufacturer's taxable income will vary directly with the value of
his ending inventory. If a manufacturer understates his ending inventory by
excluding various indirect production costs, the cost of goods sold will be
overstated, thereby causing an understatement of taxable profit. The Commis-
sioner has realized the need to control this particular situation and has now
made it mandatory for all taxpayers to adopt the full absorption method of
costing inventories. ' The Treasury regulations now enumerate which
397 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 75-5708.
398 Rev. Proc. 75-23, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 17, at 20.
399 Rev. Proc. 74-19, 1974-2 CUM. BULL. 465.
400 Included are the following subject matters: Partnerships and trusts, Code Section 103,
real estate investment trusts, stock options, charitable remainder trusts, and pooled income
funds. Rev. Proc. 75-23, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 17, at 20.
401 Excluded are requests relating to the following subject matters: Change in accounting
method or period, last-in-first-out method of computing inventory, and insurance issues involv-
ing contracts with reserves based on segregated asset accounts or requiring actuarial computa-
tions. Id. at 20-21.
402 Id. Requests from individuals for employment status and submitted on Forms SS-8 are
excluded.
40STreas. Reg. § 1.471-11(a):
In order to conform as nearly as may be possible to the best accounting practices and
to clearly reflect income (as required by §471 of the Code), both direct and indirect
production costs must be taken into account in the computation of inventorial costs ....
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indirect costs are includable or excludable in computing ending inventory
costs.
Section 1.471-11(c) (2) lists three categories of indirect production
costs. The first category includes the costs which are always required to be
included in determining inventory costs. 4 The second category includes the
costs which are not included in determining inventory costs." 5 A third
category of indirect production costs are includable or excludable from
inventory costs depending on how the taxpayer treats such items in his
financial reports and whether they are in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles.0
Section 1.471-1 (c) (2) (i) and (ii) establish fixed rules for determining
which costs are includable and which are excludable. However, Section
1.471-1(c)(2)(iii) provides a flexible rule in determining whether a
taxpayer will include or exclude certain indirect production costs. The
flexibility of the rule provides for fluctuations in industry or business
practices, again, as long as the costs are within the scope of generally
accepted accounting principles. There is a two step approach in the use of
this rule. First, a financial report text is used as an objective measure to
establish whether or not the indirect production costs should be included or
excluded. If the indirect cost has not or will not be used in determining the
taxpayer's inventory for financial statement purposes, then it may be excluded
from the taxpayer's inventory on his tax return." ' Second, the exclusion
will be allowed only if generally accepted accounting principles have estab-
lished the appropriateness of the exclusion for the taxpayer's business or
industry."".
However, the Commissioner claims:
• .. that some taxpayers have attempted to exclude some or all costs
under Section 1.471-11 (c) (2) (iii) of the regulation as not inconsistent
with generally accepted accounting principles on the basis of consistency
of treatment and materiality. "°
The Commissioner has stated that the rule is not being applied
properly by the taxpayers. 10 In order to insure that the regulations are
404Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11(c)(2)(i).
4 0 5 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11(c)(2)(iH).
406Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11(c)(2)(iii).
407 Id.
408 Id.
40 9 T. I. R. 1365, 6 P-H 1975 FED TAXES 55,221.
41°0Id: .- .
. ".. . '' . .. . .
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properly interpreted the Commissioner has issued Announcement 75-42.1'
This procedure will require the taxpayer to judge each item of indirect
inventory cost on the basis of generally accepted accounting principles
"without regard to consistency of treatment or the materiality of such
costs."412
The procedure will also require a taxpayer who is changing to the full
absorption method to make one of the following representations with respect
to each item of cost included in the third category: (1) If a taxpayer is
going to exclude certain costs under Section 1.471-11(c)(2)(iii) on the
basis of consistency with financial report, he must submit a statement to
the Commissioner from his independent public accountants that the exclusion
of such costs are not inconsistent with generally accepted accounting
principles, which must be made without regard to consistency or materi-
ality;"1 3 (2) If a taxpayer is going to exclude certain indirect inventory
costs for income tax purposes, and he is also going to change his method of
determining inventory cost for financial statement purposes (thereby excluding
certain indirect inventory costs from his financial report), he must present
a statement to the Commissioner from his independent public accountant
stating that either (A) the change in method for financial reporting of
inventory costs is preferable in the taxpayer's business or (B) the change
"is consistent with Opinion No. 20 issued by the Accounting Principles
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 4 1 4 With
respect to A and B above, each item of cost must be considered separately
"without regard to the materiality of such costs." 1'
Announcement 75-42 has caused a conflict to arise between the Commis-
sioner and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(A.I.C.P.A.). The A.I.C.P.A. in a statement to the Commissioner has
opposed the adoption of this procedure.1 6 The A.I.C.P.A. believes that,
first, since the generally accepted accounting principles have been used as
a standard in the enforcement of Section 1.471-11 (c) (2) (iii), the standard
should be applied in the same manner as the accounting profession applies
it, and not in a different manner as interpreted by the Commissioner. 17
Secondly, the A.I.C.P.A. asserts that generally accepted accounting principles
have always considered materiality and consistency. The removal of such
411 Announcement 75-42, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 19.
412 T. I. R. 1365, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 55,221.
413 Id.
414 Id.
415 Id.
416 Forster, Full Absorption Inventory Costing, 6 TAx ADVISER 424 (July 1975).
47 Id. at 425-26.
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considerations would be inappropriate. Also, the evaluation of costs on an
item-by-item basis is contrary to Accounting Principles Board Opinion
No. 20, in that all costs must be considered as a whole in determining
materiality. The new procedure additionally will determine whether to include
or exclude costs based on generally accepted accounting principles in the
taxpayer's trade or industry. The A.I.C.P.A. believes that "this presupposes
the existence . . . of industry-by-industry guidelines for various items of
overhead to be included in or excluded from inventory ... [S]uch guidelines
do not exist." '18 Finally, many taxpayers have already adopted the full
absorption method since the beginning of the two-year transitional 1 ' period
(which began September 19, 1973, and will end September 19, 1975). '
The issue that arises from this situation is the treatment under the new
procedure to be given taxpayers who have already made the transition.
Although no formal decision has been made by the Commissioner, it is
possible that the taxpayer will have to reapply in order to ensure that all
taxpayers will be subject to uniform standards. However, the Commissioner
would not be able to impose any new requirements on a taxpayer who has
already received an approval for a change to the full absorption method
and has relied on it.
9.02 Change from FIFO to LIFO Method of Inventory Valuation
The more popular procedure of valuing inventories is the first-in,
first-out, or FIFO method. The FIFO method of valuing inventories charges
the oldest items in the inventory to cost of goods sold. Traditionally, these
items have the lowest cost during periods of inflation. FIFO also values the
ending inventory at the most recent cost. This results in high profits which
causes higher taxes and an ultimate reduction in cash flow. Without an
adequate cash flow many corporations are not able to replace their inventories.
Under the LIFO method which stands for last-in, first-out, the most
recent cost of an inventory item is charged to cost of goods sold. LIFO
reduces profits and income taxes by matching the current revenues with the
current high cost of inventories. Also, under LIFO, the ending inventory is
valued at the oldest costs. This results in lower income and lower taxes.
Since the LIFO method is desirable during inflationary periods, the
Commissioner is being flooded with Forms 970.21 However, the Internal
Revenue Service requirements for a proper election of a switch to LIFO
418 Id.
419 Id. at 428..
42 0 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11(e)(ii).
421 Treas. Reg. § 1.472-3(a). 'The LIFO inventory method may be adopted and used only if
the taxpayer files with his income tax return for the taxable year . . . Form 970 . .. ."
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are very complex, and if not properly complied with, a taxpayer could lose
his LIFO election. The taxpayer would then have to pay taxes on income
determined by his former inventory method.
Revenue Ruling 74-58642. stated that if a taxpayer using the LIFO
method made any comparison of earnings or earnings per share under
another method reported in financial statements, annual reports and news
releases after January 8, 1975, then, his LIFO election could be terminated.
The use of any method other than LIFO is a violation of Section 472(c)
and (e). The ruling also stated that the only exceptions would be those
permitted by Revenue Procedures 72-29,21 73-37,24 and Revenue Ruling
73-66.425 These exceptions apply only to specific transactions and they are
rarely used.
The problem the taxpayer faced was disclosing the change from FIFO
to LIFO as required by the Security and Exchange Commission 2. and
various accounting rules. If the taxpayer made the disclosure, he would
violate Section 472 and thereby lose his LIFO election. If he did not make the
disclosure he would then violate the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.7"
The Internal Revenue Service has resolved this problem by way of
Revenue Procedure 75-10"58 which states that a taxpayer who elects to
switch to the LIFO method will not have his election terminated merely
because he makes disclosures in financial statements, annual reports and
news releases as required by Accounting Principle Board Opinions 20 and
28 (A.P.B. 20 and 28), Financial Accounting Standards Board 3
(F.A.S.B. 3), Accounting Series Release 159 (A.S.R. 159), Rule 3-07 of
the Securities and Exchange Commission Regulations S-X (Rule 3-07) and
Securities Act of 1934 Release Number 11079 (Release No. 11079). The
purpose of Revenue Procedure 75-1029 was to amplify Revenue Procedure
422 Rev. Rul. 74-586, 1974 CUM. BULL. 156.
423 Rev. Proc. 72-29, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 757, provides that a LIFO election would not be
terminated because of variations for financial and tax purposes caused by the use of accounting
principles in certain business combinations.
424 Rev. Proc. 73-37, 1973-2 CUM. BULL. 501, states that a taxpayer will not lose his LIFO
election merely because he discloses the effect of the change in method in his financial
statements as required by Accounting Principles Board Opinion 20.
425 Rev. Rul. 73-66, 1973-1 CuM. BULL. 218, states, in effect, that conformity requirements
would not be violated if the footnote disclosed only the difference in inventory value of the
FIFO over the LIFO method.
426 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-07(a) (1972).
427 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (1934).
428 Rev. Proc. 75-10, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 7 ,at 16.
429 Id.
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73-37,30 permitting the taxpayer to make proper disclosures.
Rule 3-07 requires that a disclosure of the effect of the change to LIFO
be repeated in subsequent years when the taxpayer's financial statements for
the year of change are being reported. Release No. 11079 requires that a five
year summary of operations be included in the Annual reports to show the
effect of the change to LIFO. Revenue Procedure 75-10"'1 makes it very
clear that "such disclosure is strictly limited to the effect on the year of
change included in such summary and not for subsequent taxable years." ' 2
Any disclosure of the effect of the switch to LIFO on income in a subsequent
year will terminate the LIFO election.
Another problem the taxpayer faced was the disclosure by way of
footnote or parenthetical of the "excess of replacement cost or current cost
over LIFO stated value" ''3 as required by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Prior to Revenue Ruling 75-50, ' a taxpayer would lose his
LIFO election if he made such a disclosure. 35 The only disclosure permitted
in a footnote or parenthetical was the difference in the inventory value of
FIFO over LIFO method.
There was also the question of whether or not a taxpayer would lose
his LIFO election, if he elected the LIFO method for tax purposes, while
issuing financial statements for the same year using the FIFO method to
value inventories. By way of Revenue Ruling 75-49 3 the Internal Revenue
Service has warned the taxpayer that in the year in which he elects the
LIFO inventory method, this election will be terminated if the taxpayer
has used a method other than LIFO in issued annual reports. The use of
another method violates the requirements of Section 472(c) of the Code
and Treasury Regulation 1.472-2(c). Reissuance of new statements using
the LIFO method or recall of the already issued financial statements will not
cure the failure to comply with the requirements. '
A taxpayer who elects to use the LIFO method is further required to
value his opening inventory at cost.43 8 Therefore, any write-down or mark-
down to market value must be restored. An amended return for the taxable
430 Rev. Rul. 73-37, 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 501; accord, Rev. Proc. 75-10, 1975 INT. REV.
BULL. No. 7, at 16.
431 Rev. Proc. 75-10, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 7, at 16.
432 Id.
438 17 C.F.R. § 210.5-02(6) (B).
484 Rev. Rul. 75-50, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 7, at 11.
435 Rev. Rul. 73-66, 1973-1 CUM. BULL. 218.
438 Rev. Rul. 75-49, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 7, at 11.
487 Id.
438 Treas. Reg. § 1.472-2(B).
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year prior to the LIFO election may have to be filed, which usually means
paying additional tax.
There have been many changes this year which have helped to resolve
some of the conflicts caused by the taxpayer's duty to disclose changes in
inventory method (as required by the Securities and Exchange Commission
and various accounting rules) and the Commissioner's requirement of non-
disclosure of any method other than LIFO. However, the requirements for
a proper election of a switch to LIFO remain very complex and the taxpayer
will have to proceed very carefully when making his election. A single viola-
tion of any requirement could cause the taxpayer to lose his LIFO election.
10.00 Pension, Profit Sharing, and Stock Ownership Plans
10.01 Employee Pension and Retirement Trusts
Under Section 404 contributions made to a "stock bonus, pension,
profit-sharing or annuity plan" '439 by an employer, will not be deductible
under Sections 162 or 212, unless they meet the requirements of either of
those sections. If the requirements of Section 162 or 212 are met, the
contributions to a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing or annuity plan will
be deductible when paid, if the specific plan is exempt under Section 501 (a).
The first concern is determining what qualifies as a contribution to the plan.
Cash or property.4 . will qualify as a valid contribution. But, until recently,
it was unclear whether an unsecured note given by an employer would
qualify as a valid contribution to an employee pension trust and employee
retirement trust plan.
The Tax Court clarified the issue in Lancer Clothing Corporation.'
by ruling that an unsecured note given to an employee pension trust and
employee retirement trust plan did not qualify as a contribution for a
deduction. In Lancer Clothing, the petitioner was an accrual basis taxpayer.
In 1967, the company issued $39,978 of unsecured interest bearing promis-
sory notes to its employee pension trust and employee retirement trust plans.
The company took a deduction for the contribution pursuant to Section 404.
The notes were paid in full when due in 1969.
The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction, stating that
an unsecured note was not considered a payment under Section 404. The
petitioner claimed that the payment of the unsecured notes was within the
meaning of Section 404(a), relying on Wasatch Chemical Company v.
439 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a).
440 Colorado National Bank, 30 T. C. 933 (1958).
44144 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 75,180 (June 9, 1975).
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Commissioner," 2 which held that the delivery of a taxpayer's own promissory
note to an employer's trust constituted payment for the purpose of Section
404(a). However, subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service in Revenue
Ruling 71-95"1 refused to recognize the Wasatch decision.
Petitioner further relied on the case of Colorado National Bank,"4
which held that a payment to a pension fund of property was acceptable,
and argued that his unsecured notes should be considered property. However,
the Tax Court relied on the case of Don E. Williams," '5 which held that a
promissory note given to a pension trust was not transferred property as
such and does not qualify as payment under Section 404(a). The Court
further stated that the property in Colorado National was real, rather than
personal; therefore, petitioner's argument did not come within the parameters
of the Colorado decision.
The Lancer court also stated that an unsecured promissory note "merely
suspends the underlying obligation until the instrument is paid." Thus, a
promissory note can not be considered final payment when delivered to the
employee pension trust and employee retirement trust plans.
Finally, the court stated that it was not the intent of Congress "that
the issuance of an unsecured note should be considered payment under
Section 404(a) .""'
In the future, all employers should contribute cash or real property to
the funds, since any use of unsecured promissory notes will most likely
result in the loss of the deduction under the Lancer Clothing Corporation
decision.
10.02 Federal Civil Service Retirement Fund
As privately employed and self-employed taxpayers have been allowed
increasing latitude in making payments to pension funds and excluding
these payments from taxable income, Federal employees have often argued
that their contributions to the Federal Civil Service Retirement Fund should
be deductible. In Hogan v. United States," 8 the Sixth Circuit joined the
Third" and Fourth ' Circuits in denying the Federal employees a deduction
442 Wasatch Chemical Co. v. Comm'r, 313 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1963).
4 Rev. Rul. 71-95, 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 130.
444 Colorado National Bank, 30 T. C. 933 (1958).
4 462 T. C. 166 (May 14, 1974).
44644 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 75-180 (June 9, 1975). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-802.
44744 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 75,180 (June 9, 1975).
448 35 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 75-1024 (6th Cir. 1975).
449 Megibow v. Commissioner 218 F.2d 687 (3rd Cir. 1955).
SoMiller v. Commissioner 144 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1944).
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for their contributions to the Federal Civil Service Retirement Fund.
In Hogan, the taxpayer argued that the contributions to the plan should
be treated as having been made by the employer and should therefore not
be taxable to the employee until it is received by him. The court observed
that the statutory language regulating the amount to be withheld for the
Retirement Fund creates a presumption that the federal employee "is deemed
to consent and agree to these deductions from his basic pay." ' 1 The Hogan
court also noted that Congress was fully cognizant of the income tax
consequences under the Federal Civil Service plan and could change the
classification of the contributions from employee to employer, if it so
desired.
It is apparent from the Hogan decision that relief for federal employees
in this area must come from Congress and not the courts.
10.03 Profit Sharing Plan
In the case of Ronald C. Packard," ' three dentists in a partnership
formed a corporation, making themselves the sole shareholders and directors
of the corporation. After transferring the office building and dental equipment
used in their practice to the corporation, they leased the building and
equipment back to the partnership. On August 1, 1968 the partnership
transferred all employees to the corporation. The partnership and the
corporation then entered into a contract for the corporation to supply
complete services to the partnership (building, equipment, janitorial services,
employees, bookkeeping, etc.).
On August 21, 1968 the three dentists as partners initiated a profit-
sharing plan which covered only themselves. The dentists then filed Form
3672, as required by the Internal Revenue Service, for the purpose of having
their profit-sharing plan approved. The request was denied by the Internal
Revenue Service since it did not include the employees who were transferred
to the corporation. The Internal Revenue Service stated that since the
employees still performed the same services and were still under the super-
vision of the three partners, they remained employees of the partnership.
'
The deductions which the partners took for their contributions to the plan in
1968 and 1969 were consequently disallowed by the Internal Revenue
Service.
Section 401(d)(3) requires that any profit-sharing plan cover all
employees who have three or more years service with the self-employed
451 Civil Service Retirement Act, 5. U.S.C. § 8334(b) (1970).
45263 T. C. No. 59 (March 11, 1975).
53 Rev. Rul. 68-303, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 165.
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person. Five employees of the dental partnership had been employed full-time
for three years or more and, therefore, according to the Internal Revenue
Service, should have been included under the profit-sharing plan. '54
The respondent relied on Revenue Ruling 68-303 ' 11 in which another
partnership transferred its employees to a corporation and then leased them
back to the partnership. The employees continued to be supervised as before,
and performed the same services. The only functions the corporation
performed were providing insurance and issuing paychecks to the employees.
In Packard the situation is similar to that in Revenue Ruling 68-303
but not exactly on point. The partners in Packard did have the same people
working for them, but the employees were subject to the complete control
of the corporation. The partnership desired competent personnel; the corpora-
tion was to supply that personnel and maintain supervision to assure proper
performance of job duties. Further, the corporation was vested with the
authority to discharge employees. There was no relationship between the
employees salaries, which were paid by the corporation, and the payment
made to the corporation by the dentists for personnel services rendered.
The corporation also performed all employee-related functions, including
supervision which further substantiated the fact that the employees were
employed by the corporation as opposed to the partnership. The Tax Court
therefore held that the profit-sharing plan was not disqualified under Section
401 (d) (3). Thus, the principle difference that qualified the Packard plan
was the corporation's providing a complete personnel function as opposed
to the mere provision of employees found in the 68-303 situation.
The Internal Revenue Service has issued a new Revenue Ruling
concerning employee coverage requirements. Revenue Ruling 75-3 5456
involved a physician who set up a service corporation and transferred his
employees to the corporation. At the same time, the physician formed a
professional corporation which leased back the employees. The Internal
Revenue Service stated that the individuals were employees of the professional
corporation since they performed the same services as they did before.
Revenue Ruling 75-35 would not control a Packard situation. The
service corporation in Packard provided services to other doctors, supplied
the doctors with complete service as opposed to just employee service, and
exercised control over the employees. Therefore, by using Packard's method
of setting up a service corporation, a partnership would be able to set up a
454 63 T. C. at 349.
455 Rev. Rul. 68-303, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 165.
456 Rev. Rul. 75-35, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 6, at 6.
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profit-sharing plan under Section 401 without including employees. However,
there is one danger in setting up a professional corporation and a service
corporation with both corporations having the same shareholders: Under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ' the two corporations may
be considered part of a controlled group ' of corporations and the employees
of the service corporation could still be considered employees of the profes-
sional corporation. Such a result would require inclusion of all employees of
the professional corporation in the profit-sharing plan for it to be valid.
Furthermore, consolidation of the separate entities could result from
the language of Section 414(c); the employees of any ". . . trade or business
(whether or not incorporated) which are under common control shall be
treated as employed by a single employer." ' For example, if a partnership
owned 50 percent of a service corporation, the employees of the corporation
could be considered as employees of the partnership. In essence, the controlled
group problem cannot be avoided by setting up a partnership, as opposed
to a professional corporation.
Thus, there are two potential solutions to the controlled group problem.
One is illustrated by the Packard approach, i.e., setting up a service corpora-
tion. However, it should be noted that the Packard case is unique in a
controlled group situation. A very fine line is drawn between control under
Section 1563 and the result in the Packard case.
There does appear to be another solution. A second approach is the
creation of a service corporation by an individual not associated with the
partnership or professional corporation. Employees of the latter could then
be transferred to the service corporation and leased back to the partnership
or professional corporation. No problem with controlled groups would arise
as there would be no common stock ownership. The partnership would
supervise employees and maintain their standard of work, while the service
corporation would still retain authority over the employees as their employer.
If the corporation could also extend the same services to other doctors,
there would be a further indication that there was a valid business purpose
for setting up the corporation.
4 57 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Act of Sept. 2, 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-406, § 1, 88 Stat. 829 (hereinafter referred to as ERiSA).
458 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 414(b). A controlled group of corporations is defined in
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1563(a)(1), as one or more chains of corporations connected
through 80 percent stock ownership with a common parent. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
1563(a) (2), (3) concerns brother-sister controlled groups and combined groups respectively.
45PINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 414(c).
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10.04 Employee Stock Ownership Plans*
The term Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) was introduced
into the Internal Revenue Code by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA). 6 ° The philosophy supporting the ESOP form of
employee benefit is to provide capital stock ownership for those persons
that supply the labor to produce the goods. It is an attempt, as stated by
Senator Long:
[To] move toward the day when many in this country will own an
interest in the means by which wealth is produced-I refer to the tools,
rather than the labor in this case-rather than the means or production
being owned by about 3% of the people, as is the case today." 1
The term Employee Stock Ownership Plan is defined in ERISA as an
individual account plan which is a stock bonus plan designed to invest
primarily in employer securities. '62 A stock bonus plan is a "plan established
and maintained by an employer to provide benefits similar to those of a
profit-sharing plan, except that the contributions by the employer are not
necessarily dependent upon profits, and the benefits are distributable in
stock of the employer company." 6 '
This type of stock bonus plan is composed of two parts. The first is
the ESOP and the second is the Employee Stock Ownership Trust (ESOT).
Like other deferred plans, the ESOT must satisfy the requirements of
Section 401 (a) to gain the federal tax advantages flowing to qualified plans.
In operation, the corporation would make contributions to the ESOT, in
accordance with the plan, by issuing treasury stock or authorized, but not
previously issued stock, to the ESOT which would in turn allocate the stock
to the employees' account. As the employees' rights gradually vest, they
become beneficial owners of the company. The stock need not be voting
common but can be preferred or any class which can be deemed an employer
security. '6 4 If voting shares are contributed, ERISA does not require that
the voting rights be exercisable by the employees. Therefore, the Trust can
create a committee to vote the stock, which can be comprised entirely of
directors or officers, thus preventing transfer of control to the employees."8 5
*The author wishes to extend special thanks to Anthony J. Alexander, J.D., University of
Akron, for his contribution of this section.
480 Act of Sept. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1, 88 Stat. 829.
481 Statement by Senator Long, as quoted in Hyatt, Free Distributions of Stock to Employees
Are Spurred by a New Tax-Law Provision, The Wall Street Journal, April 29, 1975, at 36,
col. 3.
462 ERISA § 407(d)(6).
4683 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (ii).
464 See ERISA § 2003(a); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4975(e) (8).
465 Provisions of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Act of March 29, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12,
[Vol. 9: 3
94
Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss3/2
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1975
An ESOP is a plan that uses borrowed funds to finance the purchase of
the firm's stock for funding the Trust. An ESOP, although a form of stock
bonus plan, is the only variety of such plans which permits the purchase of
employer stock with employer guaranteed loans."6' This feature, legislatively
approved, is the distinction which establishes the uniqueness of ESOPs as
compared with other deferred compensation plans and provides the basis for
their many uses in corporate finance.
ERISA further classifies ESOPs as defined contribution plans. 6" In a
defined contribution plan, the employer's annual contribution is fixed,
usually at a flat dollar amount or at a percentage of compensation, and the
amount of an employee's retirement benefit depends on the investment
performance of the pension fund. Since the employees' benefit depends, at
least in the case of ESOPs, on the performance of the trust, such plans are
exempt from the minimum funding standards. ' Also, as a defined contribu-
tion plan, an ESOP is excluded from the provisions requiring plan termination
insurance."9
The key to the Employee Stock Ownership Trust is its ability to invest
in employer securities. Section 407(a) of ERISA limits the holding of
employer securities to 10% of the fair market value of the assets of the plan.
However, Section 407(b) exempts eligible individual account plans, which,
as defined in Section 407(d) (3), includes employee stock ownership plans.
To fully maximize the ESOP financing technique, the trust must not only
be able to hold employer securities, but must also have the ability to leverage
investments in such securities above the amount contributed by the corpora-
tion. Section 404 (a) (1) of ERISA imposes responsibilities on fidiciaries
to discharge their duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
participants and beneficiaries for the exclusive purpose or providing benefits
to such parties and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.
This is commonly referred to as the exclusive benefit rule. It can be satisified
if the acquisition, sale or lease is for adequate consideration and if no commis-
sion is charged. ' If these conditions are complied with, ESOP financing
will be available and the trust can borrow funds and use the proceeds to
89 Stat. 26, and the Trade Act of 1974, Act of January 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat.
1978, require the pass through of voting rights to obtain the benefits contained in those Acts.
466 See ERisA § 2003(a), TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4975(d) (3).
467 ERISA § 2003(a), INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4975(e)(7).
468 ERsA § 1013(a), TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 412(b)(1).
4
69 ERSA § 4021(b).
*70d § 408(e).
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purchase employer securities, using such securities as collateral for the
loan.47 '
Even though an ESOP has the advantage of partially circumventing the
fiduciary controls, they must still comply with the provisions of ERISA
dealing with vesting and participation," 72 disclosure, 73 and requirements of
Section 401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Contributions to an ESOT are generally made in qualifying employer
securities unless cash is contributed to service debts incurred by the trust.
A qualifying employer security is defined in Section 2003(e) (8) of ERISA
as an employer security which is: "(A) stock or otherwise an equity security,
or (B) a bond, debenture, note, or certificate or other evidence of indebt-
ness . . . . " This definition establishes a basis for contributing any type of
equity security whether voting, non-voting, common or preferred. Section
415 as amended by Section 2004(a) of ERISA defines the limits on benefits
and contributions under qualified plans. Section 415 states that the trust
shall not constitute a qualified trust under Section 401 (a) if the contribution
and other additions with respect to a participant's account is greater than the
lesser of $25,000 or 25 percent of the participant's compensation. The
annual addition is computed by the sum of the employer contributions plus
forefeitures. 4 Although contributions may be made within the limits above,
the deduction from income for contributions to stock bonus plans may not
exceed 15 percent of the compensation paid or accrued during the taxable
year to covered employees. ' However, any excess contributions may be
carried forward to subsequent years when contributions are less than the 15
percent limit.
Since the corporation will be attempting to deduct the value of the
securities contributed, it is essential that a proper valuation be assigned to
the securities. If too low a value is placed on the employer securities, the
Service may claim that the plan is not qualified because it is not for the
exclusive benefit of the employees. 7 8 On the other hand, placing too high
a value on the employer securities may merely result in the corporation
claiming an excessive deduction. The valuation method chosen is determina-
471Id. § 408(b)(3).
472 ERISA, Tit. I, subtit. B, part 2.
4 3 1 Id. part 1.
474ERISA § 2004(a), INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 415(c)(2). If employee contributions are
made to the trust, the annual addition also includes the lesser of: (i) the amount of the
employee contributions in excess of six percent of his compensation, or (ii) one-half of the
employee contributions.
475 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a)(3)(A).
47e ERSA § 408(e).
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tive of various extrinsic factors and, as such, should be selected at the
outset of the plan and consistently applied for purposes of both contributions
and distributions. An appraisal may be required, since each share may not
have a value equivalent to those shares publicly traded because the shares
may be unregistered in accordance with securities laws, thus not freely
marketable, or the distribution may be so excessive as to have an adverse
effect on financial indicators, thus depressing the market value.
An ESOP has the advantage of making capital financing deductible.
By using an ESOP as the vehicle for obtaining the funds to finance corporate
growth, the corporation can use pre-tax deductible dollars to repay the loan.
In operation, the ESOT rather than the corporation would borrow the
necessary funds, with the note being guaranteed by the corporation. The
ESOT would then use such funds to purchase additional shares from the
corporation. The shares received by the ESOT would be pleged as collateral
for the loan. Thereafter, the corporation would make cash contributions to
the trust equal to the repayment schedule for the note. These contributions
are deductible by the corporation and are received tax-free by the trust."'
For example, assume that a corporation which has an effective tax rate of
50% requires $2,000,000 for an expansion program."'8 The ESOT would
borrow such funds from the bank and purchase $2,000,000 worth of shares
from the corporation. The corporation would then make cash contributions
to the ESOT sufficient to amortize the debt. Since the contributions would
be tax deductible, the corporation could service the debt by generating only
$2,000,000 of corporate earnings as opposed to $4,000,000, if normal
financing channels are utilized. The corporation has increased its net cash
flow over the period of the loan by $2,000,000 because by using an ESOP
the principal becomes tax deductible rather than merely the interest.
Cash flow will also be increased through the annual contribution of
stock to the ESOT. This is true because, via an ESOP, the corporation
receives the ultimate tax deduction which involves no cash outlay. Since
contributions to an ESOT are not contingent upon profits, as is the case
of profit-sharing plans, the corporation may be able to generate a net
operating loss which can be carried back three years and forward five
years.' 79
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 introduces a new tax concept by
granting an additional one percent investment tax credit to a corporate
47, See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 503.
478 The loan would only be limited by the amount of available private capital and the ability
of the corporation to service the loan.
'* INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172.
Winter, 1976]
97
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1975
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1976
AKRON LAW REVIEW
employer on the condition that equivalent benefits are provided to
employees. 8 ' Specifically, a corporation may elect to increase its investment
tax credit from 10 percent to 11 percent if it agrees to transfer employer
securities into an ESOP."' The securities transferred must have a value equal
to the increase in the investment credit, i.e., one percent of the employer's
qualified investment for the year. 8' However, the employer will not receive
a tax deduction for the amounts contributed to an ESOP to the extent the
transfers are pursuant to the investment credit election. To qualify for the
additional one percent investment credit, the plan must provide that the
participant's rights to the securities are nonforfeitable upon allocation to
his account at each plan year's end and that the employee can designate how
the stock is to be voted. 83
The Trade Act of 1974 provides for a $500,000,000 United States
Government fund for backing loans to businesses in "trade impacted areas,"
that is, in communities which might be adversely affected by imports from
abroad.8  Section 273 (f) (1) of the Act states that preference shall be given
to a corporation which agrees that 25 percent of the principal amount of the
loan is paid by the lender to an ESOT, "maintained by the recipient corpora-
tion, by a parent or subsidiary of such corporation, or by several corporations
including the recipient corporations . . . ." The Act further states that the
amount of the loan to the qualified trust will be used to purchase qualified
employer securities, and that the ESOT will service principal and interest
out of amounts contributed to the Trust by the recipient corporation.
In effect, the Trade Act of 1974 permits not only preferential treatment
to those companies which institute an ESOT, but further allows the loan
to the ESOT to be serviced with pre-tax dollars. The government, therefore,
pays part of the principal and interest on the loan which it backs. However,
as in the case of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, the securities must be
common voting stock which is voted by the participants when allocated to
their individual accounts. 8 '
Since the regulations dealing with Employee Stock Ownership Plans
have not yet been promulgated, determination as to what the plan must
specifically provide is unclear. However, if one views the Trade Act of 1974
and the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 as indicators of Government theories
480 Act of March 29, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26.
481 d § 301(a)(1)(B).
48
2 1d. § 301(d)(6).
4S8 3d. § 301(d)(5).
486 Act of January 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 273(g), 88 Stat. 1978.
48 1d. § 273(f)(5)(c).
[Vol. 9: 3
98
Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss3/2
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1975
on the makeup of ESOPs, it appears that the corporation through the ESOP
must provide for a flow-through of voting rights and possibly immediate
vesting. Much of the present discussion has considered that these items need
not be present to qualify the Trust, however the regulations may construe
what appears to be allowed by ERISA narrowly, so that qualifying employer
securities can be only voting securities and such voting rights must be
passed through to the participants.
When the stock is eventually distributed to the employee, a portion of
the distribution may be subject to taxation. There are basically two types
of distributions: (1) periodic, with payments from the participant's account
being made in installments exceeding one taxable year; and, (2) lump
sum, with the participant's account being distributed entirely within one
year. If the periodic method of distribution from the ESOT is elected,
Section 402(a) provides that the employee would be taxed on the distribution
under Section 72 which provides that the value of the stock distributed in
excess of the amount contributed by the employee is ordinary income. The
distribution may be taxed as a lump sum if the entire interest is distributed
within one taxable year,"8 6 and the distribution arises from the employee's
disability, death, attainment of age 591/2 or older, or termination of service,' 7
and the employee has participated in the plan for at least five years. '
The two major tax advantages associated with the lump sum method
are that a portion of the distribution may be taxed as a capital gain and
taxation of the unrealized appreciation is deferred. However, the unrealized
appreciation is excluded from the employee's basis in the stock, but on the
sale of such stock, the realization of the appreciation is treated as a capital
gain no matter how long the stock is held by the employee.' 9 If the gain
on the sale of such stock exceeds the unrealized appreciation at the time of
distribution, the excess is treated as short-term or long-term gain depending
upon whether the employee held the securities the requisite months from
the date of distribution.9 0 If the employee dies after receiving the lump sum
distribution but before disposing of the stock, the unrealized appreciation
will not be accorded a stepped-up basis under Section 1014. In Revenue
Ruling 75-125,' ' the Service concluded that the "net unrealized appreciation
constitutes a right to receive income in respect of a decedent as provided
486 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(e) (4) (A).
487 Id.
4 'sId. § 402(e) (4) (H). For a detailed discussion of calculation methods see Briner, Federal
Income Tax Developments: 1974, 8 AXRON L. REv. 206, 294 (1975).
489Treas. Reg. § 1.402(2)-1(b)(1)(i).
490 Id.
491 Rev. Rul. 75-125, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 15, at 13.
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under Section 691 (a)." As income in respect of a decedent, the unrealized
appreciation would become taxable to the recipient when distributed from the
estate, however it would retain its long-term capital gain character. Such
recipient would also receive a deduction under Section 691(c) for that
portion of the federal estate tax attributable to the amount of the net
unrealized appreciation included in the decedent's estate. Under Section
2039(c) and Section 2517, if the employee dies before retirement or before
distribution of his benefits, his interest would not be subject to either
federal estate or gift tax, except to the extent of contributions made by the
employee, provided the beneficiary is other than the employee's executor
or estate.
An ESOP is probably the most sophisticated method of providing
employee benefits. It is unique not only in application, but also in the
magnitude of benefits such plans provide. ESOP is the employee benefit
and corporate financing plan of the future and should be viewed by corporate
planners as providing a means for both at the least present cost. The most
serious obstacle in adopting this concept is the uncertainty as to how the
Treasury regulations will be promulgated. Many tax advisors believe it is
too risky to adopt a plan of this complexity without established guidelines,
however the versatility of ESOP should not be overlooked for current and
future planning.
11.00 Corporations
11.01 Stockholder Approval Requirement for Qualifying Employee
Stock Option Plans
Section 421 provides that no income will be recognized when an
employee acquires his employer's stock at discount through exercise of his
employee stock option rights, where the option is qualified pursuant to
Section 422(b)(1). A qualified stock option is one granted pursuant to a
plan which "is approved by the stockholders of the granting corporation
within twelve months before or after the date such plan is adopted .... ",492
Illuminating the phrase "approved by the stockholders", Regulation
1.422(b)(1) states:
The approval of the stockholders . . . must represent the express
consent of stockholders holding at least a majority of the voting stock
of the corporation, voting in person or by proxy at a duly held
stockholders' meeting. 9 3
Applying the above guideline, Revenue Ruling 75-256'4' determined
492 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b) (1).
'
93Treas. Reg. § 1.422(b)(1).
49 Rev. Rul. 75-256, 1975 1NT. REv. BULL. No. 27, at 18.
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that a plan of X Corporation did not qualify, since the plan was not
approved by stockholders owning a total majority of the voting stock of the
corporation. Approval by 80 percent of the stockholders voting in person
or by proxy at a stockholders' meeting was not sufficient for compliance with
Regulation 1.422(b) (1) where only 40 percent of the outstanding stock
ownership was represented at such meeting. In effect, the plan was approved
by only 32 percent of the corporation's ownership interests, therefore, the
approval failed to meet requirements of Regulation 1.422(b) (1).
In supporting this strict construction of Section 422, the Commissioner
stated that these guidelines were needed to protect the stockholders' equity
interest in their corporation. '95 It should be noted that Revenue Ruling
75-256 will not be given retroactive effect; it will apply only to plans
approved after July 7, 1976. However, it must be noted that the ruling will
not abrogate approval requirements in excess of 50 percent established by
state law or by corporate charters and bylaws.4 96
11.02 Corporate Reorganization-Non Recognition Provisions
Section 354(a) (1) provides that no gain or loss will be recognized if
stock or securities in a corporation which is party to a reorganization,
pursuant to a reorganization plan are exchanged solely for the stock or
securities in such corporation or in another corporation also a party to the
reorganization. Section 368(a) (1) (B) defines "reorganization" to include
the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its
voting stock, of stock of another corporation if, immediately after the
acquisition, the acquiring corporation has control of such other corporation.
In Revenue Ruling 75-94,"9" Corporation A desired to acquire control
of Corporation B by exchanging some of its voting stock for all the outstand-
ing stock of the latter. A valuation of $1,000 was placed on the outstanding
stock of Corporation B. The shareholders of Corporation B were willing to
exchange their stock for voting stock of Corporation A, if such stock was
also valued at $1,000. Relying on Corporation A's representations, that
its stock was presently earning $6.00 per share, the A shares, having a
supposed value of $1,000, were exchanged for B shares having the same
value. This exchange was consumated in 1973 and the shareholders for each
corporation received Section 354(a)(1) non-recognition treatment.
Subsequently, former shareholders of Corporation A discovered that
improper accounting practices of Corporation B had inflated its earnings
per share figures, which led the former Corporation B shareholders to
493 Id., citing H. R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 65 (1963).
496 Rev. Rul. 75-256, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 27, at 18.
497 Rev. Rul. 75-94, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 27, at 11.
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overvalue its shares. Within a year after the initial Section 368(a)(1)(B)
reorganization, an agreement was reached whereby former Corporation B
shareholders were to receive additional shares of Corporation A to render
the exchange equal.
The question presented to the IRS was whether the additional shares
received would be entitled to Section 354(a)(1) non-recognition treatment.
In answering, the IRS relied on Treasury Regulation 1.368-2. The test
established by Regulation 1.368-2 states that non-recognition is limited to
exchanges or distributions directly connected to the relevant Section 368(a)
reorganization.
Thus, in Revenue Ruling 75-94, the subsequent distributions were
qualified as part of the original Section 368(a) plan of reorganization
based on an exchange of shares of equal value and were held to merely
fulfill the terms of the original plan.
1L03 Applicability of Personal Holding Company Tax to Professional
Corporation
Sections 541 through 547 of the Code provide that in addition to
other income taxes, an additional 70 percent tax shall be assessed against
undistributed personal holding company income. Section 543(a)(7)
establishes that amounts received under personal service contracts shall be
considered personal holding company income if someone other than the
corporation has the right to designate who is to perform the services and the
individual performing the service owns at least 25 percent of the corporation
stock.
Revenue Ruling 75-67"98 was issued to clarify the scope of Section
543 (a) (7). It establishes that a physician, who is an 80 percent stockholder
of a professional corporation as well as its only practicing physician, is not
subject to the personal holding company tax when there is no specification
by the patient served regarding who is to perform the services and when
the services rendered are not so unique that substitution of another physician
is not practicable. This ruling resolves a potentially troublesome question in
the area of professional corporations and seems applicable to legal
corporations.
11.04 Valuation of Corporate Distribution
The Commissioner, committed to non-acquiescence regarding the Sixth
Circuit 1965 decision in H. Wetter Manufacturing Co. v. United States,'"9
49S Rev. Rul. 75-67, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 7.
499 458 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1972).
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added the case to the IRS prime issue list. In Wetter, a Section 542 personal
holding company attempted to adjust its Section 545 personal holding
company income by taking a dividend deduction authorized by Section
454(a). The controversy centered over the valuation of such deduction.
The company distributed the capital stock of Texaco, Inc., which had a
basis to the taxpayer of $2,000 and a fair market value of $38,820;
the taxpayer reduced his personal holding company income by the latter
amount. The Commissioner, relying on Regulation 1.562-1(a),5' declared
that the amount deducted for a dividend distribution must be limited to the
adjusted basis of the stock in the hands of the distributing corporation. The
taxpayer contended the opposite language in Section 301 (b) (1) (A), which
provides that "the amount of any distribution shall be . . . the amount of
money received, plus the fair market value of the property received,"
controlled the conflicting language in the regulations.
Although recognizing the direct contradiction between the Code and
the Regulations, the Commissioner contended that the latter should control
since they correctly embody the congressional intent and history behind the
Personal Holding Company sections.5"' The Sixth Circuit disagreed, analyzing
the language of Sections 301, 545, 561, 562 and 316 as supporting the
taxpayer's contention and further stated that extrinsic aids to construction
such as legislative intent and history would be used to solve, not create,
ambiguity and would not be applied to uphold regulations which are contrary
to express statutory language." 2
11.05 Capital Gains Treatment on Inter-Corporate Sales of
Depreciable Property
In Miller v. Commissioner,"3 the Ninth Circuit was confronted with
the seldom litigated issue of whether Section 1239 (a) (2) precluded capital
gains treatment when an 80 percent controlled corporation" ' sells Section
1231 assets to another corporation controlled by the same individual.
Section 1239 provides that the capital gain treatment of Section 1231 is
not available, where a direct or indirect sale or exchange is made between
an individual and any corporation whose outstanding stock is more than
80 percent owned by such individual.
Although the Commissioner contended that a sale between two
500 Treas. Reg. 1.562-1(a), reads as follows:
If a dividend is paid in property (rather than money), the amount of the dividends paid
deduction with respect to such property shall be the adjusted basis of the property in the
hands of the distributing corporation at the time of the distribution.
501 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 541-47.
502 458 F.2d at 1034, 1035.
503 510 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1975).
5 04 INT REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1239(a) (2).
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controlled corporations constituted an indirect sale between the taxpayer and
one of the corporations since the sole proceeds eventually inured to the
taxpayers benefit, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument by refusing to
characterize one of the corporations as a straw man. It declared that Section
1239 did not affect this transaction since a sale between two controlled
corporations was not specified in either the Code or the Regulations. It is
submitted that the court's refusal to characterize one of the corporations as
a straw man, and thus deem the transaction an indirect sale, was inappropri-
ate, since an 80 percent owned corporation, by analogy, is at least as
controlled as a spouse in Section 1231 inter-spousal transactions, which are
proscribed by Section 1239(a) (1). It should be noted that Miller is contrary
to Revenue Ruling 69-109 in which it was declared that Section 1239 encom-
passed the controlled corporation situation."5
11.06 Spin Offs and Split Ups from a Single Business
Section 355 enables corporations to reorganize without recognition of
gain or loss by their shareholders. Since 1961,5°8 it has been clearly
established that this section allows a corporation conducting a single business
to "split-up or spin-off"5 50 into two or more separate corporations without
tax recognition.0 8 However, the Commissioner has long relied on Treasury
Regulation 1.355-1 (a) in contending that to qualify for a tax free divisive
reorganization, it must appear that the trade or business of the new corpora-
tion must have been actively conducted as a separate business of the parent
corporation throughout the five-year period preceding the reorganization."0 '
This interpretation of Treasury Regulation 1.355-1(a) has been dismissed
as invalid.51 For example, in Edmund P. Coady,51' the Tax Court held that
Section 355 non-recognition treatment was available where two 50
percent shareholders of a construction company divided its assets to form
two separate construction companies, with each taxpayer being the sole
owner.
Against this background of consistent refusals to apply the multiple-
business requirement of Treasury Regulation 1.355-1 (a), the Commissioner
announced in advanced Revenue Ruling 75-160511 that he would follow
5 Rev. Rul. 69-109, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 202.
506 Edmund P. Coady, 33 T. C. 771 (1960).
507 See J. Chommie, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 225, at 677 (2nd ed. 1973).
508 E.g., Rafferty v. Comm'r, 452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Marrett,
433 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1963); Edmund P. Coady, 33 T.C. 771 (1960).
509 433 F.2d 1064.
510 See cases cited in note 508 supra.
51133 T. C. 771.
512 Rev. Rul. 75-160, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 18, at 7.
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Coady, United States v. Marrett,51 3 and Rafferty v. Commissioner,5"' until
publication of revised regulations for Section 355.
However, the IRS example promulgated in this ruling does not closely
resemble Coady or the others. Instead of showing a split-up of a single
business, the IRS example demonstrates a spin-off of two controlled integrated
food manufacturing and retailing corporations from a parent furniture
corporation. As a result, this example obfuscates the Commissioner's intention
as to his forthcoming revised Regulations, since the factual situation as
presented has never been a problem under Section 355 or Treasury Regula-
tion 1.355-1 (a).
11.07 Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Controlled
Corporations
Section 482 provides that the IRS may allocate gross income, deductions,
or credits among two or more corporations or other business associations
if such entities are owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interest and reallocation is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes or to clearly
reflect the income of such corporations.
Where one of a group of controlled corporations made interest-free
loans to the other three, the Commissioner, in Cayuga Service, Inc.,
15
employed Section 482 to charge taxpayer with the interest income and to
assess the additional tax which would have resulted if the loan had been made
by two firms bargaining at arm's length. 1' The Tax Court reluctantly agreed
with the Commissioner's assessment even though the interest-free loans had
not produced any income for the other corporations which could be traced
back and allocated to Cayuga. The Tax Court abandoned the tracing test,
which it had supported in Huber Homes, Inc."" and Kerry Investment Co.,"
1 8
as an appeal would be to the Second Circuit,"' which had already adopted
the rule set by the Tenth Circuit in Jack E. Golsen,"' that Section 482 did
not require income production for allocation purposes. The Golsen court
ruled that income tracing was irrelevant to the question of whether income
or deductions had been shifted among controlled corporations to lower their
collective tax bill.
5s 433 F.2d 1064.
514 452 F.2d 767.
515 44 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 75,004 (Jan. 13, 1975).
516 See Kerry Investment Co. v. Comm'r, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974).
5 55 T. C. 598 (1971).
518 58 T. C. 479 (1972).
519 B. Forman Company v. Comm'r, 453 F.2d 1144 (2nd Cir. 1972).
020 Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
940 (1971).
Winter, 1976]
105
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1975
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1976
AKRON LAW REVIEW
Although the Commissioner's position has been attacked as a creation
of non-existent income,"' the Commissioner's allocation here is appropriate
since he puts each corporation in the tax position it would have occupied
had it not been involved in these non-arm's length transactions. Cayuga is
especially appropriate since, in addition to not charging and reporting interest
income on the loan, the corporation took an interest deduction for sums it
was forced to borrow on the basis that the loans to the other controlled
corporations depleted operating capital.
11.08 Accumulated Earnings Tax
Sections 531 through 537 impose the accumulated earnings tax on
corporate profits and earnings which are permitted to accumulate instead of
being distributed as dividends. Section 531 imposes the tax on accumulated
taxable income; Section 535 defines accumulated taxable income as taxable
income reduced by the adjustments provided in Section 535(b). Section
532 (a) imposes the Section 531 tax on any corporation which is, "formed...
for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders...
by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or
distributed."
In the 1974 case of GPD, Inc. v. Commissioner,22 the accumulated
earnings tax was imposed on GPD even though its retained earnings had
actually decreased in the tax year in which it was assessed. Although GPD
had made a substantial profit in 1968, it expended all its current income
and a portion of its retained earnings to redeem stock with which it had made
a charitable contribution in past years. Since stock redemptions are not an
adjustment from taxable income provided for under Section 535(b), the
Commissioner assessed the additional accumulated earnings tax of 271/
percent on the first $100,000 of 1968 accumulated taxable income, and
38 percent of 1968 accumulated taxable income in excess of $100,000.
The taxpayer argued that the Section 532 language, "by permitting
earnings and profits to accumulate," used the present tense and therefore,
a positive accumulation of earnings in the current year was a condition
precedent to triggering the accumulated earnings tax.52 The Sixth Circuit
negated that contention by adopting the reductio ad absurdum argument of
the district court in Ostendorf-Morris Co. v. United States. " In a similar
situation, that court noted that under the taxpayer's view, none of the
accumulated taxable income could be taxed if all of the current earnings
521 See Kerry Investment Co., 58 T. C. 479 (1972); Huber Homes Inc., 55 T. C. 598 (1971).
522 508 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1974).
5231d. at 1080, 1081.
52426 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 70-5369 (N. D. Ohio 1968).
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were distributed; however, if one penny was not distributed, all of the
accumulated taxable income could be taxed. The court was quite succinct in
stating, "Certainly, Congress never intended such an absurd result."
5
"
5 The
district court further reasoned that in determining the reasonableness of
earnings accumulations, Sections 531 through 537 focused on both past and
present corporate needs and accumulations. The GPD decision seems sound;
otherwise, corporate liability for the accumulated earnings tax would be
exclusively controlled by its present earnings retention policy.
Prior to 1974, Section 531 accumulated earnings tax had only once
been assessed against a publicly held corporation."' However, in November
1974, the Ninth Circuit in Golconda Mining Corp. v. Commissioner
527 was
faced with a case where the Commissioner had assessed the accumulated
earnings on a publicly held corporation which had from 1,500 to 2,000
stockholders during the relevant tax period and was traded on three
exchanges. Additionally, the most prominent shareholder group controlled
only 12 percent of the corporation's stock.
Although Sections 531 through 537 do not expressly limit the tax's
application to privately owned corporations, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
Tax Court's decision,"' upholding the Commissioner's assessment against
Golconda. The Tax Court had looked to the language of the accumulated
earnings provisions2 ' and concluded that the sections were applicable to
any corporation irrespective of the nature of its ownership. In reversing, the
Ninth Circuit relied on congressional acknowledgment and apparent approval
of the long-standing practice of limiting the tax to private corporations. The
circuit court also logically reasoned, that when corporate control and owner-
ship were so diversified, it was unreasonable to conclude that the
stockholders could collectively institute and adhere to a plan whereby earnings
and profits were permitted to accumulate for the purpose of avoiding the
income tax. 2 The only other case in which the tax has been assessed
against a publicly held corporation was Trico Products v. Commissioner,5 1 in
which the Second Circuit upheld the Commissioner's action. The Golconda
court distinguished Trico, on the basis that in Trico a small group of stock-
holders owned 62-68 percent of the stock of the corporation." 2 Thus, unlike
525 Id.
526 Trico Products Corp. v. Comrn'r., 137 F.2d 424 (2nd Cir. 1943).
527 507 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1974).
528 58 T. C. 139 (1974).
529 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 123, 532(a).
530 507 F.2d 594, at 597.
531 137 F.2d 424.
532 507 F.2d 594, at 596.
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the Golconda shareholders, those in Trico were better able to dictate corporate
policy so that earnings and profits could be accumulated in a tax avoidance
effort. In Treasury Information Release 1355,133 the Commissioner has
announced that it will not acquiesce to the Golconda decision.
In Ivan Allen Co. v. United States,5"' the Supreme Court held that
when determining what assets are available for the reasonable needs of the
business, and hence what accumulations are unreasonable, the marketable
securities owned by a company will be valued at "net liquidation value"
rather than the traditional cost valuation accorded to such assets. Net
liquidation value here is defined as market value less costs of selling and
taxes. Thus, marketable securities are adjusted upwards for appreciation in
"reasonable accumulation" determinations. The Supreme Court opted for
this less conservative asset valuation because it felt that this measure was a
more accurate indication of the company's position.
The taxpayer in Allen argued that this valuation would have disruptive
effects on corporate finances, since distribution decisions would have to be
made on the basis of inflated and constantly fluctuating security values."'5
In dissent, Justices Powell, Douglas and Stewart agreed with the taxpayer's
contention that the company might find itself in a perilous financial position
when making distributions on the basis of the volatile securities market.
Additionally, the dissenters pointed out that the Court's net liquidation valua-
tion of "readily-marketable securities" created the problem of determining
what was readily marketable.3 '
Because the court imposes this net liquidation valuation only as to
readily-marketable securities, it may be possible to circumvent this decision
by investing in non-liquid assets.
11.09 Corporate Redemptions--Family Attribution
Section 302 allows stockholders to treat corporate distributions
received for redemption of their stock as sums received in exchange for
the stock which receive capital gains treatment rather than as dividends taxed
at ordinary income rates. Instances in which this preferred treatment is
permitted include: (1) redemptions which are not essentially equivalent to
a dividend;"" and, (2) redemptions which completely terminate a share-
holder's interest for ten years. 38 In determining whether the redemption is
538 T. I. R. 1355, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 55,150.
534 95 S. Ct. 2501 (1975).
535Id. at 2510.
5 861d. at 2511.
537 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b)(1).
5 8 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b)(3), (c)(2).
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not essentially equivalent to a dividend the Supreme Court in United States v.
Davis39 established that "redemption must result in a meaningful reduction
of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation." '
In ascertaining what a shareholder's proportionate interest is, Section
302(c) (1) invokes the constructive ownership rules of Section 318, with
the family attribution rules of Section 318 (a) (1) being triggered most often.
In Robin Haft Trust v. Commissioner,"1 the Commissioner and the Tax
Court mechanically applied the family attribution rules to characterize a
redemption as substantially equivalent to a dividend. In that case, Marcia
Foster and Burt Haft were married in 1956. Marcia's father bought 100,000
shares in Burt's corporation and made gifts of the stock to his grandchildren
in the amount of 25,000 shares given to each of four trusts he established
for them. Subsequently Marcia and Burt were divorced and Marcia moved
to New York with the children while Burt remained in Florida. Burt's
corporation redeemed the children's shares and characterized the distribution
as a Section 302(b) (1) redemption which should be accorded capital gains
treatment. The Commissioner and the Tax Court disagreed, reasoning that
since Burt was still the owner of 133,000 shares, the children should be
attributed with the shares of their father. Consequently, the proportionate
ownership interest of each child after the redemption was greater than their
interest prior to redemption. As the redemption did not result in "a meaningful
reduction in the shareholder's proportionate interest" as required by United
States v. Davis,5"2 the taxpayers were precluded from availing themselves
of Section 302(b) (1).
However, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit questioned this
mechanical application of the family attribution rules, as asserted by the
Commissioner, where the family was no longer the cohesive easily controlled
unit upon which the family attribution rules were predicated. Noting Davis'
focus on "a change in the relative economic interests or rights of the
stockholders," ' 3 the Haft court declared:
This language certainly seems to permit, if it does not mandate, an
examination of the facts and circumstances to determine the effect of
the transaction transcending a mere mechanical application of the
attribution rules. " '
B89 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
40 Id. at 313.
841 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975).
"2 Id. at 47, citing United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
54 397 U.S. 301, at 313.
54" 510 F.2d 43, at 48.
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The court therefore remanded the case to the Tax Court for a determination
as to whether this family disunity rendered application of the family
attribution rules inappropriate.
In Haft, it should be noted that the children could have received
capital gains treatment under the complete termination provisions of Section
302(b) (3), but were barred because they failed to file a Section 302(c) (2)
agreement with the Commissioner.
The IRS has promulgated Revenue Ruling 75-2,1 5 creating a dilemma
for stockholders reacquiring an interest in the corporation after receiving
capital gains treatment under Section 302(b)(3). The ruling states that
Section 302(c) (2) precludes application of the family attribution rules
if the stockholder does not reacquire stock for ten years except by bequest
or inheritance, and does not become an officer, director or employee for
the same period.
Revenue Ruling 72-380546 established that a stockholder who was
allowed capital gains treatment under Section 302(b) (3) would not be
subject to reassessment even if he is bequeathed controlling ownership of the
corporation under his father's will and becomes executor of his father's
estate which owns 100 percent of the corporation. Although Section
302(c) (2) does not specifically exclude executors as it does with legatees
of the stock, the Revenue Ruling reasons that the executor's interest is so
insignificant when compared to the legatee's interest as an owner that the
executor should not be penalized for the acquisition of his tangential interest.
However, Revenue Ruling 75-2,1"r states that if this same Section
302(b) (3) ex-stockholder also becomes an employee, director or officer
of the corporation, he would be subject to reassessment, as such positions
are specifically proscribed by Section 302(c)(2)(A)(i). This presents
an irritating problem for a legatee-stockholder since he is precluded from
operating his corporation for whatever remains of the 10 year period even
if he owns 100 percent of the corporation. It is submitted that this is an
unrealistic and unreasonable position since a 100 percent shareholder should
be permitted to directly manage his firm since his sole owner's status enables
him to attain the same result indirectly. Just as another's death frees the
taxpayer from penalty in reacquisition of stock ownership, no penalty should
accrue when death of the testator results in the legatee's management of
the firm.
545 Rev. Rul. 75-2, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 1, at 11.
546 Rev. Rul. 72-380, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 201.
547 Rev. Rul. 75-2, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 1, at 11.
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11.10 Corporate Redemptions-Deceased Employee's Stock
In two previous cases on point, the Ninth Circuit' 4' and the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 49 found that corporate death
redemptions of employee stock in excess of the agreed redemption rate
were excludable gifts as the corporation had no legal obligation to make
such excess payments. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Jensen v. United
States,"' disagreed, declaring that the excess payments were the product
of the employer's interest in making its employee stock option plan more
attractive rather than emanating from a detached and disinterested generosity,
and for that reason the payments were not excludable as gifts.
In Jensen, the taxpayer retired after twenty-five years with Graybar
Electric. Upon her death, the company exercised its right to redeem her
stock at par and, under its special death benefits plan, to pay her a sum
equivalent to dividends which would have been paid on her stock over
the next five years. Due to the long history of the death benefit plan being
automatically paid upon redemption, the court held it had become almost
adjunctive to the employee stock option plan.
In determining the issue of whether there was a gift, the Jensen court
noted this long history of payment and stated that the excess payments
were clearly a sweetener to the stock plan. As such, the benefits were intended
to benefit the corporation in assuring a ready source of capital by making
the plan more attractive. The court relied on the gift test set down in the
landmark case of Commissioner v. Duberstein,'51 which found that there was
no gift where "the payment proceeds . . . from the incentive of anticipated
benefit ... ."I" Duberstein established that the critical factor in the determina-
tion of a gift vel non was the transferor's motive. Jensen again borrowed from
Duberstein in stating that the company's payment did not meet the
requirement that a "gift . . . proceeds from detached and disinterested
generosity."55 According to the Fifth Circuit, the district court below had
placed undue reliance on the fact that Graybar had no legal obligation to
make such special death benefit payments.
11.11 Multiple Stock Redemptions to Pay Death Tax
Section 303 provides that a corporate distribution in redemption of all
or part of its stock which is included in the gross estate of the decedent shall
548 Harper v. United States, 454 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1971).
549 Pearson v. United States, 33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 74-1176 (E. D. Va. 1974).
550 511 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1975).
551 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
552 Id. at 285.
553 Id. at 286.
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be treated as a distribution in payment for such stock if the conditions of
Section 303 (b) are met. To receive capital gains treatment under this section,
35 percent of the gross estate or 50 percent of the taxable estate must consist
of stock of the redeeming corporation." ' When an estate includes the stock
of two or more corporations, such corporations are considered as a single
entity for the purposes of Section 303(b) (2) (a) if more than 75 percent of
the outstanding stock of each corporation is included in the estate. Addition-
ally, the total amount that can be given capital gains treatment under Section
303 cannot exceed the sum of estate, inheritance, legacy, and succession
taxes plus funeral and administration expenses.
In a situation where more than one Section 303 corporation redeemed
its stock from the decedent's estate and the aggregate redemption amount
exceeded the total of inheritance and estate taxes plus funeral and administra-
tion expenses,5 neither the Code nor the Regulations offered any clue as
to which redemptions were to be accorded Section 303 capital gains
treatment. To clarify this uncertainty, the Treasury promulgated an amend-
ment" 6 to Regulation 1.303(2)(g). Regulation 1.303(2)(g)(1) directs
that where more than one qualified" ' corporation redeems its stock from
the decedent's estate and the aggregate redemption exceeds the amount
determined by Section 303(a), the amounts received are to be applied
against the amount qualifying for preferred treatment in the order in which
such amounts were received.
11.12 Valuation of Transferred Securities
In Bankers Trust Co. v. United States,558 the Commissioner and Court of
Claims agreed as to the date of valuation and method of valuation to be
applied when calculating a corporation's income or receipt of stock. In 1939,
Mesabi Iron Company entered into an agreement with Reserve Mining Co.,
whereby Reserve Mining would work land owned and controlled by Mesabi
and pay Mesabi one third of the net profits for the iron mining orperation.
In addition, Reserve Mining promised to procure the highest current price
known for material of like value in use and for like quantities in making sales
and determining profits. The parties set up a board of arbitration to settle
disputes.
During the 1950s Reserve Mining failed to share profits with Mesabi
in accordance with their agreement. These disputes were followed by years
5 4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954. § 303(b)(2) (A).
55' TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 303(a).
55 6Treas. Reg. 1.303(2)(g).
537 Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 303(b)(2).
858 36 AM. FED. TAx R. 2d 75-5313 (Ct. Cl. July 11, 1975).
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of negotiation and litigation. On February 18, 1960 negotiators reached an
agreement under which Mesabi would receive $400,000 and all of Reserve
Mining's stock in Mesabi, totaling 163,570 shares worth $5,908,966.25 as
of February 18, 1960. Reserve Mining requested that the agreement not
become effective until approved by a majority of outstanding Mesabi
shares not including Reserve's shares. Mesabi stockholders approved
the agreement on April 22, 1960 at which time the transferred stock was
worth $12,799,352.50. In filing its 1970 income tax return Mesabi used
the February 18, 1960 valuation date to determine its income less a $4.25
per share "blockage" discount. The Commissioner disallowed the "blockage"
discount and determined that the proper value of the stock was its value
as of April 22, 1960.
The petitioner argued that Herbert J. Investment Corp. v. United
States,559 which placed the date of valuation of transferred assets at the time
of the final settlement, should control. However, the court distinguished
Herbert J. Investment Corp. v. United States on the rationale that the parties
in Herbert reached a binding agreement without waiting for ICC approval,
and that such approval was merely a condition subsequent to the agreement.
On the other hand, in Bankers no effort was made to close the agreement
until the Mesabi stockholders approved the agreement. The stockholder's
approval was treated as a significant condition precedent in effecting a final
agreement, rather than a condition subsequent to the agreement as was ICC
approval in Herbert J. Investment Corp. From the evidence presented,
the court concluded Mesabi and Reserve never contemplated that closing
of the agreement would or could occur prior to stockholder approval.
To avoid the pitfalls of the Bankers case in determining the date of
valuation, a taxpayer should pattern the closing of a negotiated agreement
in settlement of claims in accordance with Herbert J. Investment Corp. v.
United States. The negotiated agreement should clearly indicate the value
of all items given and received and the valuation date contemplated by the
parties, to facilitate evaluation of the items exchanged.
12.00 Subchapter S Corporations
12.01 Creation of Voting Trust
In Lafayette Distributors, Inc. v. United States,56° the Commissioner
had terminated taxpayer's subchapter S election because three stockholders
with a combined 50 percent ownership interest in the company had formed
a voting trust. The Commissioner contended that because the individuals
559 360 F. Supp. 825 (E. D. Wis. 1973), affd, 500 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1974).
560 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 75-5479 (W.D. La. 1975).
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surrendered their shares and had them reissued in the name of the trustee of
the voting trust, the trust, as technical owner of the shares, was not an
individual as required by Section 1371 (a) (2). In making this assertion, the
Commissioner relied on Treasury Regulation 1.1371-1(e) which states:
"A corporation in which any shareholder is a ... trust ... does not qualify
as a small business corporation."
The Lafayette court ruled that the regulation was clearly inconsistent
with the statute and unreasonable in its application and held that the creation
of a voting trust did not terminate taxpayer's Subchapter S election. The
court characterized its decision as one based upon substance rather than
form, reasoning that the individuals were still the beneficial owners and that
they would pay the tax on the corporation's income. The court quoted the
following language in Treasury Regulation 1.1371-1(d)(1) in supporting
its decision: "Ordinarily, the persons, who would have to include in gross
income, dividends distributed with respect to the stock of the corporation,
are considered to be the shareholders of the corporation."
Rather than classifying Treasury Regulation 1.1371-1(e) as an
exception to the above statement, the court held that voting trusts do not
constitute an exception to the general rule that one who is the beneficial
owner is also the stockholder for purposes of Section 1371 (a) (2).
Although it may seem that the Commissioner could have asserted a
Section 1371(a) (4), "more than one class of stock," violation due to the
creation of a voting trust, it appears that this issue has already been resolved
in favor of the taxpayer.5 61
12.02 Retroactive Accounting Changes
Barring fraud or error, a taxpayer can generally assume that once he
has been assessed and paid the tax on income resulting from business
operations, his tax liability for that period is settled. However, in Ronnie L.
Barber,562 the Tax Court permitted the IRS a 1972 retroactive accounting
change, which resulted in increased income and tax on the taxpayer's 1971
return.
Barber had been a minority shareholder in a Subchapter S corporation
whose fiscal year ended on April 30, 1971. On the basis of its completed
contract accounting method, the corporation passed through an $11,000
loss to Barber who deducted the same on his 1971 return. In June, 1972,
the IRS allowed the corporation to file an amended return for the fiscal
561 See A & M Furniture & Appliance Co. v. United States, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 1487
(S. D. Ohio 1967).
562 64 T. C. No. 27 (May 29, 1975).
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year ending April 30, 1971, in which it allowed the company to change to
the percentage of completion accounting method. The result was a net
profit for the corporation and a $5,000 pass through to Barber.
The taxpayer contended that he should not be reassessed, since the
IRS is given no authority to accept retroactive accounting changes. The
Commissioner countered that although there seemed to be no specific grant
of authority in this area, his actions were sanctioned by the broad grant of
discretion given him to make any adjustments required to clearly reflect
a taxpayer's income. The Barber court agreed, analogizing the Commissioner's
action to his Section 446(b) power to direct present or future accounting
methods which clearly reflect income.563 The Tax Court also found support
for the IRS position in the fact that there was no specific prohibition of this
type of action.5"'
This decision presents a problem for a withdrawing Subchapter S
shareholder who wishes to protect himself. Perhaps future shareholders can
reach agreements with the corporation for retroactive adjustments of the
selling price of shares or procure a warranty against retroactive accounting
changes.
12.03 Passive Investment Income
Section 1372(e)(5)(A) provides that the election of a Subchapter S
Corporation made under Section 1372(a) shall be terminated if passive
investment income constitutes more than 20 percent of such corporation's
gross receipts. Section 1372(e)(5)(C) defines passive income as including
gross receipts derived from interest.
In Marshall v. Commissioner,565 over 20 percent of the taxpayer's gross
receipts were made up of income derived from financing operations. Applying
Section 1372(e) (5) with its inclusion of interest as passive income in Section
1372 (e) (5) (A), the Commissioner terminated the taxpayer's Subchapter S
status. Marshall contested this action, arguing that since the interest income
was earned as a result of the active operations of its small loan department,
such interest income was beyond the scope of Section 1372(e) (5) passive
income limitations. Following the lead of the Tax Court.. and the Eighth
Circuit,567 the Tenth Circuit agreed with the Commissioner, pointing out that
Section 1372(e) (5) (C) specifically enumerates interest as passive income
563 Id. at 156.
564 Id. at 156-57.
565510 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1975).
566 60 T. C. 242 (1973).
567 Zychinski v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1974).
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for purposes of the 20 percent termination rule. The court also declared that
the statute made no mention of actively earned Section 1372(e)(5)(C)
income.
Further support for the Marshall court's holding is found in an analysis
of other Code provisions relating to earned income. When differentiating
earned income from passive income for the purposes of the Section 1348
maximum tax rate, Section 1348 (b) (1) defines earned income as any income
which is earned within the meaning of Section 911(b). In turn, Section
911 (b) defines earned income as "wages, salaries, or professional fees, and
other amounts received as compensation for personal services actually
rendered. .. ."
Thus, interest income must be distinguished from the above sources
since it results from use of capital rather than use of one's labor.
12.04 Shareholder's Basis for Loss Pass Through Purposes
Section 1374 provides that a Subchapter S Corporation shareholder
may deduct corporate operating losses from his personal income to the extent
that such losses do not exceed his adjusted basis in the corporation's stock
plus his adjusted basis in any indebtedness running from the corporation to
him.568
In Revenue Ruling 70-50,569 the IRS declared that, in addition to actual
indebtedness running directly from the shareholder to the corporation, a
shareholder's basis, for loss pass through purposes, also included the amount
of any corporate indebtedness to a third party which the shareholder had
guaranteed and subsequently paid. Increasing the shareholder's basis in the
Subchapter S corporation by the amount the shareholder was forced to pay
under his guarantee is quite appropriate because subrogation concepts then
permit the shareholder to take the third party's place as a creditor of the
corporation.
In Revenue Ruling 75-144,7o the Commissioner dealt with a situation
in which the shareholder-guarantor substituted a personal note, as opposed
to cash, for a corporate note to cover corporate default. Again, applying a
subrogation rationale, the Commissioner held that the shareholder had
increased his basis even if he was not actually obligated to begin paying off
his note until one year later. Although the shareholder had not yet expended
any funds, the Commissioner reasoned that by substituting his own note for
568 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1376, establishes the method for determining the adjusted
basis in stock or indebtedness.
589 Rev. Rul. 70-50, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 178.
570 Rev. Rul. 75-144, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 16, at 19.
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that of the corporation, he had performed his guarantor's contract and was
subrogated to the position of the corporation's original creditor.
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